Narrative as rhetoric: technique, audiences, ethics, ideology by Phelan, James, 1951-

Narrative as Rhetoric

Technique, Audiences, Ethics, Ideology 
James Phelan 
In Narrative as Rhetoric, James Phelan explores the 
consequences for narrative theory of two signifi­
cant principles: (1) narrative is rhetoric because 
narrative occurs when someone tells a particular 
story for a particular audience in a particular situ­
ation for some particular purpose (s); (2) the read­
ing of narrative is a multidimensional activity, 
simultaneously engaging our intellects, emotions, 
ideologies, and ethics. 
Narrative as Rhetoric consists often essays, each 
of which explores these principles in connection 
with interpretative problems posed by one of the 
following narratives: William Makepeace Thack­
eray's Vanity Fair, Virginia Woolf's The Waves, 
Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms and "My 
Old Man," F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby, 
Joseph Conrad's The Secret Sharer, Lorrie Moore's 
"How," Dinesh D'Souza's/ZZifcera/ Education, and 
Toni Morrison's Beloved. 
The rhetorical theory of narrative that emerges 
from these investigations emphasizes the recur­
sive relationships between authorial agency, text­
ual phenomena, and reader response, even as it 
remains open to insights from a range of critical 
approaches—including feminism, psychoanalysis, 
Bakhtinian linguistics, and cultural studies. The 
rhetorical criticism Phelan advocates and employs 
seeks, above all, to attend carefully to the multiple 
demands of reading sophisticated narrative; for 
that reason, his rhetorical theory moves less to­
ward predictions about the relationships between 
techniques, ethics, and ideologies and more to­
ward developing some principles and concepts 
that allow us to recognize the complex diversity 
of narrative art. 
Written with clarity and flair and experiment­
ing at times with the conventions of critical writ­
ing, this collection, which includes some of 
Phelan's best work, is itself audience oriented. 
The book includes an appendix that is in part an 
experiment with voice, and it ends with a helpful 
glossary of the technical vocabulary of narrative 
theory. 
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Preface

This book did me the great favor of sneaking up on me. I wrote it 
while procrastinating on a different, seemingly more daunting project. 
I'd get to that large body of work, I told myself many times over the 
last few years, right after scratching this itch, massaging that cramp, 
scrubbing away this dirt. After a while, I realized that I'd done so 
much scratching and scrubbing that I'd managed to create something 
with a discernible identity of its own. Whether the coherence and 
magnitude of this creature is sufficient—or sufficiently attractive—for 
anyone to want to spend much time in its company remains to be 
seen. But it is worth noticing here that the coherence derives from my 
consistent attempt to think through what it means to say that narrative 
is rhetoric, even as I've worked on the range of issues that give the 
book its first claim to magnitude: voice, progression, mimesis, the eth­
ics of reading, kinds of textual recalcitrance, the paradoxes of first-per­
son (or homodiegetic) narration, the role of ideology in telling and 
interpreting nonfictional narratives. At the same time, the thinking 
through occurs very much in connection with the practical work of 
interpreting particular narratives, and the range of these texts consti­
tutes the other claim to magnitude: short stories by Joseph Conrad, 
Katherine Anne Porter, Ernest Hemingway, and Lome Moore; nov­
els by William Makepeace Thackeray, Virginia Woolf, Hemingway, 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, Toni Morrison; nonfictional accounts of contem­
porary campus life by Dinesh D'Souza. 
The progression of chapters here does show some shifts in my 
thinking about narrative as rhetoric: in particular, I start with but 
gradually move away from a model in which rhetoric consists of an 
author, through the narrative text, extending a multidimensional (aes­
thetic, emotive, ideational, ethical, political) invitation to a reader 
who, in turn, seeks to do justice to the complexity of the invitation 
and then responds. In the model I move to, the multidimensional 
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quality of reading is retained, but the lines between author, reader, and 
text become blurred. In the revised model, rhetoric is the synergy oc­
curring between authorial agency, textual phenomena, and reader re­
sponse. Despite this shift, I don't regard the book as implicitly con­
structing a metanarrative, a Bildungsroman in which the initially 
flawed but sympathetic critic moves, with each succeeding chapter, 
nearer and nearer to the Great Enlightenment. If, as I maintain, au­
thor, text, and reader are in an endlessly recursive relationship, then 
any one essay will necessarily emphasize some features of that relation­
ship more than others—and it will have been written at some particu­
lar moment in my ongoing relationship to the narrative. Conse­
quently, the particular work of any essay here should remain both 
potentially useful and presumptively less than definitive regardless of 
when in the last few years I composed it. To help indicate some of the 
connections between the essays, I have written headnotes to each. To 
help the reader with the terminology of narrative theory I employ in 
the book, I have included a glossary of terms after the appendix. 
While the book was sneaking up on me, I was getting help from many 
people. I owe thanks to Debra Moddelmog for introducing me to 
"Magic"; to Paul Smith, Scott Donaldson, and Mike Reynolds for en­
couraging me to think some more about Hemingway, and to Jackson 
Breyer and Jerry Kennedy for an inducement to do something with 
Fitzgerald; to Elizabeth Langland and Laura Claridge for the invitation 
to write about Thackeray and to Susan Griffin and Sandy Morey 
Norton for complicating my first conclusions; to Dan Schwarz for 
asking me to write about Conrad; to Monika Fludemik for prodding 
me to think about second-person narration; to Dinesh D'Souza for 
agreeing to participate in a dialogue about Illiberal Education. I am also 
indebted to a large group of students and colleagues who have over 
the years patiently listened to me go on about these texts and these is­
sues (in one seminar, my worrying over "My Old Man," I later dis­
covered, almost transformed the twelve vigorous participants into 
"My Prematurely Aged Grad Students"). I have named some of these 
people in notes to specific chapters, but here I want to acknowledge 
my deep and enduring appreciation for the help of four research assis­
tants, Elizabeth Patnoe, Jane Greer, Susan Swinford, and Elizabeth 
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Preston. These people have each provided crucial material support 
and invaluable criticism and advice; without them, this book would 
be a lesser thing. To Peter J. Rabinowitz, I owe a special thanks: he 
read it all—much of it more than once—with a wonderful combina­
tion of generosity and rigor, and then took the time to walk me 
through his responses. In short, he exemplified what it means to enter 
into an authorial audience without losing oneself in the process. Fi­
nally, I am thankful for the rhetorical community in which I find most 
favor, that provided by my wife, Betty Menaghan, and our two chil­
dren, Katie and Mike; this one is for all of you. 
Different versions of the following chapters have appeared, in whole 
or in part, in the following publications. I thank all of them for permis­
sion to reprint. 
Chapter 1 as "Character and Judgment in Narrative and in Lyric: 
Toward an Understanding of Audience Engagement in The Waves." 
In Style 24 (1990): 408-21. 
Chapter 2 as " Vanity Fair: Listening as a Rhetorician—and a Femi­
nist. In Out of Bounds: Male Writers and Gender(ed) Criticism, edited by 
Laura Claridge and Elizabeth Langland, 132-47. Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1990. 
Chapter 3 as "Distance, Voice, and Temporal Perspective in 
Frederic Henry's Narration: Powers, Problems, Paradox." In New Es­
says on "A Farewell to Arms," edited by Scott Donaldson, 53—73. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Also as "The Concept of 
Voice, the Voices of Frederic Henry, and the Structure of A Farewell 
to Arms. In Hemingway: Essays ofReassessment, edited by Frank Scafella, 
214-32. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Chapter 4 as "What Hemingway and a Rhetorical Theory of Nar­
rative Can Do for Each Other: The Example of 'My Old Man.'" In 
the Hemingway Review 12, no. 2 (1993): 1-14. 
Chapter 6 as "Sharing Secrets." In The Secret Sharer: A Casebook in 
Contemporary Criticism, edited by Daniel R. Schwarz. Boston: Bedford 
Books, 1996. 
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I—and You?—Read 'How.'" In Style 28 (1994): 350-65. 
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Introduction

Narrative as Rhetoric:

Reading the Spells of

Porters "Magic"

Reading a Narrative of Rhetoric 
What does it mean to treat narrative as rhetoric? Although this ques­
tion, a natural way to begin a book entitled Narrative as Rhetoric, 
tempts me to deliver a long, theoretical disquisition on authors, read­
ers, narrative techniques, structures, conventions, and the concept of 
rhetoric, I will spare you that and opt for illustration by offering a rhe­
torical reading of a particular narrative. The narrative I choose is a nar­
rative of rhetoric, that is, a narrative whose central event is the telling 
of a story, Katherine Anne Porter's "Magic." 
Magic 
And, Madame Blanchard, believe that I am happy to be here with 
you and your family because it is so serene, everything, and before 
this I worked for a long time in a fancy house—maybe you don't 
know what is a fancy house? Naturally .. . everyone must have 
heard sometime or other. Well, Madame, I work always where 
there is work to be had, and so in this place I worked very hard all 
hours, and saw too many things, things you wouldn't believe, and I 
wouldn't think of telling you, only maybe it will rest you while I 
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brush your hair. You'll excuse me too but I could not help hearing 
you say to the laundress maybe someone had bewitched your linens, 
they fall away so fast in the wash. Well, there was a girl there in that 
house, poor thing, thin, but well-liked by all the men who called, 
and you understand she could not get along with the woman who 
ran the house. They quarreled, the madam cheated her on her 
checks: you know, the girl got a check, a brass one, every time, and 
at the week's end she gave those back to the madam, yes, that was 
the way, and got her percentage, a very small litde of her earnings: it 
is a business, you see, like any other—and the madam used to pre­
tend the girl had given back only so many checks, you see, and really 
she had given many more, but after they were out of her hands, 
what could she do? So she would say, I will get out of this place, and 
curse and cry. Then the madam would hit her over the head. She 
always hit people over the head with botdes, it was the way she 
fought. My good heavens, Madame Blanchard, what confusion 
there would be sometimes with a girl running raving downstairs, 
and the madam pulling her back by the hair and smashing a bottle 
on her forehead. 
It was nearly always about the money, the girls got in debt so, and 
if they wished to go they could not without paying every sou 
marque. The madam had full understanding with the police; the 
girls must come back with them or go to the jails. Well, they always 
came back with the policemen or with another kind of man friend 
of the madam: she could make men work for her too, but she paid 
them very well for all, let me tell you: and so the girls stayed on 
unless they were sick; if so, if they got too sick she sent them away 
again. 
Madame Blanchard said, "You are pulling a little here," and 
eased a strand of hair: 'and then what?" 
Pardon—but this girl, there was a true hatred between her and 
the madam. She would say many times, I make more money than 
anybody else in the house, and every week were scenes. So at last she 
said one morning, Now I will leave this place, and she took out forty 
dollars from under her pillow and said, Here's your money! The 
madam began to shout, Where did you get all that, you ? and 
accused her of robbing the men who came to visit her. The girl said, 
Keep your hands offor I'll brain you: and at that the madam took 
hold of her shoulders, and began to lift her knee and kick this girl 
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most terribly in the stomach, and even in her most secret place, 
Madame Blanchard, and then she beat her in the face with a bottle, 
and the girl fell back again into her room where I was making clean. 
1 helped her to the bed, and she sat there holding her sides with her 
head hanging down, and when she got up again there was blood 
everywhere she had sat. So then the madam came in once more and 
screamed, Now you can get out, you are no good for me any more: 
I don't repeat all, you understand it is too much. But she took all the 
money she could find, and at the door she gave the girl a great push 
in the back with her knee, so that she fell again in the street, and 
then got up and went away with the dress barely on her. 
After this the men who knew this girl kept saying, Where is 
Ninette? And they kept asking this in the next days, so that the 
madam could not say any longer, I put her out because she is a thief. 
No, she began to see she was wrong to send this Ninette away, and 
then she said, She will be back in a few days, don't trouble yourself. 
And now, Madame Blanchard, if you wish to hear, I come to the 
strange part, the thing recalled to me when you said your linens 
were bewitched. For the cook in that place was a woman, colored 
like myself, like myself with much French blood just the same, like 
myself living always among people who worked spells. But she had a 
very hard heart, she helped the madam in everything, she liked to 
watch all that happened, and she gave away tales on the girls. The 
madam trusted her above everything, and she said, Well, where can 
1find that slut? because she had gone altogether out of Basin Street 
before the madam began to ask the police to bring her again. Well, 
the cook said, I know a charm that works here in New Orleans, 
colored women do it to bring back their men: in seven days they 
come again very happy to stay and they cannot say why: even your 
enemy will come back to you believing you are his friend. It is a 
New Orleans charm for sure, for certain, they say it does not work 
even across the river. . .. And then they did it just as the cook said. 
They took the chamber pot of this girl from under her bed, and in it 
they mixed with water and milk all the relics of her they found 
there: the hair from her brush, and the face powder from the puff, 
and even little bits of her nails they found about the edges of the 
carpet where she sat by habit to cut her finger- and toenails; and they 
dipped the sheets with her blood into the water, and all the time the 
cook said something over it in a low voice; I could not hear all, but 
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at last she said to the madam, Now spit in it: and the madam spat, 
and the cook said, When she comes back she will be dirt under 
your feet. 
Madame Blanchard closed her perfume bottle with a thin click: 
"Yes, and then?" 
Then in seven nights the girl came back and she looked very sick, 
the same clothes and all, but happy to be there. One of the men said, 
Welcome home, Ninette! and when she started to speak to the 
madam, the madam said, Shut up and get upstairs and dress yourself. 
So Ninette, this girl, she said, I'll be down injust a minute. And after 
that she lived there quietly. 
In saying that "Magic" is a narrative of rhetoric, I want to call atten­
tion, first, to the rhetorical dimensions of the maid's action: she is tell­
ing a particular story to a particular audience in a particular situation for, 
presumably, a particular purpose. I want to call attention, second, to the 
parallel between the maid's action and Porter's: the particular story 
that Porter is telling is the maid's telling of Ninette's story. In analyz­
ing these parallel acts of telling, I want to focus on teller, technique, 
story, situation, audience, and purpose: all the elements that help de­
termine the shape and effect of the story. 
By approaching both the maid's telling and Porter's telling as paral­
lel rhetorical acts, we can recognize a crucial element of its construc­
tion that may not initially jump out during a first reading: "Magic'' is a 
narrative with three interrelated levels. These are (1) the inner level, 
narrated by the maid: the story of Ninette, the madam, and the cook; I 
shall refer to this level as Ninette's story; (2) the middle level, narrated 
by the heterodiegetic narrator, who appears only twice: the report of 
the maid's telling Ninette's story to Madame Blanchard; I shall refer to 
this level as the maid's story; and (3) the outer level, constructed and 
designed by Porter as implied author: the largely covert communica­
tion from Porter to her audiences, implied and real, of the narrator 
telling the maid's story of Ninette's story; I shall refer to this level as 
Porter's story. 
In looking first at the technique of "Magic," notice that, rather 
than calling attention to the three different levels, Porter's presenta­
tion blurs the borders between them, especially the border between 
Ninette's story and the maid's story. Porter starts in the midst of things 
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and does not even use quotation marks for the maid's story (And Ma­
dame Blanchard, I am happy to be here [emphasis mine]); further­
more, she has the heterodiegetic narrator speak only after Ninette's 
story is well under way and, as noted above, only twice in the whole 
story—and each time very briefly. As a result, Porter elides the differ­
ence between Ninette's story and the maid's story—or perhaps, bet­
ter, she foregrounds Ninette's story and backgrounds the maid's. 
Given this technique, it is not surprising that, as Helen Leath has 
noted, many critics focus on Ninette to the exclusion of the maid. 
Surely, one effect of the technique is to engage us strongly in the hor­
rors of Ninette's story. 
Indeed, as we attend to those horrors, we also recognize the major 
disparity between the maid's version of Ninette's story and Porter's: in 
Porter's version Ninette is not defeated by the cook's magic spell but 
rather by the social forces lined up against her. Ninette returns to the 
fancy house looking sick and wearing the same clothes because she has 
had no money to live on and has not been able to find another way to 
support herself. Ninette's story in Porter's version is not about magic 
but rather about failed rebellion and victory for the oppressive madam 
and her support system of police and well-offmen. 
This first act of seeing beneath the surface of Ninette's story quickly 
moves us into the next, richer area of the rhetorical exchange, that in­
volving the ways that Ninette's story, the maid's story, and Porter's 
story intersect. As soon as we infer that Porter does not expect us to 
believe in magic, we are inclined to ask whether the maid does—and 
whether the maid expects Madame Blanchard to. The answers are not 
immediately obvious, but merely posing these questions highlights the 
fact that the maid seizes upon the pretext of Madame Blanchard's re­
mark about her laundry being bewitched to tell Ninette's story. This 
recognition in turn prompts the questions that form the interpretive 
crux of "Magic": what are the maid's motivations for telling Ninette's 
story, what does she hope to achieve by telling it, and does she achieve 
any of her goals? In short, what rhetorical purposes does the maid want 
her narration to serve, and does it achieve those purposes? 
Porter's technique of eliding the first two levels of the narrative 
suggests that the answer can be found in parallels and contrasts be­
tween them. Porter provides many. First, there are the two madams. 
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Though they move in different social spheres, both are powerful 
women—they have money, authority, employees. At the same time, 
their power itself depends on a larger patriarchal structure: the madam 
provides a service to the men of New Orleans, and when they com­
plain about Ninette's absence, the madam responds; Madame Blan­
chard's wealth and comfort depend, to some extent at least, on her 
marriage to M. Blanchard. Second, there are the maid and Ninette: 
they are both subservient employees of a madam. Third, and most 
strongly, there are the maid and the cook: both have "mixed racial 
blood"; both have lived always among people who work spells; both 
like to watch all that happens; both apparently like to tell tales. 
All these parallels help us answer the questions about the maid's 
rhetorical purposes, though we have a multitude of possibilities rather 
than any single answer. The maid may be giving Madame Blanchard a 
warning: If you do not treat me well, I will, like Ninette, oppose 
you—and because I am like the cook, I will be more successful in my 
opposition than she. The maid may be trying to ingratiate herself, say­
ing in effect, "Like the cook, I am willing to help my Madame in all 
things." Or the maid may be signifying on Madame Blanchard's re­
mark that the sheets are bewitched in order to scare Madame 
Blanchard: Like the cook, I can do powerful magic; if you think those 
sheets are bewitched, you ain't seen nothin* yet. 
Because the end of the maid's story coincides with the end of 
Ninette's, we cannot know which is her primary purpose and we do 
not know whether she has achieved it. But the two appearances of the 
heterodiegetic narrator and the two interjections by Madame 
Blanchard do direct our attention in specific ways. The power struggle 
between employer and employee that defines Ninette's story seems to 
be very much the subtext of the maid's story. It is when the maid is 
telling about the madam's general ill-treatment of her employees that 
the maid pulls Madame Blanchard's hair: a quiet assertion of the 
maid's power even as she is serving her mistress. Madame Blanchard 
reasserts control by gently stopping the hair pulling, but she also re­
veals that she has been caught by the power of the maid's storytelling: 
she asks the rapt audience's perpetual question, "And then what?" In 
the second appearance, just after the maid recounts the cook's spell, 
the heterodiegetic narrator calls attention to Madame Blanchard's 
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closing her perfume bottle "with a thin click." Since Ninette's madam 
asserted her power over her employees by beating them with bottles, 
Madame Blanchard's clicking her own perfume bottle shut at this mo­
ment suggests that she feels some need to remind herself—and the 
maid—of her power. But, like the first interruption of the maid's tell­
ing, this one also ends with Madame Blanchard asking the engaged 
audience's question: "Yes, and then?"' 
More generally, the more we look at the interaction of Ninette's 
story, the maid's story, and Porter's story, the more it seems that Por­
ter wants us to view the maid's telling of Ninette's story as the prime 
example of the maid's magic. Like the cook, the maid casts a spell. By 
calling her story "Magic," Porter makes the same claim for herself: just 
as the maid seeks to catch Madame Blanchard in the spell of Ninette's 
story, so too does Porter want to catch us up in her telling of the 
maid's story. 
In this way, the rhetorical exchanges in which we participate as we 
read and interpret Ninette's story, the maid's story, and Porter's story 
eventually lead us to reflect on the power of narrative. We do not 
know exactly what the effect of the maid's telling on Madame 
Blanchard will be, but the clues about the subtext of power relations 
and the evidence of Madame Blanchard's being caught by the maid's 
spell strongly suggest that it will have some effect. And the effect of 
this conclusion on us is to reinforce our sense of the magic of narrative 
and to take pleasure in our consenting to Porter's spell. In this respect, 
the open-endedness of the story is all to the good. The more interpre­
tations we find of the maid, her motive, her story, and its likely effect, 
the more we are both drawn into her world and made cognizant of the 
magical power of narrative. 
Concepts of Rhetoric: Deconstruction,

Pragmatism, Communication

There is more to say about the concrete particularities of "Magic," 
and I will return to them shortly, but I turn now to consider the theo­
retical principles I have been using to discuss the story so far. First, 
the phrase "narrative as rhetoric" means something more than that 
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narrative uses rhetoric or has a rhetorical dimension. It means instead 
that narrative is not just story but also action, the telling of a story by 
someone to someone on some occasion for some purpose.2 Furthermore, as the 
analysis of "Magic" indicates, this basic configuration of teller-story­
situation-audience-purpose is at least doubled in most narrative: there 
is the narrator's telling the story to his or her audience and then the 
author's telling of the narrator's telling to the author's audience. Con­
sequently, the narrator's telling is part of the author's construction of 
the whole narrative, and in that sense, what is a matter of the telling at 
one level becomes a matter of the told at the next. Before exploring 
the details of this rhetorical configuration, I would like to highlight 
some of its key assumptions and emphases by comparing the general 
approach with the ones that follow from two other widely circulating 
conceptions of rhetoric: deconstruction and pragmatism.3 
I call deconstruction's conception of rhetoric "widely circulating" 
with full knowledge that deconstruction's heyday has passed and that 
most critics and theorists are currently more concerned with reinvent­
ing historical criticism and merging literary with cultural studies in 
ways that foreground the politics and ideology of both cultural and 
critical texts. I engage deconstruction here because its legacy is so influ­
ential: it is to deconstruction that we owe the wide acceptance of the 
principles that language is inherently unstable, that there is no tran­
scendental anchor to textual meanings, and that textual meanings are 
more likely to be at odds with one another than not. Like most other 
contemporary theorists, I acknowledge the value of these decon­
structionist principles for complicating our understandings of lan­
guage, textuality, and interpretation. At the same time, however, I 
find these views less compelling than many other critics do, and al­
though I am not interested in trying to repudiate deconstruction, I do 
want, first, to show how the principles of my approach to narrative as 
rhetoric differ from deconstruction's and, second, to suggest that, de­
spite appearances, deconstruction does not invalidate or otherwise 
supplant those principles.4 
I call pragmatism's conception of rhetoric a widely circulating one 
because, through the efforts of Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty, this 
conception has come to be seen as part and parcel of poststructuralist 
antifoundationalism. Again, my efforts here are less to argue either for 
or against pragmatism as a philosophical position than to locate my 
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approach to narrative as rhetoric in relation to it—and, more specifi­
cally, to make a space for that approach in the contemporary critical 
landscape. 
Paul de Man's famous essay "Rhetoric and Semiology" illustrates 
the fundamental emphasis of deconstruction's approach to rhetoric: a 
rigorous reading of language as a system of tropes and a rigorous analy­
sis of the logic implied by the tropes of any text. De Man argues that 
the grammar and rhetoric of texts frequently diverge, but efforts to de­
cide whether one should be privileged over the other are doomed to 
failure precisely because there is no decisive evidence in the text. He 
brilliantly illustrates this logic of deconstruction in his tour de force 
reading of an interchange from the 1970s television show All in the 
Family. When Edith Bunker asks her husband, Archie, whether he 
wants the laces on his bowling shoes tied over or under, he impa­
tiently replies, "What's the difference?" Under de Man's gaze, 
Archie's question is fully explicable, first, as what its rhetoric sug­
gests—a rhetorical question revealing Archie's belief that there is no 
difference—and, second, as what its grammar suggests, that is, a genu­
ine question, asking for an explanation of difference. As a genuine 
question, it is a kind of challenge to Edith—if you're going to ask me 
such a question, I want you to explain the difference to me. It is worth 
noting that de Man's analysis includes the rhetorical situation but that 
he does not believe that an appeal to the situation can decide the case. 
Since the fault line between grammar and rhetoric is so wide, since the 
text finally does not contain sufficient evidence for its own interpreta­
tion, appealing to author, audience, occasion, or purpose for a resolu­
tion to the undecidability is not a valid move but instead an imposition 
of the interpreter's will on the text. 
What deconstruction's attention to textual rhetoric means for nar­
rative analysis is very nicely encapsulated in J. Hillis Miller's entry 
"Narrative" in Critical Terms for Literary Study. The "basic elements" of 
narrative, Miller declares, are three: plot, personification, and trope. 
Not surprisingly, he gives special emphasis to trope, arguing, in effect, 
that narrative inevitably tropes over itself. That is, narrative develops 
some pattern or repetition of trope, and this patterning invariably gen­
erates "fundamentally incongruous meanings" or "narrative disjunc­
tions that can never be brought back to unity" (77). 
Turning back to "Magic," then, we can see that a deconstructionist 
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would be willing to accept much of the analysis I have presented so far 
but would go on to say that it stops too soon, that it does not do a suffi­
ciently rigorous reading of the logic of Porter's narrative. The conclu­
sion that the story demonstrates the magical power of narrative does 
not attend sufficiently to the first move of my analysis: the inference 
that Porter's story tells us that Ninette comes back not because of the 
cook's spell but because of the madam's power. Once we reexamine 
that inference, we can see that the powers of all the spells found 
through the analogies made in my analysis—between the cook's spell, 
the maid's story, and Porter's story—are built on an illusion. Conse­
quently, Porter's story simultaneously demonstrates the power of nar­
rative and exposes narrative as powerless. Everyone may be caught in 
the spell of narrative, but the spell is, finally, based on an illusion. 
Furthermore, we can push the logic of Porter's technique of elision 
to its logical conclusion. The spell in Ninette's story that brings her 
back is cast by the cook, whereas the spell in the maid's story is cast by 
the maid's own telling. But it is just as much the spell cast by the 
maid's story that brings Ninette back, because there is no evidence 
other than the maid's word that Ninette came back in seven days. In­
deed, there is no evidence that any of the events of the tale actually oc­
curred or that Ninette is anything other than the maid's invention. 
Again, the effect is to demonstrate narrative's power and simulta­
neously to expose its powerlessness. The maid's narrative makes things 
happen—and makes them happen so vividly as to catch Madame 
Blanchard in its spell—but the things it makes happen may have hap­
pened only through the act of the maid's telling. If saying makes things 
so, then our sayings are powerful indeed; but if saying makes things so, 
then, to anyone's saying, we can say, "So what?" And of course, this 
same logic applies a fortiori to Porter's story. 
Before discussing the relation of this deconstructive reading to the 
one I have offered, I would like to consider the pragmatist conception 
of rhetoric and its resultant claims for both readings. This conception, 
represented in the work of Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, Steven 
Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, and others, is well summarized in 
Fish's chapter entitled "Rhetoric" in Doing What Comes Naturally. 
This view sees the world—especially that part of the world concerned 
with knowledge—as constituted by rhetoric. Our discourse about the 
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world makes the world what we find it to be. In his essay, Fish points 
to two attitudes toward rhetoric that have been present in different 
forms throughout the history of Western thought: (1) the attitude that 
rhetoric is a means by which a truth independent of our discourse is 
folded, spindled, mutilated, or otherwise manipulated; and (2) the at­
titude that rhetoric is inescapable because truth is not independent of 
but rather constituted by our discourse about it. Fish emphasizes the 
point that the ancient quarrel can never be resolved, but upon reflec­
tion we can see that this emphasis itself indicates his preference for the 
second view. Someone committed to the position that truth is inde­
pendent of our discourse would think that this truth could be demon­
strated sufficiently for the quarrel to be resolved, whereas someone 
committed to the position that truth is constituted by our discourse 
about it can see both positions as consistent with the general prin­
ciple—and therefore as engaged in a quarrel in which neither can win. 
A pragmatist view of narrative as rhetoric would view narrative as 
inescapably bound up with its interpretation and its interpretation as 
endlessly malleable—according to the needs, interests, and values of 
the interpreter on any given occasion. Consequently, the pragmatist 
would regard both my analysis of "Magic" and that of the 
deconstructor as different instances of the same phenomenon: each is 
construing Porter's narrative in a particular way for its particular pur­
poses. What neither view realizes, however, is how partial and par­
ticular it is, how much the questions it asks and the assumptions it 
makes—about language, the nature of narrative, readers, and many 
other things—participate in the construction not just of the interpre­
tation but also of the text. And what each view needs to recognize is 
that no final resolution of disagreements is possible. There is no fixed 
ground, no foundation—either in the narrative text, in authorial 
agency, in reader response, or, indeed, in any general theory of inter­
pretation—that would allow for any satisfactory adjudication. How­
ever, the pragmatist would also say that the difference between my 
analysis and the deconstructive one is the difference between a 
foundationalist and an antifoundationalist view of truth. From the 
pragmatist perspective, my analysis seems to assume Porter's nar­
rative has some essential character that the interpretation seeks to de­
scribe, whereas the deconstructive analysis sees the textual rhetoric as 
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frustrating any access to such an essential character. Although the 
pragmatist would want to qualify the deconstructor's claim for the ne­
cessity of the deconstructive reading, the pragmatist would also favor 
it over the one I have proposed. 
Let me now reconsider my analysis in light of these critiques. As al­
ways, I find that the deconstructive analysis seems simultaneously 
counterintuitive and virtually irresistible: once the premises ofdecon­
struction are granted, its logic is very persuasive. However, thinking 
about this logic from the pragmatist's antifoundational perspective 
clarifies the strength and weakness of deconstruction's appeal. From 
the pragmatist perspective, the logic is intriguing because it is an in­
stance of what it describes, an enactment of the power and powerless­
ness of narrative. That is, the logic leads to a strong account of Porter's 
narrative, one capable of disrupting the analysis I proposed, but the 
logic also leaves us powerless to move beyond its contradictory asser­
tions about power and powerlessness. To describe the logic this way is 
to make clear how deconstruction's claim to be reading the text more 
closely than anyone else can be legitimately questioned: the logic de­
pends on two interpretive leaps. The first leap is to key terms—in this 
case, magic and narrative, as opposed, say, to race and class; the second is 
to a narrative about those terms in the text—in this case, the narrative 
about the power/powerlessness of narrative. In other words, the 
antifoundational perspective helps point out that although no narra­
tive and no interpretation is deconstruction-proof, deconstruction's 
logic about textual logic is not as inevitable and necessary as its atten­
tion to textual rhetoric makes it appear. Laying bare the leaps that 
form the basis of the deconstructor's operation shows that deconstruc­
tion cannot really claim to be closer to the literal text than other 
approaches. 
With this understanding in mind, we can return to the most impor­
tant question that the deconstructive reading presents to the one I of­
fered: what is the relation between the cook's magic spell and the 
maid's magic of narration? Does our awareness that the cook's magic is 
illusory make us suspect that the magic of narrative is similarly illusory? 
A closer look reveals that Porter's story, in effect, recognizes the 
deconstructive hypothesis but then sets out its affirmation of the 
power of narrative. That is, Porter's story indicates that the maid's nar­
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rative is more powerful than the cook's spell because the maid's narra­
tive catches the powerful Madame Blanchard, whereas the cook's 
spell is not really responsible for Ninette's return and both that spell 
and the return may be a product of the maid's magic. Furthermore, 
the parallel between the maid and Ninette also works to point to the 
story's ultimate affirmation of narrative. Ninette, though sufficiently 
wily and resourceful to save enough money to leave the brothel, is not 
sufficiently wily and resourceful to construct a narrative for her 
madam that will allow her to keep the money and successfully escape. 
Regardless of whether the maid wants to ingratiate herself with Ma­
dame Blanchard, to scare her, or to warn her, the maid uses narrative 
in an effort to establish a different relationship with her employer than 
the one Ninette has with the madam. To be sure, Porter leaves open 
the question of whether the magic of the narrative will have any real 
effect. But in these situations "where it was almost always about the 
money"—situations faced by Ninette, the cook, and the maid— 
where the powerful have money and the powerless minorities and 
women have none, Porter's story suggests that the best weapon or best 
defense of the powerless is narrative. Porter's story, of course, does not 
offer any guarantee of the maid's success, but it certainly suggests that 
her odds are better than Ninette's. 
Before turning from the deconstructionist to the pragmatist chal­
lenge, I would like to call attention to some other dimensions of the 
spell Porter casts in "Magic." To read the story is not only to inquire 
into the maid's motives but also to situate ourselves emotively and 
ethically in relationship to Ninette, the French cook, the two mad­
ams, the maid, and Porter herself. In Ninette's story, the emotive and 
ethical lines are clearly drawn: our sympathies are with Ninette in her 
nervy effort to escape the domineering, abusive madam (and her will­
ing helper, the cook); we experience the madam's victory as a dispirit­
ing defeat. In the maid's story, however, the emotive and ethical lines 
are blurry. Because we have no strong evidence of Madame 
Blanchard's ethical character, the maid's storytelling, in contrast to 
Ninette's efforts at escape, has the quality of a preemptive strike. Our 
inferences about Ninette's story and what it suggests about the plight 
of the powerless woman certainly make the maid's action understand­
able, and these inferences may incline us to sympathize with and even 
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admire her ingenuity and resourcefulness. However, once we recall 
that the maid may have simply fabricated Ninette's story, the maid's 
character—and the ethical balance of her story—shift. If the maid has 
invented Ninette's story, then she is someone who aggressively ma­
nipulates her environment, someone who, above all, looks out for 
number one. Of course, with either construction of the maid's charac­
ter, Madame Blanchard does not change. We never see her as a victim 
of the maid, and, indeed, she may remain ultimately unaffected by the 
maid's storytelling. Nevertheless, our reflections on the maid enable 
us to recognize more fully how charged this domestic scene of one 
woman brushing another's hair may be. It is certainly a subtle power 
struggle; it may also be one with an underlying threat of violence. If 
Ninette's story is dispiriting, the maid's is chilling: although its out­
come is unknown, the story itself is full of ominous notes. 
Moving to Porter's story, we can recognize that her technique of 
plunging us into this situation works not just to involve us cognitively 
but also to affect us emotionally and to challenge us ethically. Each in­
ference we make about the maid's storytelling situation also leads us, 
first, to a tacit judgment of the maid's action, motives, and character, 
and second, to our sense of how powerfully the scene is charged. But 
virtually each new inference (the maid is telling a story from her past; 
the maid is making up this story) leads us to a reexamination of these 
same things, a reexamination that involves us in such ethical questions 
as how much we take the maid's side, regardless of her motives, how 
much we care about whether she is making up Ninette's story, how 
much we judge Madame Blanchard simply on the basis of her name 
and her class. In short, Porter's story so successfully casts its spell be­
cause it so efficiently arouses and so tightly interweaves the audience's 
cognitive, emotive, and ethical responses. 
If, on the one hand, my effort to make space for my approach to 
narrative as rhetoric alongside the deconstructive one has been suc­
cessful, it may, on the other, nevertheless serve to sharpen the pragma­
tist objection: the approach is based on a fundamental epistemological 
error, the notion that there are facts and truths outside of our dis­
course. Now note that the pragmatist, especially the pragmatist called 
Stanley Fish, works with a strict either/or logic: either language de­
scribes the world or language constructs the world; either there is tran­
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scendent Truth or there is no truth; either there are facts outside of 
discourse or discourse creates facts and truths. My response to the 
pragmatist objection is that this either/or logic inadequately captures 
the complexity of the relationship between facts, hypotheses, and 
theories, or in the realm of literary criticism, texts, interpretations, and 
approaches. I can better substantiate this claim after you read the fol­
lowing narrative, which I have entitled "Institutional Magic' 
During a session at a conference I recently attended called "The Poli­
tics of Interpretation after Poststructuralism," I witnessed a disturbing 
event. A white middle-aged man was reading a paper arguing that the 
political consequences of much mainstream poststructuralist thought 
are inimical to the politics of multiculturalism and that this antithesis 
highlights some serious theoretical limitations of poststructuralism. 
His delivery indicated both that he felt very strongly about the politi­
cal dimension of his argument and that he was very nervous about 
making this case at a conference where the reigning assumption 
seemed to be that the theoretical (non)foundations of poststructural­
ism were beyond question. After he had been talking for about ten 
minutes, a man in the audience began to hiss. At first the sound was 
barely audible, but the hisser gradually grew bolder and louder. Then 
the woman sitting next to him joined in. And then another person and 
another, until everyone in the room, including the speaker, could hear 
it. The speaker became increasingly flustered until, unable to stand it 
anymore, he looked up from his text and berated the audience: "You 
see, this is exactly the kind of negative political consequence I am talk­
ing about.' But this chiding only incited the hissers to increase their 
volume. The speaker tried to return to his text but was now so dis­
traught that he could not find his place. The hissing continued un­
abated, and the speaker's distress turned to panic: shouting, "The hell 
with it!" he threw his paper into the air and ran from the podium and 
out of the room. As he left, the hissing turned to applause. 
Horrified by this event, I wrote two letters: one to the speaker to 
express some sympathy and support, and one to the conference orga­
nizer to complain about the behavior of the audience and to inquire 
whether any formal action was going to be taken. Within a few weeks 
I had two replies: a very brief thank-you from the speaker, and a 
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longer letter from the conference organizer with a very surprising 
enclosure. Since an unsolicited apology had just arrived, he was not 
going to pursue any formal action; I would understand, he said, when 
I read the enclosed copy of the letter of apology. This letter, you see, 
was from the speaker. In addition to apologizing, the speaker detailed 
his conversion to a position much more sympathetic to poststruc­
turalism, and he expressed gratitude for the audience's "creative resis­
tance" to his earlier, erroneous argument. Finally, the speaker hoped 
that the organizer would be willing to consider the paper he wrote 
about his conversion experience for publication in the conference 
volume, adding as an aside that the acceptance of one more essay 
would clinch his pending tenure case. 
Let us now consider the pragmatist question about the existence and 
force of the "facts" of this story and my use of it. There are, I maintain, 
numerous kinds of facts involved here: (1) Facts that will not be dis­
puted—for example, that I asked you to read "Institutional Magic. 
(2) Facts that depend on the employment of our interpretive facul­
ties—for example, that there are recognizable parallels between this 
story and Porter's "Magic," especially between Ninette's defeat and 
the conference speaker's change of heart. (3) Facts that depend on an 
even deeper excursion into the realm of interpretation so that the line 
between fact and interpretation is extremely blurry—for example, 
that the speaker's capitulation in "Institutional Magic1' is different 
from Ninette's because he is more complicit in the oppressive system. 
Beyond this point, we get so deep into the territory of interpretation 
that rather than facts we have questions whose answers most will agree 
deserve the name "interpretations'": How much is the "I" of "Institu­
tional Magic' like the maid in "Magic"? How much is the "I" con­
structing you as a reader in a role like the one Madame Blanchard has 
in "Magic"? What is the relation between the "I" of "Institutional 
Magic" and the "I" of Narrative as Rhetoric? What is the veiled com­
munication I want to make? Is "Institutional Magic'' less open-ended 
than Porter's story? Given the context in which I have used it, how 
much is "Institutional Magic" thematizing narrative? 
According to the pragmatist view, even this delineation of kinds of 
facts and this consideration of the interrelations between facts, inter­
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pretations, and questions needs to be seen as the product of a kind of 
discourse: everything I've said about "Magic" and "Institutional 
Magic" can be seen as arising from a set of beliefs and assumptions that 
in turn influence my way of talking about narrative, literary critical ar­
guments, academic audiences, and other issues. Without those beliefs 
and assumptions and without that discursive framework, both "Insti­
tutional Magic" and the things I have said about it—indeed, perhaps 
most of the things you have thought about it—are not recognizable 
and therefore cannot be considered as facts of any kind. If we stepped 
out of the discursive framework provided by my beliefs and assump­
tions and moved into one that attended, say, only to the reproduction 
of the black marks on the white page, then even the data and the giv­
ens of my case apparently disappear. 
With the point that there are no facts outside of some framework 
for describing them I am in complete agreement. It is the next step of 
the pragmatist logic, the conclusion that truth is constituted by our 
discourse about it, that gives me pause. That our facts change as our 
discursive frameworks change does not prove that there are no facts; it 
proves rather that there are multiple facts and multiple ways of con­
struing facts. Thus the same phenomenon, for example, the phrase 
"happy to be here," may be, in one discursive frame, an ironic com­
ment that reveals something about a character, while in another frame 
something that tells us about the importance of the letter h. In making 
this claim, I am not asserting that my rhetorical approach to "Magic" 
or "Institutional Magic" is the standard or foundation against which all 
other ways must be compared. But I am asserting that the approach 
makes a legitimate claim to propose one kind of truth about both 
stories: the way each functions as a communication from author to 
reader. 
To put the point another way, to accept the pragmatist position 
would be to accept that your experience in reading "Institutional 
Magic"—its arousal of horror, pleasure, disgust, indifference, or any­
thing else—is not primarily a function of textual phenomena and their 
shaping by me (under Porter's influence) but rather is rooted in some­
thing else—a set of beliefs about the academy, about stories, and about 
stories about the academy. My alternative view is quite simple: we 
should reject the institutional magic of pragmatism that makes the 
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story and its techniques disappear, because those techniques and that 
shaped story do influence the experience. Indeed, I have told this story 
about the academy rather than a whole range of others precisely be­
cause I believe in its power to evoke a strong response from my ex­
pected audience. You will be willing to accept my alternative to the 
extent that you find yourself convinced that the shaped story is impor­
tant to (though not necessarily determinative of) whatever response it 
evokes in you. 
In countering the either/or logic of the pragmatist by arguing that 
there are multiple facts and multiple ways of construing them, I am 
proposing a different kind of antifoundationalism. The position is 
antifoundationalist because it insists on the incompatibility of the mul­
tiple facts, the impossibility of finding the one true account of them 
and their connection to each other. At the same time, my antifounda­
tionalist position departs from Fish's version by insisting that although 
facts are always mediated, always seen from within the confines of a 
given perspective, the perspective does not create the facts. In doing 
interpretation, then, we will encounter narratives capable of providing 
recalcitrance to the rhetorical critic; furthermore, the perspectives of 
other approaches have the potential to complicate, revise, or even 
overturn the initial results of a rhetorical interpretation. 
Rhetoric in Relation to Other Interests 
As many readers will have already recognized, my approach is in­
debted to rhetorical theorists such as Kenneth Burke and Wayne C. 
Booth who also emphasize narrative as a distinctive and powerful 
means for an author to communicate knowledge, feelings, values, and 
beliefs to an audience: indeed, viewing narrative as having the purpose 
of communicating knowledge, feelings, values, and beliefs is viewing 
narrative as rhetoric. There are various metaphors, all somewhat inad­
equate, that might be applied to this relationship between author, text, 
and audience: interaction, exchange, transaction, intercourse. Interaction is 
unexceptionable because unexceptional and bland. Both exchange and 
transaction carry connotations of buying and selling, and while these 
connotations are not entirely inappropriate, they are also reductive. 
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Gift exchange is better (see Sharp), but it does not quite capture the ef­
fort frequently involved in the reader's half of the exchange. Intercourse 
is, well, sexy. Its calling attention to the play of desire and the erotic 
component in the writing and reading of narrative (see Barthes) are 
genuine advantages, but again, it strikes me as too narrow. What I 
want is a shorthand term that might include all these things—interac­
tion, transaction, (gift) exchange, intercourse. Rather than search for 
another metaphor, I propose to let rhetoric function as this shorthand. 
That is, in this book, when I talk about narrative as rhetoric or about a 
rhetorical relationship between author, text, and reader, I want to re­
fer to the complex, multilayered processes of writing and reading, 
processes that call upon our cognition, emotions, desires, hopes, val­
ues, and beliefs. 
Given this larger interest, I am more specifically interested in the 
elements of narrative (e.g., character, event, setting, narrative dis­
course) and in techniques, forms, structures, genres, and conventions 
of narrative for the ways in which they enable, enrich, interfere with, 
or otherwise complicate narrative as rhetoric. I am interested in the 
author in a way that parts company with Booth's highly influential 
rhetorical approach. Booth emphasizes the author as Constructor of 
the text, whose choices about the elements of narrative largely control 
the responses of the audience. As a result of this emphasis, Booth's 
work moves in the direction of defending the Author and the impor­
tance of authorial intention for determining the meaning of a text.5 I 
do not see authorial intention as fully recoverable and as controlling 
response, even as I want to insist that when we read rhetorically we 
encounter something other than ourselves. The approach I am advo­
cating shifts emphasis from author as controller to the recursive rela­
tionships among authorial agency, textual phenomena, and reader 
response, to the way in which our attention to each of these elements 
both influences and can be influenced by the other two. Shifting the 
emphasis this way also helps to open the rhetorical approach to the in­
sights of many other approaches—from feminism to psychoanalysis, 
from Bakhtinian linguistics to cultural studies—about agency, re­
sponse, and text. These insights, when integrated into the general ap­
proach, can complicate interpretations, even as the main concern with 
the rhetorical transaction of reading remains.6 
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In the case of "Magic," the rhetorical analysis I have presented so 
far benefits especially from being complicated by the insights of a 
feminist analysis. Attending more closely to issues of gender and espe­
cially to issues of gender and power in "Magic," several important 
points emerge or at least take on greater importance. First, although all 
the main actors and tellers in the story are women and, indeed, the 
maid's story occurs in a distinctly female space, there is a larger system 
of patriarchy controlling the events. The madam of the "fancy house" 
is, in one sense, not entirely successful in her battle with Ninette be­
cause she has to give in to the demands of the male customers and take 
steps to bring her back. Furthermore, this development helps bring to 
the fore the way in which the brothel's existence depends upon the 
indulgence of the police and the larger patriarchal society. And why is 
Ninette unable to support herself except as a prostitute? This question 
is easily answered in light of the way the class-gender system worked 
in New Orleans of the 1920s (and still works in many places today) to 
prevent a poor woman from having any serious economic opportu­
nity outside marriage. Ninette's parallel with the maid and the 
madam's with Madame Blanchard are also important in this connec­
tion. The maid's opportunities are severely limited by her gender, 
class, and race, and her effort to overcome these limitations through 
narrative becomes more important the more we attend to these limi­
tations. If the madam of the brothel is dependent on a bargain she has 
made with patriarchal society, so, too, is Madame Blanchard. The dif­
ference, of course, is that her bargain seems to have left her better off. 
But Madame Blanchard's particular interest in Ninette's story may 
now appear as some kind of recognition, however unconscious, of 
some fundamental similarity among women that cuts across differ­
ences of class and race. Attending to these issues also suggests that we 
should not be too quick to move from the horror of Ninette's story to 
Porter's thematizing of the power of narrative: to do so is to blunt the 
narrative's genuine social critique. Indeed, it is the rhetorical power of 
the first-level story upon which all the effects of the narrative are built. 
What is true of such a feminist approach is also true of other ap­
proaches: each of them is a potential source of complication for the 
rhetorical precisely because the rhetorical is interested in the multilay­
ered relationships between authorial agency, textual phenomena, and 
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reader response and because it believes that reading is endlessly recur­
sive. Consequently, I could continue the analysis of "Magic" by 
bringing the conclusions reached so far into dialogue with some things 
I've barely touched on, such as the story's location in New Orleans 
in the 1920s. But rhetorical criticism must reach a (provisional) 
end, even if rhetorical reading, like relationships between people, 
stops nowhere. 
Prelude 
The rest of this book offers essays based on the underlying conception 
of narrative as rhetoric that I have sketched in this introduction, but 
each essay takes its particular shape from the particular problem or is­
sue it seeks to address. Where this introduction has been concerned 
with illustrating, situating, and articulating the fundamental principles 
of my approach, the succeeding chapters are concerned with deploy­
ing it in the service of specific interpretive and theoretical problems. 
In this respect, my strategy of advancing the case for my approach will 
shift from direct comparison with other approaches to demonstration 
of the kinds of analysis this approach makes possible—or, more gener­
ally, to the way in which it can be an effective means of both identify­
ing and resolving a wide range of theoretical and interpretive 
problems. No chapter is designed to produce a comprehensive analy­
sis of any narrative, but each one is designed to explore some relation 
between particular features of a specific narrative and general issues in 
narrative theory. Because the essays were originally composed on dif­
ferent occasions for different purposes and different audiences, I have 
found it helpful to write headnotes for the occasion and audience of 
this book. Therefore, I will not describe the essays in detail here, but 
just offer the following brief remarks about their arrangement and 
their concerns. 
I have organized the essays into three groups, but there is consider­
able overlap among the groups. In the first group are essays concerned 
primarily with progression and narrative discourse. In my previous 
book of narrative theory, Reading People, Reading Plots, I sketched an 
approach to character and narrative progression that seeks to describe 
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the way in which the internal dynamics of narrative directed our at­
tention to different dimensions of characters—to what I called their 
mimetic, thematic, and synthetic components. The essays in this first 
group, in effect, expand upon the model I developed in Reading People 
by first considering Virginia Woolf's Hie Waves, whose progression is 
more lyric than narrative, and second by attempting to theorize the 
role of "voice" in narrative with particular attention to Thackeray's 
Vanity Fair and Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms. The essay on Hem­
ingway also begins to move into the territory of the second group of 
essays, on mimetic conventions, ethics, and homodiegetic narration, 
because it moves beyond voice to consider some of the powers and 
limits associated with Frederic Henry's narration. 
The first two essays in part 2, on Hemingway's "My Old Man" and 
Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby, consider two problems in homodiegetic 
narration that both relate to the larger question of what constitutes mi­
mesis in homodiegetic narration. In Hemingway's story, the issue is 
unselfconscious narration and paralipsis, the narrator telling less than 
he or she knows. My effort there is not only to address some interpre­
tive problems in "My Old Man" but also to show why the paralipsis is 
a paradox but not a problem. In Tlie Great Gatsby, the issue is paralep­
sis, the narrator telling more than he knows, and its relationship to 
narrative reliability and unreliability. I attempt to show that under­
standing the rhetorical reasons for the paralepsis helps understand the 
ways in which the relationship between the narratorial and the charac­
ter functions of homodiegetic narrators such as Nick Carraway can 
fluctuate considerably in the course of a novel. In both essays, ques­
tions of ethical judgment figure prominently, but in the third essay 
in this group, on Conrad's story "The Secret Sharer," I make ethics 
the primary focus as I examine the way in which the technique 
and the progression complicate the ethical positioning of the authorial 
audience. 
This interest in the ethics and ideology of reading continues in the 
third group of essays. Here I combine issues of form and technique 
with questions of ideology and audience. The first essay in this section 
considers the question of audience in relation to second-person narra­
tion, particularly that in Lorrie Moore's short story "How. Bringing 
structuralist theory's concept of "narratee' and rhetorical theory's 
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concept of "narrative audience'' together, I attempt to show that the 
complexity of effects generated by Moore's story can best be ex­
plained by recognizing the complementarity of the two concepts. In 
the next essay, I consider the form of Dinesh D'Souza's storytelling in 
Illiberal Education and how his ideology shapes that storytelling and my 
ideology shapes my critique. Although Illiberal Education is no longer 
receiving the attention it once did, I offer this essay as an illustration of 
how approaching narrative as rhetoric can perform effective work in 
the public arena. In the final essay of the book, I consider the problem 
of interpreting Toni Morrison s character Beloved as an instance of a 
textual recalcitrance that is designed not to yield to our efforts at inter­
pretation. This "stubbornness," I suggest, has implications for my ef­
forts as a white male reader to come to terms with Morrison's 
narrative. This essay also experiments with a possible new direction in 
rhetorical reading by trying to mirror in some of the critical prose the 
complexity of the reading experience itself. Finally, I have included an 
appendix written in a different voice, which assesses the work of 
Wayne C. Booth, the theorist who has most advanced the profession's 
thinking about rhetoric and narrative. 
In sum, this book represents a series of inquiries into a range of texts 
and problems with a corresponding range of emphases on textual 
form, authorial agency, and reader response, especially those compo­
nents of response involvingjudgment, ethics, and ideology. Taken to­
gether, these essays are an attempt to offer a rounded, albeit not 
exhaustive, view of what it means to claim that narrative is rhetoric; as 
rhetorical acts themselves, they are an attempt to show the power of 
the antifoundationalist, ethical, ideological, and audience-oriented 
rhetorical approach applied here to the spells of Porter's "Magic." 

Part One

Narrative Progression and

Narrative Discourse:

Lyric, Voice, and

Readerly Judgments


Character and Judgment in 
Narrative and in Lyric: 
Toward an Understanding 
of Audience Engagement 
in The Waves 
In this essay, I focus on the relation between textual phenomena and audience 
response, proposing a distinction between lyric and narrative that has less to do 
with particular formal features of texts than with particular ways in which audi­
ences respond to those features. Developing a point I learned from Sheldon 
Sacks many years ago, I propose that the key difference between the genres is in 
the role of judgments by readers: narrative requires audiences to judge its charac­
ters; lyric requires audiences not to judge its speakers. I relate this insight to the 
theory of character and progression I proposed in Reading People, Reading 
Plots (the summary in this essay is also relevant to later chapters) and then 
sketch how these ideas begin to explain the complicated invitation for engage­
ment offered by The Waves, the way it both draws us in and pushes us away 
from Bernard, Susan, Rhoda, Jinny, Neville, and Louis. I want to stress the 
word begin in the previous sentence: I realize that there's much more work to 
do with the complexities of Woolf's narrative experiment. 
It [the novel of the future] will resemble poetry in this that it will

give not only or mainly people's relations to each other and their
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activities together, as the novel has hitherto done, but it will give the 
relation of the mind to general ideas and its soliloquy in solitude. For 
under the dominion of the novel we have scrutinized one part of the 
mind closely and left another unexplored. We have come to forget that 
a large and important part of life consists in our emotions toward such 
things as roses and nightingales, the dawn, the sunset, life, death, and 
fate; we forget that we spend much time sleeping, dreaming, thinking, 
reading, alone; we are not entirely occupied in personal relations; all 
our energies are not absorbed in making our livings. The psychological 
novelist has been too prone to limit psychology to the psychology of 
personal intercourse. . . . We long for some more impersonal relation­
ship. We long for ideas, for dreams, for imaginations, for poetry. 
—Virginia Woolf, Granite and Rainbow 
I am not trying to tell a story. 
—Virginia Woolf, Writer's Diary, 28 May 1929 
An Approach to Character and Narrative Progression 
Although it is a critical commonplace to think of The Waves as a lyrical 
novel, and although Woolf's experiment has received much insightful 
commentary about both her themes and her techniques (especially by 
Freedman, Graham, Richter, Fleishman, Caws, and Dick), we do not 
yet have an adequate account of the reading experience the novel of­
fers. Central to any account of that experience will be an understand­
ing of how we respond to Woolf's six speakers. Just what kind of 
emotional and intellectual engagement does Woolf ask her implied 
audience to have with Bernard, Susan, Louis, Jinny, Neville, and 
Rhoda as she presents their voices against the backdrop of the inter­
ludes?' Is J. W. Graham overstating the case or getting at something 
important about our response when he claims that, since The Waves 
is an antinovelistic work, "such critical terms as "plot,' 'character,' and 
setting' are the wrong instruments for exploring its nature as fiction'' 
(193)? 
I think that these questions about character in Woolf's novel are 
best approached after addressing some broader theoretical issues. To 
decide whether it is appropriate to call Woolf's speakers "characters," 
we need some working conception of that term, so I will begin by re­
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viewing a model for understanding character in narrative that I have 
developed elsewhere. To decide whether our designation of The 
Waves as a lyrical novel captures something important about our re­
sponse to the characters, I will first extend the model to include an ac­
count of character in the lyric and then apply those findings, with the 
necessary modifications, to Woolf's experimental work. Although I 
will be sketching an interpretation of The Waves here, my purpose is 
less to offer a new reading of the work than to develop a new under­
standing of the conditions of our response to it, especially the prin­
ciples upon which Woolf has constructed her characters. 
The model for analyzing character I develop in Reading People, 
Reading Plots has three main parts: (1) Character consists of three com­
ponents—the mimetic (character as person), the thematic (character 
as idea), and the synthetic (character as artificial construct). (2) The re­
lationship between these components varies from narrative to narra­
tive. The mimetic may be undermined by the foregrounding of the 
synthetic, usually for some thematic purpose (as in some metafiction); 
the mimetic may be highly developed and the synthetic kept covert 
(as in most realistic fiction), but then either the mimetic or the the­
matic may be finally given greater emphasis. To account for the vari­
ety of characters and relationships, I distinguish between dimensions 
and functions, between the potential to signify in a certain way and the 
realization of that potential. On the mimetic level, a character may 
have dimensions without functions when s/he has traits that do not 
coalesce into the portrait of a possible person (e.g., Jonathan Swift's 
Gulliver, whose traits change in each of his journeys as Swift adapts 
new targets for his satire). On the thematic level, a character may have 
dimensions without functions when traits are not thematized, not 
made part of the work's ideational content. On the synthetic level, di­
mensions are always also functions, but they may be more or less 
foregrounded. Thus, within the terms of this model, Graham is over­
stating the case when he claims that "character"' is an inappropriate 
term to apply to The Waves. Woolf's speakers have mimetic, thematic, 
and synthetic components; on the mimetic level, it may be debatable 
whether they have functions or only dimensions, but they are still 
characters. (3) The relations between the components are determined 
by narrative progression, the way in which the narrative initially 
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establishes certain issues or relationships to be the center of its implied 
audience's interest, and the way in which the narrative complicates 
and resolves (or fails to resolve) those interests. Progressions are gener­
ated in two ways: through instabilities, that is, some unstable relation­
ships between or within characters and their circumstances, and 
through tensions, that is, some disparity of knowledge, value, judg­
ment, opinion, or belief between narrators and readers or authors and 
readers. Let me leaven this dense description of the model with the 
discussion of a concrete case. 
In Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice the synthetic component of 
character remains in the background, and the mimetic is foregrounded 
as the progression introduces and complicates the instabilities created 
by the entrance of Bingley and Darcy into the Bennets1 neighborhood. 
(Further instabilities are introduced by the arrival of Collins and 
Wickham, but these are eventually tied to the main line of the progres­
sion.) As the progression develops, the implied audience is asked to see 
Lizzy's various traits as forming the portrait of a possible person and to 
respond to her accordingly, that is, to become actively involved in her 
dilemmas and choices, and eventually to feel emotional satisfaction in 
her engagement to Darcy. At the same time, Austen sets the action in a 
context that focuses our attention not just on general thematic issues of 
pride and prejudice but more particularly on what it means for a 
woman to get married—or not—in this society. Thus, after we read 
the famous first sentence ("It is a truth universally acknowledged that a 
single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife"), 
and after we see such actions as Charlotte Lucas's decision to marry 
Collins and Lady Catherine's attempt to tell Lizzy that she is not wor­
thy of marrying Darcy, we respond to Lizzy's final happiness not only 
for its mimetic power but also for its thematic significance, for the way 
in which it signals Austen's belief in both the necessity and the possi­
bility of marrying for the right reasons in the face of all the pressures 
that operate on a woman to marry for the wrong reasons. 
Within this general construction of the narrative, Austen builds 
many nuances that I cannot go into here, but my main point is that the 
model for analyzing character and progression improves our under­
standing of how we relate to Austen's characters and how we gener­
ally participate in the narrative as we read from beginning to end. 
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Reading People, Reading Plots seeks to develop and substantiate the 
model's power by analyzing a broad range of characters, progressions, 
and audience involvements. But the book does not address the issue of 
character in the lyric, something that needs to be done for an adequate 
understanding of character in The Waves. 
Distinguishing Lyric from Narrative 
In her essay "Lyric Subversions of Narrative in Women's Writing: 
Virginia Woolf and the Tyranny of Plot,' Susan Stanford Friedman 
invokes a generally held conception of the difference between lyric 
and narrative. "Narrative," she says, "is understood to be a mode that 
foregrounds a sequence of events that move dynamically in space and 
time. Lyric is understood to be a mode that foregrounds a simultaneity, 
a cluster of feelings or ideas that projects a gestalt in stasis. Where nar­
rative centers on story, lyric focuses on state of mind, although each 
mode contains elements of the other" (164).2 As the final clause indi­
cates, this account of the difference between the modes indicates ten­
dencies in each, but does not adequately capture their essential 
difference. It is an easy matter to think of lyrics that "move dynami­
cally in space and time" ("Because I Could Not Stop for Death") and 
of narratives that focus on states of mind (Ulysses and its progeny). Fur­
thermore, if we think of progression not just as something internal to 
the text (a question of whether a character or a speaker "goes" any­
where between beginning and end) but also as something linked to its 
audience's understanding of the text, then the opposition between 
story and gestalt in stasis also becomes less than adequate: the very 
temporality of reading means that the effects of both narrative and 
lyric depend in part upon sequence. If the opposition between se­
quence and stasis does not adequately pinpoint the difference between 
lyric and narrative, if the difference cannot be fully located in the 
content or the arrangement of that content, then we must shift our at­
tention elsewhere. Since the material of lyric and narrative can so eas­
ily overlap, I suggest that we look to discriminate between them 
according to the attitudes we are asked to take to that material. I want 
therefore to examine the interaction between character and judgment 
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in the two modes.3 I will anchor the discussion in two well-known 
poems by Frost: "Nothing Gold Can Stay," in which the speaker is 
not individualized and is not placed in any specific situation, and 
"Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," in which the speaker is 
somewhat individualized and speaking in a clearly specified situation. 
Suppose, first, that a character in a traditional narrative were to 
make an argument for the evanescence of beauty that began with the 
description of particular things in nature ("Nature's first green is gold / 
Her hardest hue to hold / Her early leaf's a flower / But only so an 
hour"), invoked some notion that this is the Order of Things ("So 
Eden sank to grief"), and ended with a generalization about that eva­
nescence ("Nothing gold can stay"); suppose, that is, that the charac­
ter uttered the text of Frost's poem. Our response to that utterance 
would follow the same logic as our response to any other speech by 
that character: the response would be mediated powerfully by our 
previously established sense of the character. If this character has fre­
quently been exposed as lacking in understanding, then we would ei­
ther suspect that the author did not stand behind the argument 
contained in this new utterance or, depending on other cues in con­
text, that the author wants to suggest some alteration in the character's 
understanding. In either case, the poem would be important for its 
contribution to the characterization of the speaker and to the se­
quence of judgments we are making about her. Furthermore, that 
characterization and those judgments would be required for anyone 
who wanted to participate in the experience offered by the narrative's 
design. In that sense, the judgments would be internal to the narrative 
itself, part of the logic of its construction. We might later evaluate 
whether being asked to judge the character as we do for the reasons 
that we do enhances or detracts from the value of the text, but such an 
evaluation obviously depends on our having understood the charac­
terization and made the judgment. In that sense, such an evaluation 
would be an external judgment. 
Read in its usual context, as a lyric by Frost, "Nothing Gold Can 
Stay" obviously has a very different effect. The speaker's character is 
not a functional part of the poem; instead, it fades back into the image 
of the implied author. In other words, the distinction between speaker 
and author does not exist here. If we describe the speaker as having the 
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mimetic dimension of possessing the belief in the evanescence of 
beauty, we are also describing the implied author. If we describe the 
implied author as having certain powers of expression as exhibited in 
the poem's diction, rhythm, and rhyme, we are also describing the 
speaker.4 With the conflation of the nondramatized speaker and the 
implied author, our attention is directed away from any mimetic rep­
resentation of that speaker and toward the poem's thematic point 
about beauty. We are not asked to judge the speaker and use that judg­
ment as part of our overall understanding of the poem, but instead are 
asked to take in, understand, and contemplate the speaker's argument 
for its own sake. To be sure, Frost presents the argument as something 
of value, and our response to the poem is not complete until we make 
some judgment of that value. This judgment will necessarily include 
some judgment of the speaker. But this judgment is not internal to the 
poem but external to it: it is part of evaluating what we are asked to 
take in and, in effect, it is an evaluation of the implied author and the 
poem itself. In short, a crucial difference between narrative and lyric is 
that in narrative internal judgments of characters (and narrators) are 
required, while in lyric such judgments are suspended until we take 
the step of evaluation. 
Now what of lyrics where we have dramatized speakers and thus 
situations that more closely resemble narratives? A poem such as 
Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening' is at first glance 
strikingly different from "Nothing Gold Can Stay" because it presents 
a speaker in a specified situation that calls for—and receives—some 
response from him. Indeed, the poem has the ingredients of narrative: 
a character, an unstable situation, a resolution of the instability. Fur­
thermore, it is helpful to think about the design of the poem in terms 
of the speaker's character and the progression of his emotions and 
thoughts. The first three stanzas, with their descriptions of the woods, 
the snow, the wind, and the darkness, gradually reveal the instability: 
the speaker's desire to stop traveling, to give himself up to the woods, 
the snow, and the darkness, a desire that finds its veiled expression in 
the first line of the last stanza—"The woods are lovely, dark and 
deep." The last three lines then resolve the instability as the speaker 
voices his decision not to yield to the desire. The poem is complete 
once the choice is made: the repetition of "And miles to go before I 
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sleep" in the last two lines signals both the power of the desire—the 
decision needs to be restated—and the finality of the resolution. 
The poem nevertheless remains lyric because of the way character­
ization and judgment work.5 Speaker and author are not identical 
here, as we can see by reflecting that we intuitively assign the rhymes 
of the poem to Frost rather than to the speaker. Our covert awareness 
of Frost's presence through the rhymes is also a sign that the synthetic 
component of the speaker's character remains in the background. Yet 
the mimetic component of the speaker's character is highly re­
stricted—his main trait is his desire for surcease. This restricted char­
acterization allows readers to project themselves into the poem, to 
experience vicariously the speaker's desire and choice. As Rader says 
about the dramatic lyric in general, "The figure in the poem is imag­
ined from within, so that we participate in his mental activity as if his 
eyes and experience had become the poet's and our own" (142). 
This effect is also possible because once again we are not asked to 
make an internal judgment of the speaker. Neither his desire nor his 
decision are held up for evaluation by Frost, though of course we may 
come to think of that desire and that decision—and thus, the whole 
poem—as trivial, profound, sentimental, inspiring, or something else. 
What Elder Olson says about "Sailing to Byzantium" applies as well to 
"Stopping by Woods"—the speaker performs an act of choice "actu­
alizing and instancing his moral character" (286)—but that choice and 
that character are presented not for us to judge but to project ourselves 
into. Consequently, experiencing the progression here is closer to ex­
periencing the progression of "Nothing Gold" than to experiencing 
that of a narrative such as "Magic": we do not develop hypotheses 
about the motivation for the telling nor expectations or hopes or de­
sires about the resolution of the instability. Furthermore, the thematic 
dimensions of the speaker do not become functions. We do not 
thematize the desire of the speaker in "Stopping by Woods' the way 
we thematize the maid's motivations in "Magic," and we do not con­
sider whether Frost is sympathetic or unsympathetic toward him the 
way in which we must consider whether Porter is sympathetic or un­
sympathetic toward the maid. (It is, of course, possible for the speaker 
of a lyric to describe his or her situation in thematic terms as, for ex­
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ample, Matthew Arnold's speaker does in "Dover Beach," but this 
thematizing is a variable rather than an essential of the lyric situation.)6 
Although I have been focusing on the text of "Stopping by 
Woods," I have also been articulating the set of conventions we bring 
to the reading of lyric. It would be misleading to argue that the "text 
itself" is the sole basis upon which we will experience the poem as 
lyric rather than as narrative. Part of the difference in experience is also 
a consequence of our choice to employ the conventions of lyric rather 
than those of narrative in our reading of the poem. At the same time, 
the fit between the conventions of lyric and the text is tighter than the 
fit between the conventions of narrative and the text: as in "Nothing 
Gold Can Stay" and in contrast to "Magic,' there is no textual mate­
rial that moves us toward internal judgments of the speaker. 
Speech and Lyric in The Waves 
Consider now the episode of "the primal kiss" (Fleishman, 156) in 
section 1 of The Waves. The episode contains material with the poten­
tial to establish instabilities that could be the source of much of the 
later narration—instabilities between Jinny and Louis (when she kisses 
him, he says, "all is shattered"), between the two of them and Susan, 
who witnesses the kiss and is pierced with anguish, between Susan and 
Bernard, who goes to comfort her, and between Bernard and Neville, 
who resents Bernard's leaving him to comfort Susan. Although the 
episode is referred to several times later, its potential to set in motion a 
chain of events is never actualized. That potential is never actualized 
because of what Woolf has done before this incident, because of how 
she treats the incident itself, and because of what she does later. 
The influence of the first "stream' of narration, the impersonal 
narrator's description of the sun rising over the ocean waves and 
gradually illuminating a garden and a house, is subtle but powerful 
even in the first section. The impersonality of the voice, especially its 
distant psychological stance, provides a context of distance within 
which we read the voices of the characters in the second "stream" of 
narration. This distance combines with the juxtaposition of the scene 
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in nature with the characters' speeches to move us away from a full 
involvement with any developing story involving the characters and 
toward the thematic connections we can make between the juxta­
posed scenes. More important, the initial group of speeches establishes 
the separateness of the speakers: 
"I see a ring," said Bernard, "hanging above me. It quivers and 
hangs in a loop of light.*' 
"I see a slab of pale yellow," said Susan, "spreading away until it 
meets a purple stripe.'' 
"I hear a sound,'' said Rhoda, "cheep, chirp; cheep, chirp; going 
up and down.' 
"I see a globe,' said Neville, "hanging down in a drop against the 
enormous flanks of some hill." 
"I see a crimson tassel," said Jinny, "twisted with old threads." 
"I hear something stamping,'' said Louis. "A great beast's foot is 
chained. It stamps, and stamps, and stamps.1' (9) 
We do not have different perceptions of a common phenomenon 
or different participations in a common action, but rather different 
consciousnesses with different perceptions (some hear, some see, but 
no perceptions overlap) following one another in sequence. This sepa­
rateness of the speakers is reinforced by the stylized language and by 
Woolf's technique of simply shifting our attention from one speech to 
the next without providing any narrative presence that might com­
ment on the speeches or relate them to each other. The pattern of 
separate consciousnesses reporting by turns is solidified in the next few 
rounds of speech, where even imperatives spoken by one character are 
not responded to by the others: When Bernard says, "Look at the 
spider's web,' or when Jinny says, "Look at the house," the next voices 
do not comment on the web or the house. This feature of the dis­
course prompts one to label even these opening speeches soliloquies 
(although that label does not apply to all the speeches of the text, for 
sometimes characters clearly address and respond to each other). 
Since we are not reading the speeches as responses to each other, 
we are invited to adopt the perspective of each one much as we are in­
vited to adopt the speaker's perspective in the lyric. That is, we are 
asked to see the world through the speaker's eyes without making a 
judgment on that vision. Woolf maintains the same effect throughout 
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the incident of the primal kiss, as we can see by looking at Neville's 
speech, which closes the incident. 
"Where is Bernard?" said Neville. "He has my knife. We were 
in the tool-shed making boats, and Susan came past the door. And 
Bernard dropped his boat and went after her taking my knife, the 
sharp one that cuts the keel. He is like a dangling wire, a broken 
bell-pull, always twangling. He is like the seaweed hung outside the 
window, damp now, now dry. He leaves me in the lurch; he follows 
Susan; and if Susan cries he will take my knife and tell her stories. 
The big blade is an emperor; the broken blade a Negro. I hate dan­
gling things; I hate dampish things. I hate wandering and mixing 
things together. Now the bell rings and we shall be late. Now we 
must drop our toys. Now we must go together. The copy-books are 
laid out side by side on the green baize table.'' (19) 
In a traditional narrative, we would be asked to evaluate Neville and 
Bernard in light of this speech: is Bernard insensitive for leaving 
Neville "in the lurch," or is Neville selfish for resenting Bernard's fol­
lowing Susan? In this narrative, the issue does not arise, both because 
of the pattern already established and because of the way Woolf 
handles the link between Neville's expression of resentment and his 
confession of hate. Woolf uses Neville's resentment of Bernard pri­
marily as a way to reveal something about Neville—"I hate dangling 
things. . . I hate mixing things together"—rather than as a way to build 
some future conflict between the two that the narrative will focus on 
and develop. As flesh-and-blood readers we may of course judge 
Neville for his resentment, but Woolf never makes that judgment 
functional within the progression of the narrative. In this passage, after 
revealing Neville's feeling, Woolf takes things in a new direction— 
back to narration—and so we are left contemplating Neville rather 
than anticipating any consequences of his feelings for the later action. 
This effect is reinforced by the beginning of the next speech in which 
Louis, who has last said, "all is shattered," makes no reference to any­
thing that Jinny, Susan, or Bernard have done, but begins this speech 
with the clause, "I will not conjugate the verb' (19). Through this 
jump in Louis's consciousness, Woolf signals that we have now 
moved into a new lyric moment. 
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Progression and Audience Engagement in The Waves 
To say that the speeches often function as lyric utterances is only to 
take a first step toward understanding our engagement with Woolf s 
narrative. There are several ways in which this view needs to be com­
plicated or supplemented. First, the utterances often follow the pat­
tern of Neville's and move from narration to lyric revelation and back 
again. The narration always functions to give us information about 
some situation or action in which the characters are placed; sometimes 
it also functions to advance our sense of the character's particular way 
of perceiving things. When the characters' speeches are giving us in­
formation about their situation rather than their particular percep­
tions, the speeches work to invite thematic connections between the 
situations they describe and the scene in nature described in the previ­
ous interlude. Take, for example, Louis's description of the boys' last 
day at school. Although it becomes lyric by the end ("I see wild birds, 
and impulses wilder than the wildest birds strike from my heart"), ini­
tially the speech is not important for what it reveals about Louis's per­
spective; instead, it focuses our attention on a particular stage of the 
boys' lives as an analogue to the stage in the sun's progress toward the 
horizon we have read about before section 2: 
"Now we have received,' said Louis, "for this is the last day of the 
term—Neville's and Bernard's and my last day—whatever our 
masters have had to give us. The introduction has been made; the 
world presented. They stay, we depart. The great Doctor, whom of 
all men I most revere, swaying a little from side to side among the 
tables, the bound volumes, has dealt out Horace, Tennyson, the 
complete works of Keats and Matthew Arnold suitably inscribed." 
(57-58) 
A second important supplement in our understanding of lyric in 
The Waves is that Woolf varies the kinds of lyric utterance she gives to 
the speakers. Sometimes, she orchestrates a revelation of feeling such 
as we have seen in Neville's speech, a revelation triggered by some ac­
tion or situation—often described in the first few sentences of the 
speech—external to the character. At other times, Woolf orchestrates 
a lyric of perception and sensation, exemplified in miniature by the 
opening speeches and exemplified more fully by Bernard's description 
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of being bathed: "Water pours down the runnel of my spine. Bright 
arrows of sensation shoot on either side. I am covered with warm 
flesh. My dry crannies are wetted; my cold body is warmed; it is 
sluiced and gleaming. Water descends and sheets me like an eel" (26). 
The consequence of this variation is that Woolf is able to incorporate 
an enormous range of experiences into the text. Thus, for example, 
Susan's utterances range from the revelation of her intense reaction to 
Jinny's kissing Louis to the report of her baking bread in her country 
kitchen, and Bernard's range from his cool assessment of Dr. Crane to 
the revelation of his deeply mixed emotions at the combined news of 
Percival's death and the birth of his son. 
A third complication is that the same material will sometimes be re­
visited and rendered differently. This movement helps Woolf adapt 
the lyric utterances to her larger narrative purpose because it shows the 
speakers in a changed relation to the original material as they move 
through life. Nevertheless, the sense of lyric remains strong because 
the new relation is not presented as more valid than the old; it is differ­
ent in a way that reflects the different stage of the speaker's life. When 
Bernard, for example, remembers his bath, he is less concerned with 
the sensations he captured so vividly the first time than he is with their 
consequences: "Mrs. Constable raised the sponge above her head, 
squeezed it, and out shot, right, left, all down the spine, arrows of sen­
sation. And so, as long as we draw breath, for the rest of time, if we 
knock against a chair, a table, or a woman, we are pierced with arrows 
of sensation—if we walk in a garden, if we drink this wine" (239). 
A fourth complication is that the speakers' utterances function not 
just to reveal themselves and their perspectives but also to reveal the 
other characters more fully. Because of what Neville says in section 1, 
for example, we see not only Neville but also Bernard in a new way. 
More generally, Woolf uses each character's view of the others to help 
us form our understanding of each, and thus we can have a greater par­
ticipation in their lyric utterances as the work progresses. We develop 
this understanding through a fusion of the perspectives offered by the 
other characters and the perspectives we gain from our inside views of 
each. In this way, we develop a sense of these characters as individuals 
that is far greater than anything that occurs in any dramatic lyric such as 
"Stopping by Woods." The question about the mimetic component 
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of Woolf's speakers can now be resolved: Each of the six has a fully de­
veloped mimetic function, one that, though easily recognized in the 
reading, is not easily summarized.7 
Mimetic, Synthetic, and Thematic

Components of The Waves

We can move from this account of the characters' speeches to a fuller 
account of our response to them. The lyric mode of their utterances 
invites a very strong mimetic involvement with them and their visions 
of the world. Yet this mimetic involvement is itself complicated by 
the way in which Woolf's technique makes us aware of the synthetic 
component of the characters and by the way the progression makes us 
respond to them thematically. In the first section, the gap between the 
speakers' ages and their powers of expression calls attention to the arti­
fice of the text. That their voices remain largely the same from child­
hood to middle age further reinforces that artifice. That the language 
of one speaker sometimes overlaps with the language of another or 
with the language of the interlude narrator is a third strong sign of 
their artifice. Because the artifice of Woolf's technique shows through 
in these ways, our mimetic involvement is juxtaposed with—and 
somewhat diminished by—our awareness of Woolf's experimenting 
with narrative form here. 
I said above that the first stream of narration distances us from the 
second. The distance derives in part from the impersonality of the 
voice and in part from what the voice describes. As we follow the de­
scriptions of the sun, the waves, the birds, the garden, and the house as 
the day proceeds from sunrise to sunset and the seasons proceed from 
spring to winter, we read the second stream with an awareness that the 
characters lack: we see them as like the sun, waves, and birds, i.e, as 
unwittingly following some natural laws that are governing their 
movement from childhood to death." Furthermore, because we al­
ways read the characters' speeches against the situation in nature de­
scribed in the interludes, we come to view the individual lyric 
utterances as part of this overall progression of the six characters from 
childhood to death. Consequently, the characters become representa­
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tive figures as well as mimetically differentiated individuals, figures of 
Childhood, Young Adulthood, Middle Age, and figures of Responses 
to Life Events such as marriage, birth of children, the death of a friend. 
This heightening of the thematic component also contributes to our 
overt awareness of the synthetic component of the characters and thus 
works against a full mimetic involvement of the kind that we have in 
either a dramatic lyric such as "Stopping by Woods" or in a narrative 
such as "Magic"' or Pride and Prejudice. 
Why should Woolf want to involve us in her characters in this way, 
to ask us to participate in the mimetic sphere while also giving us sig­
nals that work against that participation? The reason, I think, can be 
found in her larger thematic intention. As noted earlier, Woolf uses 
the characters' utterances to express many different kinds of experi­
ence at many different stages of life. In doing that, she is also able to 
explore many thematic issues: the nature of identity, the difficulty of 
connecting with others, the intensity of life, its chaos, its beauty, its 
pain, its ordinariness, its strangeness, its value. But the juxtaposition of 
these explorations with the impersonality of the interludes leads to a 
larger emphasis on a double vision: the lyric utterances collectively in­
sist on the intensity and value of life, while the distance between them 
and the interlude descriptions implicitly questions the significance of 
those lyric moments. This point is made perhaps with its greatest im­
pact at the very end of the narrative, when Bernard's ringing defiance 
of Death, "Against you I will fling myself, unvanquished and unyield­
ing, O Death!" is juxtaposed with the impersonal description of in­
exorable nature, "The waves broke upon the shore."9 
The point is also made for us in the experience of reading the text 
as we move from a strong engagement with the characters, their vi­
sions, and emotions to a more detached assessment of them as con­
structs serving Woolf's thematic and synthetic purposes. They matter 
intensely to us as individuals, and then again they don't. They live in­
tensely and diversely, but their lives do not make a dent in the uni­
verse. To experience the narrative fully we need to experience both 
sides of Woolf's vision. 
If the previous analysis is at all accurate, then Woolf has offered us a 
most unusual kind of engagement with her characters. We are asked 
not only to be simultaneously and overtly aware of their mimetic, 
42 Chapter 1 
thematic, and synthetic components but also to refrain from making 
judgments of them or to develop attachments to them of the kind we 
develop toward Elizabeth Bennet that makes us expect and desire cer­
tain outcomes for them. It is, I think, the very peculiarity of our re­
sponse that leads critics such as Graham to say that the term character is 
the wrong instrument for discussing Woolf's creation. But I hope that 
this essay has shown that we do better justice both to The Waves and to 
our reading experience if, rather than turning away from the term, we 
deepen our understanding of what character is and of the complicated 
relations that readers can have to it. 
Gender Politics in the

Showman's Discourse; or,

Listening to Vanity Fair

As the title suggests, this essay is an effort to think about the relationship be­
tween reading narrative and listening to it. More particularly, it is concerned 
with developing an understanding of "voice" and illustrating how voice func­
tions as part of narrative discourse. Influenced by Mikhail Bakhtin, I empha­
size the connection between voice and ideology: to listen to narrative is, in part, 
to listen to values associated with a given way of talking. Thackeray's Vanity 
Fair provides a rich site for exploring voice because the Showman's virtuoso per­
formance is fascinating in itself and revealing of Thackeray's attitudes toward 
Victorian patriarchy. As in the essay on The Waves, my emphasis here is 
more on the textual phenomena and their shaping by an implied author than on 
readerly subjectivity, though once I move to evaluate the Showman's voices, my 
ideological commitments as aflesh-and-blood reader become significant. 
The first version of this essay was written for a collection concerned with com­
plicating our views of male writers' relations to patriarchy, Out of Bounds: 
Male Voices and Gender(ed) Criticism, edited by Laura Claridge and 
Elizabeth Langland (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990). In 
that version I distinguished between my rhetorical approach to Thackeray's dis­
course and what I called "one kind of feminist perspective." In this revision, I 
have eliminated that differentiation because, for reasons I discuss in the intro­
duction, it now seems to me misleading. In looking at voice rhetorically, I 
am looking at ideology, and my evaluations of that ideology are very much 
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influenced by my interactions with feminist theory (and many flesh and blood 
feminists). For these reasons, my rhetorical analysis and evaluation is consis­
tently informed by "one kind of feminist" ideology. 
Thackeray's decision to survey the booths of Vanity Fair by charting 
the progress of Becky Sharp and Amelia Sedley, two very different 
women, leads him into numerous representations of and reflections on 
women in patriarchy, while his own virtuoso performance as the 
Showman of Vanity Fair leads him to adopt many poses and to speak in 
many voices. Consequently, Vanity Fair provides fertile ground for in­
vestigating voice and its relation to ideology as well as for exploring the 
role of voice in relation to other elements of narrative. I will undertake 
such an investigation and exploration here by first setting forth a rhe­
torical understanding of voice and then employing that understanding 
in the analysis of two passages whose gender politics seem to be signifi­
cantly different from one another.1 I will extend the analysis by evalu­
ating Thackeray's deployment of voice and by considering how my 
rhetorical and ideological commitments shape that evaluation. 
The Concept of Voice: Some Rhetorical Principles 
Voice is one of those critical terms {genre, theme, style, irony, pluralism 
are others) that are frequently used but rarely defined with any preci­
sion. The result is that we now have no commonly accepted meaning 
for the term, no clear understanding of what constitutes voice, let 
alone what makes one kind of voice more effective than another.2 The 
understanding I propose here is dictated in large part by my purpose in 
defining it: I want to talk about voice as a distinct element of narrative, 
something that interacts with other elements like character and action 
but that makes its own contribution to the communication offered by 
the narrative. 
My understanding of voice comprises four interrelated principles 
about language in use. (1) Voice is as much a social phenomenon as it is an 
individual one. This principle follows from the observation that wher­
ever there is discourse there is voice. Just as there can be no utterance 
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without style, there can be no utterance without voice—although, of 
course, just as some styles are more distinctive than others so too are 
some voices. In the case of, say, a letter from the university registrar to 
the faculty stipulating that grades must be submitted by a certain date, 
one might be tempted to say that there is no voice in the discourse, 
that what speaks is some bureaucratic machine. In one sense, this 
might be true: the discourse may not be at all expressive of the registrar 
himself or herself. But that is just the point: the letter does not signal 
the absence of voice but rather the presence of one voice rather than 
another. We recognize that voice not because we recognize the au­
thor of the letter but because as social beings we have heard that voice 
speak to us on other occasions.3 The example also indicates that, in 
adopting this principle, I am postulating that although voice is a term 
that seems to privilege speech over writing, it is a concept for identify­
ing a feature of both oral and written language. 
(2) Though mediated through style, voice, as Bakhtin suggests, is 
more than style and in a sense is finally transstylistic. Voice is the fusion of 
style, tone, and values. There are markers of voice in diction and syntax, 
but the perception of voice also depends on inferences that we make 
about a speaker's attitude toward subject matter and audience (i.e., 
tone) and about the speaker's values. Style will reveal the register of a 
voice and sometimes its location in space and in time relative to the 
things it describes and to its audience. But for inferences about per­
sonality and ideological values, style is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition: by itself style will not allow us to distinguish among possi­
bilities. The same sentence structure and diction may carry different 
tones and ideologies—and therefore different personalities—while 
the same personality and ideology may be revealed through diverse 
syntactic and semantic structures. For example, in the first chapter of 
Pride and Prejudice, Mrs. Bennet echoes the diction of the narrator s fa­
mous opening remark that a "single man in possession of a good for­
tune must be in want of a wife" by referring to Mr. Bingley as "a single 
man of large fortune." The similar style is spoken with different 
tones—the narrator's voice is playfully ironic, Mrs. Bennet's is serious 
and admiring;—and communicates different values: the narrator 
mocks the acquisitiveness behind Mrs. Bennet's speech. Austen uses 
the similar style to emphasize their different voices, their different 
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values and personality. Later, in describing Mrs. Bennet at the end of 
the chapter, Austen changes the tone of the narrator's voice. "The 
business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was vis­
iting and news." Although the change in tone indicates a difference in 
the voice, the consistency of the values expressed enables us to regard 
the difference as a modulation in the voice rather than the adoption of 
a whole new one. 
A corollary of the principle that voice is more than style is that 
voice is also more than speech act or, to put it another way, the rela­
tion between style and voice is similar to the relation between voice 
and speech acts. If a speaker typically gives commands rather than 
making requests or extending invitations, this speech behavior will 
influence our perception of her voice. Nevertheless, a request and 
a command can be spoken in the same voice. Imagine an even-
tempered benevolent middle manager who would say first to his su­
pervisor and then to his secretary, "Could you please give me the 
documentation on that?" The illocutionary force of the sentence, 
when directed to the supervisor, is that of a request, and, when di­
rected to the secretary, the illocutionary force is that of a command. 
Provided that the middle manager conveys the same respect to each 
and the same understanding of the power hierarchy in the organiza­
tion, the voice of each utterance will still be the same. Two com­
mands can be spoken in two different voices, as Shakespeare shows us 
through Lady Macbeth: "Come, spirits, unsex me here!" and "Out! 
Out! Damned spot!" In sum, locutionary and illocutionary acts both 
contribute to but do not determine our sense of voice. 
(3) As Wayne C. Booth and Mikhail Bakhtin (among numerous 
others) have amply demonstrated, the voice of a narrator can be con­
tained within the voice of an author, creating what Bakhtin calls the 
situation of "double-voiced" discourse. Significantly, the presence of the 
author's voice need not be signaled by any direct statements on his or her part but 
through some device in the narrator's language—or indeed through such 
nonlinguistic clues as the structure of the action—-for conveying a discrepancy in 
values or judgments between author and narrator. (In fact, one of the defin­
ing features of homodiegetic narration is that all such discrepancies 
must be communicated indirectly.) In the first sentence of Pride and 
Prejudice, Austen s style and tone allow her to communicate the way 
 47 Gender Politics in the Showman's Discourse
she is undermining a literal reading. In homodiegetic narration, our 
perception of the authorial voice may have less to do with style and 
tone than with the social values at work in the discrepancy between 
the voices. When Huck Finn makes his famous declaration, "All right, 
then, I'll go to hell," there is nothing in Huck's sincerely resolute voice 
to signal that Twain is double-voicing his utterance. We hear Twain's 
voice behind Huck's because we have heard and seen Twain s values 
earlier in the narrative; we thus place Huck's sincere resolution within 
a wider system of values that allows us to see his decision to accept 
damnation as a decision confirming his ethical superiority. 
Double-voicing can, of course, also occur within the explicit syn­
tax or semantics of an utterance. When Voltaire has a speaker say, "As 
luck would have it, providence was on our side," he is using the style 
to bring two different social voices into conflict. In cases such as this 
one, the author's voice functions as a crucial third member of the cho­
rus by establishing a hierarchy between these voices. 
(4) Voice exists in the space between style and character. As we attribute 
social values and a personality to voice, we are moving voice away 
from the realm of style toward the realm of character. But voice, espe­
cially a narrating voice or a "silent" author's voice, can exist apart from 
character-as-actor. Voice has a mimetic dimension, but it need not 
have a mimetic function. That is, voice exists as a trait of a speaker, but 
it need not be the basis for some full portrait of that speaker. In many 
narratives, especially ones with heterodiegetic narrators, the voice of 
the narrator will be his or her only trait, though modulations within a 
voice will reveal more traits. In homodiegetic narratives, the narrator's 
voice is more likely to be one trait among many. The same holds true 
for the voices of characters in dialogue. 
Two main consequences follow from these four principles. (1) 
Voice is an element of narrative that is subject to frequent change as a 
speaker alters tones or expresses different values, or as an author 
double-voices a narrator's or character's speech. The corollary of this 
point is that even as voice moves toward character, it maintains an im­
portant difference in its function. Whereas many narratives require 
consistency of character for their effectiveness, consistency of voice is not 
necessary for its effective use. (2) Voice is typically a part of narrative man­
ner, part of the how of narrative rather than the what. That is, like 
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style, it is typically a mechanism (sometimes a crucial one) for influ­
encing its audience's responses to and understanding of the characters 
and events that are the main focus of narrative.4 Like any other ele­
ment, voice could itself become the focus of a specific narrative (argu­
ably this situation obtains in Tristram Shandy), but more commonly it 
will be a means for achieving particular effects. Thus, we cannot expect 
an analysis of voice to yield a comprehensive reading of most narratives, 
though we should expect that such an analysis will enrich significantly 
an understanding of the way any narrative achieves its effects. 
Just as the first three principles in my account of voice move the 
concept away from style and toward character, these two conse­
quences of the principles move the concept back toward style. The 
point again is that voice exists in the space between style and character. 
Some Functions of the Showman's Multiple Voices 
To understand the functions of the Showman's voices, we need a 
fuller explanation of the context in which they are heard. Broadly de­
fined, Thackeray's purpose in the narrative is to expose the condition 
of universal vanity he describes in the final paragraph: "Ah! Vanitas 
Vanitatem! Which of us is happy in this world? Which of us has his de­
sire? or, having it, is satisfied?"5 To achieve this purpose, Thackeray 
invents his dramatized male narrator and has him tell the story of the 
progress of two very different women through a society that consis­
tently reflects and reveals the ineradicable but multifarious vanity of its 
inhabitants. This story is frequently (even ubiquitously) linked with 
gender issues: not only does the male narrator comment on the careers 
of the women but those careers themselves expose the patriarchal 
structures as well as the vanity of society. Again speaking schemati­
cally, we can see that Thackeray takes his two female characters, places 
them in the same setting but in different circumstances in the opening 
chapters, then sends them off in different directions so that he might 
conduct a relatively comprehensive survey of nineteenth-century so­
ciety. He then reunites them at the end of the narrative as a way to 
achieve closure. 
He uses Amelia to explore the workings of vanity in the private 
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sphere—the realm of the home and the heart—and he uses Becky to 
explore those workings in the public sphere—the realm of social 
climbing and social status. In keeping with his overriding thematic 
purpose, Thackeray uses Amelia and Becky to expose the vanity of 
others and to exemplify certain vain behaviors. In the case of Becky, 
the procedure is effective and straightforward: he gives her a tempo­
rary license to succeed in her vain pursuits by playing on the greater 
vanity of others, and then once she has exposed that vanity in creatures 
ranging from Miss Pinkerton to Lord Steyne, he takes the license away 
and emphasizes what has never been far from the foreground of the 
narrative: Becky's own vanity-driven life. In the case of Amelia, how­
ever, the situation (though not her character) is more complicated: he 
uses her constancy, love, and dependence on George first as a way to 
expose the vanity of George and those like him; later Thackeray tries 
to expose the negative side of these very same qualities as he shows 
how they ultimately undermine Dobbin's estimation of her worth— 
and the chance for their happiness together when he finally succeeds 
in marrying her. 
Although the stories of Becky and Amelia have clear beginnings, 
middles, and ends, although the characters move from an initial situa­
tion to a final one, the principle controlling the linking of episodes is, 
for the most part, additive rather than integrative. That is, unlike a 
novel by Jane Austen in which the significance of each episode derives 
from its consequences for and interaction with later episodes, Vanity 
Fair is built upon episodes that typically derive their significance from 
their contribution to the overriding theme of ubiquitous vanity.6 One 
consequence of this broad design is that it allows Thackeray to vary 
the way in which he treats his characters. Sometimes they appear to be 
autonomous beings for whom he wants us to feel deeply, sometimes 
they are obvious artificial devices for making his thematic points, and 
sometimes they are largely incidental to the Showman's disquisitions 
about the workings of society. In other words, Thackeray's narrative 
fluctuates the audience's attention between the mimetic, thematic, 
and synthetic components of the narrative. 
One consequence of this narrative design is that it allows the Show­
man great freedom in his use and selection of voice: he can move from 
intimacy to distance, from formality to informality, from treating the 
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characters as puppets to treating them as people provided that the 
movement remains in the service of the thematic end. Indeed, be­
cause of the additive structure and the length of the whole narrative, it 
is almost incumbent upon Thackeray to take full advantage of that 
freedom and make the narrator's performance one source of our sus­
tained interest in the narrative.7 The performances I will focus on 
here, while not fully representative, illustrate many other transactions 
that go on between Thackeray and his audience. 
As this way of talking about the narrative performances indicates, I 
see the Showman as Thackeray's mouthpiece: the only distance be­
tween author and narrator is created by the audience's knowledge that 
the narrator is created. On this reading, the Showman is the knowing 
source of the numerous ironies of the narrative discourse. Thackeray, 
in other words, does not communicate to his audience behind the 
Showman's back, but rather uses the protean Showman as the orches­
trator of virtually all the narrative's effects.8 
In chapter 3, the Showman comments on Becky's interest in Jos 
Sedley: 
If Miss Rebecca Sharp had determined in her heart upon making 
the conquest of this big beau, I don't think, ladies, we have any right 
to blame her; for though the task of husband-hunting is generally, 
and with becoming modesty, entrusted by young persons to their 
mammas, recollect that Miss Sharp had no kind parent to arrange 
these delicate matters for her, and that if she did not get a husband 
for herself, there was no one else in the wide world who would take 
the trouble offher hands. What causes young people to "come out," 
but the noble ambition of matrimony? What sends them trooping to 
watering-places? What keeps them dancing till five o'clock in the 
morning through a whole mortal season? What causes them to labor 
at piano-forte sonatas, and to learn four songs from a fashionable 
master at a guinea a lesson, and to play the harp if they have hand­
some arms and neat elbows, and to wear Lincoln Green toxophilite 
hats and feathers, but that they may bring down some "desirable'' 
young man with those killing bows and arrows of theirs? What 
causes respectable parents to take up their carpets, set their houses 
topsy-turvy, and spend afifth of their year's income in ball suppers 
 51 Gender Politics in the Showman's Discourse
and iced champagne? Is it sheer love of their species, and an unadul­
terated wish to see young people happy and dancing? Psha! they 
want to marry their daughters; and, as honest Mrs. Sedley has, in the 
depths of her kind heart, already arranged a score of little schemes 
for the settlement of her Amelia, so also had our beloved but unpro­
tected Rebecca determined to do her very best to secure the hus­
band, who was even more necessary for her than for her friend. (28) 
For the most part, the Showman speaks here in the sociolect of the 
genteel upper middle class. He is someone who knows and feels com­
fortable in the social circuit of that class: the well-informed gentleman 
speaking politely but firmly—and with a certain air of superiority—to 
a group of women from the class. His diction is generally formal, but 
he will occasionally drop the register to something more familiar: 
"mammas" or "take the trouble off her hands." Furthermore, the gen­
teel and formal qualities of the voice are reinforced by the parallel 
structure of the rhetorical questions and their well-chosen concrete­
ness, as, for example, in "four songs from a fashionable master at a 
guinea a lesson.' In adopting his air of knowing gentility, the Show­
man also positions himself at a considerable distance from Becky: he 
calls her "Miss Rebecca Sharp" at the outset, and even later when he 
speaks of her as "our beloved but unprotected Rebecca," his sympa­
thy does not overpower the distance. As a result of the genteel stance 
and the cool distance from Becky, the voice appears to be considering 
her as a "case,1 one that he is finally sympathetic to, but one that he is 
interested in as much for what it generally illustrates. 
Within this general sociolect, there are significant modulations—so 
significant, in fact, that even as we read we come to see the dominant 
voice as a pretense, one that the Showman puts on to expose the limi­
tations of the values associated with it. The Showman's strategy is 
twofold: he occasionally lets a certain aggressive element enter the 
genteel voice and, more dramatically, he temporarily shifts to a voice 
that is critical of the dominant one and then lets this voice invade and 
subvert the dominant. One major consequence of this strategy is that 
while making his apologia for Becky, the Showman offers a powerful 
indictment of courtship behavior in this male-controlled society. 
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The Showman adopts the genteel voice right away, but in the sec­
ond half of the first sentence the voice momentarily drops into a dif­
ferent, franker register as the Showman mentions "the task of 
husband-hunting." The phrase not only calls to mind the image of the 
social circuit as a jungle where women are the predators, men the 
prey, but also insists on the hunt as work rather than sport. Although 
the Showman quickly regains his genteel voice, everything he says in 
the rest of the sentence is now double-voiced, undermined by the 
candid, antigenteel voice of the earlier phrase. 
When the genteel voice calls the business of the hunt "delicate mat­
ters, we register the discrepancy between this description and "the 
task of husband-hunting" and the corresponding conflict between the 
values associated with each; in addition, the use of "delicate matters" 
privileges the antigenteel voice: his reference to "the task of husband-
hunting" makes the phrase "delicate matters" an ironic euphemism. 
When the Showman modulates his voice from genteel to informal 
and affectionate with his reference to "mammas," the earlier presence 
of the frank, antigenteel voice strongly ironizes the new modulation— 
and indeed, the whole clause in which it appears. When he tells us that 
the task of husband-hunting is "generally, and with becoming mod­
esty, entrusted by young persons to their mammas," we recognize the 
disparity between the image of the hunt and the alleged modesty of 
those in the hunting party. Moreover, we infer that the "young per­
sons" have no choice about "entrusting" the hunt to their "'mammas": 
the mammas manage, whether the daughters wish them to or not, as 
we learn later when we are told that "Mrs. Sedley has arranged a 
score of little schemes for the settlement of her Amelia." We see, in 
short, that the real predators are those we usually call "mammas." This 
realization in turn adds another layer of irony to the phrase "kind par­
ent to arrange these delicate matters." 
The initial reference to husband-hunting as a "task" is echoed in 
the aggressive note that repeatedly creeps into the Showman's use of 
the genteel voice: "what sends them trooping to watering-places?" 
"What keeps them dancing?" "What causes them to labour?" (It is 
worth noting here, if only in passing, that the grammar of the passage 
suggests that "them" refers to "young people" but "young people" ac­
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tually means "young women.") "What causes respectable parents to 
take up their carpets, set their houses topsy-turvy, and spend a fifth of 
their year's income?" The aggressive note is given more emphasis to­
ward the end of this series of questions, when the Showman slides 
smoothly from the genteel voice to the franker, antigenteel one of the 
first sentence. His reference to the young people wearing "Lincoln 
Green toxophilite hats and feathers'' is parallel to the previous phrases 
about their learning musical instruments. But once the topic of ar­
chery is introduced through this description of their clothes, the 
Showman quickly appropriates the earlier hunting metaphor: what 
keeps them doing all these things "but that they may bring down some 
'desirable' young man with those killing bows and arrows of theirs?" 
The result is that the Showman strongly reinforces the subversion of 
the social values implied in the dominant voice: These genteel "young 
persons" and their "mammas" are no better than prisoners of their 
patriarchally imposed task, the purpose of which no one has even 
mentioned yet—nor has anyone apparently given any thought to what 
happens once the hunter has bagged her game. 
The critique of "courtship" in the Fair reaches its high point in the 
final sentences of this passage as the Showman turns to answer his own 
questions about the motives for the behavior he describes. His inter­
jection, "Psha!" followed by the direct assertion, "they want to marry 
their daughters,' marks the entrance into the passage of a third 
voice—a more honest, more direct voice than the genteel one that has 
been speaking so far. With this third voice, the Showman is overtly 
setting himself above his genteel audience to reject their pretense and 
speak a truth that they also know but don't usually admit. This shift 
then sets up the final statement as an apologia for Becky's behavior, 
one that is convincing according to the values associated both with the 
genteel language he once again adopts—"so also had our beloved but 
unprotected Rebecca determined to do her very best to secure the 
husband"—and, significantly, with the new superior voice: "who was 
even more necessary for her than for her friend.' 
Because the new voice is clearly superior to the dominant one and 
because it is not ironized the way that the genteel one is (note all the 
undercutting in the description of "honest Mrs. Sedley" and her 
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"schemes"), the apologia has real force. Yes, what Becky is doing is 
no different from what every other woman in this jungle does; yes, 
precisely because she has "no kind parents," a husband is more neces­
sary for her than for Amelia. Yet the presence of the earlier subversion 
of the dominant voice and its values complicates this apologia. The 
case for Becky works only in terms of the values that we have been 
made to question by the earlier interaction between the voices; the 
case does not recognize how the very role that Becky "justifiably' 
adopts (i.e., mamma's role) has been exposed as itself constrained by 
patriarchy. Consequently, by the light of the values associated with 
the frankest voice of the passage, the apologia is unconvincing. In this 
sense, then, the superior voice of the last few sentences of the passage 
is itself undercut; though it drops the pretenses of the genteel voice, it 
does not question the basic assumptions and values of the upper-
middle-class social circuit. 
Evaluating the Showman's Voices 
The interaction between this superior voice and the earlier, antigen­
teel one highlights an important effect of the passage that is character­
istic of Thackeray's position throughout the novel. By insisting on 
both the limitations of and the constraints on Becky's behavior, the 
Showman offers a critique without offering an alternative. The power 
of the Fair is such that virtually no one can get outside it. The corollary 
of this point has been well illustrated by the analysis of the passage: the 
power of the patriarchy is also often such that no one can get outside 
it. It seems fair to conclude—at least tentatively—that Thackeray's 
analysis of Vanity Fair is in part a critique of the patriarchy by one of its 
own, the Showman. Let me now probe that conclusion, first by look­
ing at some other elements of the chosen passage, at the novel more 
generally, and at one more passage (albeit not with the same degree of 
attention to detail). 
The very positioning of the male voice in relation to the "ladies" 
addressed in the passage raises a question about the thoroughness of 
the critique, about whether the rhetorical setup of the passage works 
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against the message conveyed through the modulation of the voices. 
Note, first, that the address to "ladies" is made in the Showman's gen­
teel voice, the one that is most undercut in the whole passage. As that 
voice takes on and reflects the values of the genteel society, it takes on 
the assumption that the man can tell the "ladies'' the truth about their 
behavior. When we see that this voice doesn't have the truth, this as­
sumption is itself called into question. In that respect, the narrator-au­
dience relationship reinforces rather than undercuts the message 
conveyed through the voices. 
The passage, to be sure, does not suggest that the "ladies" see the 
full critique; instead, it presupposes that they will agree with the supe­
rior voice of the final sentences. But that presupposition does not 
mean that the Showman is talking down to them as much as it suggests 
that these "ladies" of genteel society, like Becky, the mammas, and the 
superior male voice, are caught in the trap of patriarchy. 
Nevertheless, even as the analysis indicates Thackeray's consider­
able virtuosity in the manipulation of voice, it also suggests a poten­
tially negative—or at least rhetorically risky—side to that virtuosity. 
The complex interplay of voices and their effects leads us back to their 
source, to what we might call the metavoice of the Showman. In addi­
tion to the qualities of wit, intelligence, learning, and a willingness to 
criticize, the Showman's virtuosity here involves a fondness for ironic 
one-upmanship: his communication to us comes at the expense of his 
addressed audience of "ladies.' We—male and female readers alike— 
are invited to stand with him, to compliment him and ourselves on 
our superior knowledge as we look down on the Fair and those caught 
in it. Although there are places in the narrative when the Showman 
indicates that he too can't escape the traps of vanity, his frequently dis­
played penchant for one-upmanship at the expense of his characters 
and his addressed audiences creates a problem for many flesh-and­
blood readers who seek to join the authorial audience. The invitation 
to stand with the Showman looking down on Amelia, Dobbin, 
George, Becky, Jos, Jones at his Club, genteel ladies, or whoever else 
the Showman names makes such readers uncomfortable: we feel that 
we're asked to participate in the metavoice's smugness or snideness 
or superciliousness.9 This feature of the metavoice obviously has 
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consequences for any evaluation of it, but it has an especially notewor­
thy role in our efforts to assess Thackeray's attitude toward Victorian 
patriarchy. 
When we look at the novel more broadly than we have so far, we 
soon see that the Showman is hardly Jane Eyre's brother under the 
skin. His most obvious limitations are that he does not follow through 
on his insights into the patriarchy's shaping of women's behavior and 
that he sometimes reveals his own complicity with the patriarchy. 
Many instances could be cited to make these points, especially his am­
bivalent treatment of Amelia, but perhaps the clearest evidence is in 
the famous passage in chapter 64 describing Becky as "syren." 
I defy any one to say that our Becky, who has certainly some 
vices, has not been presented to the public in a perfecdy genteel and 
inoffensive manner. In describing this syren, singing and smiling, 
coaxing and cajoling, the author, with modest pride, asks his readers 
all round, has he once forgotten the laws of politeness, and showed 
the monster's hideous tail above water? No! Those who like may 
peep down under waves that are pretty transparent, and see it writh­
ing and twirling, diabolically hideous and slimy, flapping amongst 
bones, or curling round corpses; but above the water line, I ask, has 
not everything been proper, agreeable, and decorous, and has any 
the most squeamish immoralist in Vanity Fair a right to cry fie? 
When, however, the syren disappears and dives below, down 
among the dead men, the water of course grows turbid over her, 
and it is labor lost to look into it ever so curiously. They look pretty 
enough when they sit upon a rock, twanging their harps and comb­
ing their hair, and sing, and beckon to you to come and hold the 
looking-glass; but when they sink into their native element, depend 
on it those mermaids are about no good, and we had best not exam­
ine the fiendish marine cannibals, revelling and feasting on their 
wretched pickled victims. And so, when Becky is out of the way, be 
sure that she is not particularly well employed, and that the less that 
is said about her doings is in fact the better. (617) 
The interplay among voices is characteristically complex here, as the 
Showman gives the very picture he is praising himself for having sup­
pressed. He uses a refined, almost prissy voice to compliment himself 
for his decorum, and then, when talking about what he has not done, 
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he adopts a melodramatic voice that likes to dwell on the seamier side 
of things. The alternation between these voices is clear and striking 
throughout but perhaps nowhere more so than when it occurs within 
the same sentence: "has he once forgotten the laws of politeness, and 
showed the monster's hideous tail above the water?" The hierarchy 
established between the voices brings the snideness of the Showman's 
metavoice into play. The melodramatic voice is privileged here: the 
chief effect of the passage is to convey the Showman's clear condem­
nation of Becky as a hideous female creature.10 The refined voice acts 
as a cover under which the Showman asserts that Becky is ugly, fiend­
ish, and murderous. Thackeray's early understanding of how Becky's 
behavior can be seen as shaped and constrained by the patriarchy 
seems to have vanished. Instead, the Showman enjoys himself at 
Becky's expense and asks us to do the same as he links her with a 
whole group of creatures whose evil derives in part from their female­
ness and especially from their female sexuality. 
In linking Becky this way, the Showman is performing an all-too­
familiar misogynist maneuver, one that ought to be kept in mind as a 
severe limit on any unqualified claim that Thackeray's critique of 
Vanity Fair is also a critique of patriarchy. Furthermore, the snideness 
with which the whole maneuver is carried out makes the Showman's 
voice not simply one that is complicit with the values of patriarchy but 
one that is actively perpetuating them. 
At the same time, Thackeray's sliding away from the critique of pa­
triarchy in his representation of his female characters is worthy of fur­
ther thought. Why should his representation be inconsistent in this 
way? Or, to put the question another way, are there good—or at least 
plausible—reasons, within the working of the narrative itself, why his 
attitude toward the patriarchy would seem to shift from one point in 
the narrative to another? 
Thackeray is a moralist as well as a social analyst, and he insists on 
locating some instances of vanity and its related sins—as well as its op­
posite virtues—in individuals themselves: consider his treatment of Jos 
Sedley on the one side and of Dobbin (for most of the narrative) on 
the other. Since his aim is to show the multifarious and ubiquitous 
operations of vanity, sometimes he uses Becky and Amelia as instru­
ments for exposing vanity in others or in the structures governing the 
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society, and at other times as exemplars of certain manifestations of the 
problem. If Thackeray used his female protagonists only as instru­
ments of exposure, then his critique of patriarchy would be stronger 
and more consistent, but his demonstration of the omnipresent work­
ings of vanity would be weakened. At the same time, of course, there 
is no necessary link between his location of vanity within individual 
women and the kind of misogyny that emerges in the passage we have 
just examined. Furthermore, on this last point, I think that a defense 
based on an appeal to historical and cultural difference is only partially 
successful. It is sensible and important to remember that we cannot 
expect Thackeray or any other author to escape entirely the ideology 
of his or her time and place and that, therefore, we ought not to evalu­
ate voices and ideologies solely according to their conformity with our 
own. At the same time, an act of evaluation is, to some extent at least, 
an assessment of a text's value to us now, so our own values do matter. 
If condemning the entire book for the misogyny of the Becky-as­
syren passage (and some others) would be a rash judgment, then over­
looking or dismissing that ideology would be an evasion of the 
evaluative task. At the same time, we need to be clear about the nature 
of our evaluative claims. It is one thing to object to Thackeray's larger 
narrative project as we might do if we concluded that he should have 
written a consistent critique of patriarchy. It is quite another thing to 
say, as I have done here, that in the execution of his critique of the op­
erations of vanity in Victorian society, he himself sometimes critiques 
patriarchy, sometimes trades in misogynistic stereotypes. More gener­
ally, the analysis suggests that listening to the Showman's voices deep­
ens our engagement with Thackeray's narrative to the point that we 
must talk back to it—and that talking should in turn provoke more 
listening. 
Voice, Distance, Temporal

Perspective, and the Dynamics

of A Farewell to Arms

This chapter builds on the model of voice outlined in the essay on Vanity Fair 
by deploying it to reexamine Hemingway's famous style in A Farewell to 
Arms and to offer an account of how voice contributes to the novel's progression. 
Althoi jh I want to claim some originality for my specific analyses, the 
overarching goal of the first part of the chapter is quite traditional: to show how 
the technique is working in the service of the narrative's larger effects. Later, 
however, I expand my focus from voice to the autodiegetic narration more gener­
ally and investigate not just positive contributions of the technique but also some 
instructive problems and an interesting paradox in Hemingway's use of it. In 
looking at the problems, I am exploring the space where authorial agency and 
textual phenomena are in some tension, where intentionality seems to pull in 
one direction and the textual signs pull in another. In looking at the paradox, 
which concerns how the knowledge Frederic Henry arrives at through his experi­
ence does and does not inform his narration of that experience, I am trying to 
show how attending to narrative progression helps readers to understand a pecu­
liarity of many autodiegetic narratives. 
Voice and Style in A Farewell to Arms 
Taken collectively, critical discussions of A Farewell to Arms are strik­
ing in at least two respects: there is considerable consensus about the 
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nature and effect of Hemingway's style, and there is considerable dis­
agreement about the nature and effect of the narrative as a whole. 
Here I shall try to develop new grounds for consensus about its larger 
design by disrupting—or better, complicating—the consensus about 
the style. My contention is that A Farewell to Arms, though marred by 
Hemingway's characterization of Catherine, traces a coherent process 
of growth and change in Frederic Henry that culminates, tragically 
and ironically, in the moment of his greatest loss. Furthermore, I be­
lieve that Hemingway's representation of this process cannot be fully 
appreciated until we combine our attention to style, character, and 
structure with careful attention to voice. Thus, I will focus on 
Frederic's voice, with an occasional glance at the voices of other char­
acters, in order to assess how Hemingway's modulation of voices helps 
to reveal—and contribute to—the novel's gradually unfolding design. 
Larzer Ziff offers an apt and characteristic, albeit incomplete, de­
scription of Hemingway's style: a predominance of simple sentences; 
the frequent use of "blank" modifiers such as nice; the restricted use of 
figures of speech; the frequent use of proper nouns; the frequent use of 
indirect constructions (e.g., "took a look" rather than "looked"). In 
an essay subtitled "The Novel as Pure Poetry," Daniel Schneider adds 
imagery as an element of style, notes the recurrence of images of rain, 
desolation, impurity, and corruption in A Farewell to Arms, and offers 
the strongest statement of its effect: the style creates "the perfect cor­
relative . . of the emotions of despair and bitterness. . Virtually ev­
ery sentence says, 'Death, despair, failure, emptiness.' The novel 
begins with this state of mind, and it is established so firmly, through 
the repetition of the central symbols, that any emotions other than de­
spair and bitterness may thereafter intrude only with difficulty" 
(273—75). In general, discussions of the style assume not only that it is 
consistent within the narrative but also that it has consistent and pre­
dictable effects. One burden of my argument will be to show that 
similar stylistic features of Frederic's discourse actually create widely 
divergent effects because they are spoken by recognizably different 
voices. 
The disagreement about the effect of the whole no doubt has mul­
tiple causes, but one of them surely is the problem of establishing with 
any confidence the relation between Hemingway as implied author 
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and Frederic. Some of the different relations posited can be seen in 
even a brief sampling of critical commentary: Schneider argues that 
the novel is a lyric expression of despair, failure, and emptiness; just as 
the speaker in a lyric poem may be distinguishable from the author 
even as that speaker expresses the author's attitudes, so too Frederic is 
distinguishable from but a surrogate for Hemingway. Earl Rovit views 
the novel as an epistemological tale "though not a tragedy"; Frederic 
learns something as he goes along;—in a sense, narrator moves closer 
to author—but he does not attain tragic stature. Scott Donaldson 
maintains that the narrative is Frederic's failed apologia; he has taken 
advantage of Catherine and is now unsuccessfully trying to avoid tak­
ing responsibility for his behavior; in Donaldson's reading, author and 
narrator are consistently distant from each other. Gerry Brenner con­
tends that the narrative is Frederic's unsuccessful attempt to make 
sense of his experience before he takes his life; on his account, Hem­
ingway and Frederic are miles apart. Given these divergent readings, I 
want to investigate what happens to our understanding of the author-
narrator relationship when we try not only to see it but to hear it. 
There is just one feature of the long discussion of voice in chapter 2 
that I want to repeat here because it bears directly on the author-nar­
rator relationship. When we detect a discrepancy between an author's 
values and those expressed in a narrator's voice, we have the situation 
of a double-voiced discourse: the narrator's voice is contained 
within—and its communication thereby complicated by—the 
author's. In such situations, I will employ the term distance to refer to 
the relationship between the authorial voice and the narrative voice.1 
The Voices of Book 1 
Let us listen to Frederic Henry at the beginning of the narrative. 
In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a village

that looked across the river and the plain to the mountains. In the

bed of the river there were pebbles and boulders, dry and white in

the sun, and the water was clear and swiftly moving and blue in the

channels. Troops went by the house and down the road and the dust

they raised powdered the leaves of the trees. The trunks of the trees
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too were dusty and the leaves fell early that year and we saw the 
troops marching along the road and the dust rising and leaves, stirred 
by the breeze, falling and the soldiers marching and afterward the 
road bare and white except for the leaves. (3) 
This paragraph is often cited (and parodied) as a quintessential ex­
ample of Hemingway's style, and in fact at least two critics have been 
moved to recast Frederic's prose into verse.2 Critical disagreements 
about Frederic himself, however, begin right here. Commenting on 
this passage and the descriptions of it as emanating from the voice of a 
"tough guy" (Walker Gibson) or the voice of a "spiritually maimed" 
individual (John Edward Hardy), Gerry Brenner writes, "Both the 
"tough1 and the "maimed' labels judge Frederic's style upon the basis of 
the perennial illusion that Hemingway, a crippled tough, a sentimen­
talist masquerading behind he-man brusqueness, wants his reader to 
endorse Frederic's values, to emulate his conduct, and to imitate his 
style" (34). Brenner wants to accept the label "'maimed" but to see its 
consequences differently: Frederic is not maimed and tough, but 
maimed and "disoriented." I will try to adjudicate these different con­
clusions by attending to both the stylistic and transstylistic features of 
the voice. 
As has often been noted, the use of the definite article ("the late 
summer") and the demonstrative adjective ("that year") indicate that 
there are to be no preliminaries here: we are asked to recognize that 
the narratee already knows the narrator and the year referred to—or 
we are asked to conclude that the speaker is disoriented.3 The style of 
the rest of the passage does not give other evidence of disorientation. 
Instead, it locates the voice in space (at the window of the house in the 
village) and gives an orderly description of what can be seen from that 
window, a description that continues beyond this paragraph as the 
narrator's gaze moves from the river and the road to the plain and then 
the mountains. We can conclude, at least tentatively, that the voice 
addresses an audience that already has some knowledge of the context 
of the utterance. 
Strikingly, however, this shared knowledge between voice and au­
dience does not form the basis for emotional intimacy. As many others 
have already noted, the voice does not share feelings or evaluations 
but focuses on the sensual surface of things. The voice, in effect, be­
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comes a camcorder: this is where I was; these are some things I could 
see; this is what happened as I kept my eye on the passing scene. The 
clear, controlled style and the evenness that comes with the paratactic 
syntax—we saw this and this and this—give Frederic's apparent objec­
tivity and neutrality a self-assured, authoritative quality. Nevertheless, 
the lack of evaluation is conspicuous. This voice could be "tough' or 
"maimed" or many other things we might project onto it. 
Once, however, we consider the trans-stylistic features of the voice 
and the way that its discourse is actually double-voiced, we can better 
assess its quality. Behind the paratactic sentence structures we sense 
another consciousness and thus another voice—Hemingway's—con­
veying information that the narrator's voice is not aware of. As we 
move in the authorial audience from the description of the river ("In 
the bed of the river there were pebbles and boulders, dry and white in 
the sun, and the water was clear and swiftly moving and blue in the 
channels") to the description of the troops, whose marching disrupts 
the natural order of things ("and the leaves fell early that year"), we 
make inferences about the war's negative effect on nature, even in its 
apparently nonviolent activities such as the marching of troops. These 
inferences, as I will argue at some length below, are controlled by the 
authorial voice but not the narrating voice. 
Furthermore, what is true about the distance between Frederic and 
Hemingway in this opening passage remains true for most of the nar­
ration in book 1 of the novel. In making this statement, I am parting 
company with most other critics of the novel, who see Frederic's later 
experiences coloring his retrospective account of his life.4 In terms of 
Gerard Genette's distinction between who sees and who speaks, be­
tween, that is, vision and voice, I find that Hemingway typically re­
stricts us to Frederic's vision and voice at the time of the action, even 
though he is narrating after the fact. This technique highlights the lim­
its of Frederic's understanding early in the narrative—and nowhere 
more so than in the passage at the end of the first chapter: "At the start 
of the winter came the permanent rain and with the rain came the 
cholera. But it was checked and in the end only seven thousand died 
of it in the army"(4). 
The air of authority and the paratactic structure are again joined 
here. But the discrepancy between Frederic and Hemingway arises 
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not through any particular linguistic signal but rather through our 
awareness of the difference in values between them. Frederic is voic­
ing an official party line here, mouthing the military's position on the 
damage done by the cholera; his personal voice is inhabited by the so­
cial voice of the military command. Hemingway asks his audience to 
recognize the severe limits of the values expressed in that voice: seven 
thousand lives can be dismissed with the adverb "only" and the lives of 
those outside of uniform simply do not count. For all the authority of 
his voice at the beginning of the narrative, Frederic Henry is strikingly 
ignorant; the implied presence of Hemingway's voice, which gives 
the sentence its pointed irony, makes Frederic's voice naive. This gap 
between Frederic and Hemingway is arguably the most important 
revelation of the first chapter. It establishes a tension between author 
and narrator that is one major source of our continued interest in the 
narrative, and it helps define the major initial instability of the narra­
tive: Frederic's situation in a war whose effects and potential conse­
quences he is ignorant of. 
Since, as I noted above, this way of hearing the voice is not the one 
adopted by previous critics and since it has significant consequences 
for my claims about the larger dynamics of the narrative, I would like 
to consider the basis of my case more fully. Since Frederic is telling the 
tale after the fact, we should consider the hypothesis that he, not 
Hemingway, is the source of the irony in that last sentence of the first 
chapter: the knowledge he has gained from his experience would in­
form his discourse, and we would be asked to know that he knows. 
The problem with this hypothesis is that we have no evidence that his 
knowledge is informing his narration. The past tense in fictive narra­
tion may function as narrative present5—and in the absence of clear 
signs to the contrary, that is the way it typically functions. Since there 
is nothing in the chapter—no switch to the present tense, no clue of 
self-conscious narration—signaling that his vision is that of the man 
who has lived through these events and now sees them differently, it 
makes sense to conclude that both Frederic's vision and his voice are 
those of the time of the action. Indeed, the definite articles of the 
chapter's first sentence seem designed in part to indicate right from the 
outset that Frederic is offering his vision at the time of the action: we 
are back there with him in "the house in the village that looked across 
the river and trees to the mountains.' 
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Consider his later statement, also in the past tense, where the rela­
tionship between narrator's and author's voices, though perhaps more 
readily apprehended, works the same way: the war, Frederic says, 
"seemed no more dangerous to me myself than war in the movies'' 
(37). Again we have the vision and the voice of Frederic at the time of 
the action, and again the discourse is double-voiced by Hemingway, 
who has already shown us that the war is dangerous to everybody. An 
even more extreme statement along these lines that Hemingway at 
one point placed just after Catherine's arrival in Milan was deleted 
from the final version of the novel: 
The world had always been afine place for me. I saw the things 
there were to see and felt the things that happened and did not 
worry about the rest. There were always plenty of things to see and 
something always happened. You needed a certain amount of 
money and you did not need the gonorrhea but if you had no 
money and had the gonorrhea life was still quite passable. I liked to 
drink and liked to eat and liked nearly everything. The war was bad 
but not bad for me because it was not my war but I could see how 
bad it could become. (Ms. pp. 206-7) 
Hemingway does not need this passage because he has already pre­
sented its content in more dramatic fashion, but its unironic presenta­
tion of Frederic's clearly limited view is consistent with the effect of 
the narrative discourse as I have been analyzing it: Frederic's voice 
conveys his beliefs at the time of the action, while our awareness of 
Hemingway's voice conveys the distance between narrator and im­
plied author. 
The more general issue raised by the question of whether Frederic 
or Hemingway is responsible for the ironic effects of the discourse is 
one about Frederic's degree of self-consciousness. To read Frederic's 
voice in book 1 as if it is infused with the vision he has at the time of 
the narration is to entail the conclusion that Frederic is a self-conscious 
narrator, aware that he is presenting double-voiced discourse, aware 
of the ironic effects he is creating by portraying himself in this way. 
On this reading, Frederic becomes a kind of Humbert Humbert of the 
AWOL set, that is, a narrator much like Vladimir Nabokov's self-
conscious artist in Lolita, one who carefully constructs his narrative 
as a work of art. To argue that Hemingway rather than Frederic is 
66 Chapter 3 
responsible for the double-voicing is to entail the conclusion that 
Frederic is not self-consciously creating the narrative's effects. The 
control of the effects, in other words, belongs not to Frederic but to 
Hemingway. The manuscript shows that at one stage of composition, 
Hemingway thought to have Frederic talk about his difficulty with the 
narration: 
This is not a picture of war, or really about war. It is only a story. 
That is why sometimes it may seem there are not many people in it, 
nor enough noises, nor enough smells. There were always people 
and noises unless it was quiet and always smells but in trying to tell 
the story I cannot get all in always but have a hard time keeping to 
the story alone and sometimes it seems as though it were all quiet. 
But it wasn't quiet. If you try and put in everything you would 
never get a single day done. (Ms. p. 174) 
Although the passage emphasizes Frederic's lack of control, Heming­
way's decision to delete it supports my point. By showing that Frederic 
was self-conscious about the task of telling his story, the passage inter­
feres with the effects of the narrative discourse Hemingway left. As I 
have been suggesting, the discourse indicates that Frederic describes 
the way things looked and the way he felt in a manner that comes 
naturally to him; Hemingway arranges those descriptions so that we 
can understand more than Frederic is aware he is communicating.5 
There are other places in the early part of the narrative where 
Frederic's apparently distinctive voice mouths conventional positions 
that he has not closely examined and that Hemingway clearly disap­
proves of. I will look at two especially important instances, the first in­
volving his argument with Passini about the justification for the war, 
the second involving his interaction with Catherine. Just before he is 
wounded, Frederic debates Passini on the need for the war. Their po­
sitions are very clear and very opposed. Passini argues, "There is noth­
ing worse than war, while Frederic counters, "Defeat is worse" (50). 
Again Frederic is clear, authoritative—and, in a significant sense, na­
ive. His authoritative tone again depends in part on the paratactic 
structure and in part on his own confidence in conventional justifica­
tions: "They come after you. They take your home. They take your 
sisters." "I think you do not know anything about being conquered 
and so you think it is not bad." "I know it is bad but we must finish it' 
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(50). Passini's voice of respectful authority, by contrast, is established 
through its reference to concrete possibilities and its firm but carefully 
argued rejection of the conventional wisdom: 
"War is not won by victory. What if we take San Gabriele? What 
if we take Carso and Monfalcone and Trieste? Where are we then? 
Did you see all the far mountains to-day? Do you think we could 
take all them too? Only if the Austrians stop fighting. One side must 
stop fighting. Why don't we stopfighting? If they come down into 
Italy they will get tired and go away. They have their own country. 
But no, instead there is a war." (50-51) 
Hemingway shows that Passini has the greater share of wisdom not 
only by letting him "win" the debate but also by following it with the 
landing of the shell that kills Passini and wounds Frederic. 
The difference in Frederic's voice when he describes the landing of 
the shell and Passini's death clinches the point: the voice is urgent, 
anxious, and focused on the concrete; it also makes way for the more 
urgent and anguished voice of physical pain that springs from the dy­
ing Passini. We recognize, though Frederic does not, that his voice of 
conventional wisdom loses its force when juxtaposed with the voices 
involved in the concrete rendering of the scene: 
and then I heard close to me some one saying "Mama mia! Oh,

mama Mia!" I pulled and twisted and got my legs loosefinally and

turned around and touched him. It was Passini and when I touched

him he screamed. His legs were toward me and I saw in the dark and

the light that they were both smashed above the knee. One leg was

gone and the other was held by tendons and part of the trouser and

the stump twitched and jerked as though it were not connected. He

bit his arm and moaned, "Oh mama mia, mama Mia," then, "Dio te

salve, Maria. Dio te salve, Maria. Oh jesus shoot me Christ shoot me

mama mia mama Mia oh purest lovely Mary shoot me. Stop it. Stop

it. Stop it. Oh Jesus lovely Mary stop it. Oh oh oh oh," then chok­

ing, "Mama mama mia." Then he was quiet biting his arm, the

stump of his leg twitching. (55)

Besides Frederic's relation to the war, the other major instability of 
the early part of the narrative is his relation to Catherine. Again, one 
way that Hemingway establishes the instability is through the discrep­
ancy between Frederic's voice and his own. Frederic remains the 
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objective recorder speaking from the time of the action, but one of the 
things he records is Catherine's dialogue. By skillfully juxtaposing 
their conversations with Frederic's commentary, Hemingway plays 
Frederic's voice against Catherine's and double-voices Frederic's nar­
ration. Here is Frederic's rendering of part of his third meeting with 
Catherine: 
"You did say you loved me, didn't you?"

"Yes," I lied. "I love you." I had not said it before.

"And you call me Catherine?"

"Catherine." We walked on a way and were stopped under

a tree.

"Say 'I've come back to Catherine in the night.'"

"I've come back to Catherine in the night."

"Oh, darling, you have come back, haven't you?"

"Yes.1'

"I love you so and it's been awful. You won't go away?" . . .

I kissed both her shut eyes. I thought she was probably a little

crazy. It was all right if she was. I did not care what I was getting 
into. This was better than going every evening to the house for 
officers where the girls climbed all over you and put your cap on 
backward as a sign of affection between their trips upstairs with 
brother officers. I knew I did not love Catherine Barkley nor had 
any idea of loving her. This was a game, like bridge, in which you 
said things instead of playing cards. Like bridge you had to pretend 
you were playing for money or playing for some stakes. Nobody 
had mentioned what the stakes were. It was all right with me . . . . 
[Catherine:] "This is a rotten game we play isn't it?"

"What game?"

"Don't be dull."

"I'm not, on purpose."

"You're a nice boy,'' she said. "And you play it as well as you

know how. But it's a rotten game.' 
"Do you always know what people think?" 
"Not always. But I do with you. You don't have to pretend you 
love me. That's over for the evening.'' (30-31) 
Clearly, Frederic's commentary is self-indicting in its selfishness, its 
calculation that playing this game with Catherine is better than going 
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to the house for officers, its indifference to the consequences of his ac­
tions. But Hemingway's orchestration of the voices does more than 
that with the scene. Hemingway shows Catherine insisting that 
Frederic adopt a particular voice and speak the language of romantic 
love so that she too can adopt that voice. Yet to speak the language of 
love on command is to speak without sincerity, to mouth the words 
but be detached from the feelings they're intended to express. By thus 
commanding Frederic to speak a language that can never be sincerely 
spoken on command, Catherine puts herself in a position where her 
response to Frederic's words must also be at some remove from her 
feelings. To act as she does is indeed to act "a little crazy.1' Then after 
Hemingway inserts Frederic's voice of selfishness in his address to the 
reader, the voice of the male on the make, Hemingway returns to 
Catherine and shows her speaking sincerely and frankly. The move­
ment from her earlier voice to this one is so great that Frederic cannot 
keep up with it, and he tries to maintain the pretense of sincerity by 
feigning ignorance. With this move in the play among the voices, 
Hemingway shows us that Frederic's statement about what he is doing 
with Catherine is not just extremely selfish but is also woefully inad­
equate in its understanding of Catherine and what she knows about 
the way each of them is behaving. Frederic is out of his depth with her 
just as he is out of his depth in the war. 
More generally, by establishing considerable distance from 
Frederic's commentary and some from Catherine's behavior in the 
earlier part of the scene, Hemingway is implicitly revealing his beliefs 
about love. It is unselfish, other-directed, based on honesty; Heming­
way expresses some of what is implicit here in the priest's later words, 
"When you love you wish to do things for. You wish to sacrifice for. 
You wish to serve'' (72). Another significant measure of Frederic's 
distance from Hemingway will be where he stands in relation to this 
authorial norm. 
Closing the Distance 
One of the striking features of A Farewell to Arms is how skillfully 
Hemingway gradually closes the distance between himself and 
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Frederic and how he uses the narration to signal Frederic's changes. In 
Frederic's conversation with the priest after he returns from Milan to 
the front, Frederic articulates one of his traits, which in turn sheds 
light on Hemingway's general strategy in the novel: "I never think 
and yet when I begin to talk I say the things I have found out in my 
mind without thinking" (179). Frederic typically recounts his experi­
ences without commenting on his feelings and thoughts about them. 
The devices that Hemingway uses to have us assess Frederic's progress 
are, for the most part, the ones we have seen in the passages already 
discussed: asking us to see behind what Frederic explicitly says to what 
he unwittingly reveals; using the dialogue of another character to give 
us a perspective different from—and sometimes superior to— 
Frederic's. In addition, by making Frederic more of a recorder than a 
reflector, Hemingway is able to emphasize those places where Fred­
eric does explicitly reveal his feelings. For example, when Frederic, af­
ter engaging in the drinking contest at the mess and then rushing to 
the hospital only to find out that Catherine could not see him, tells us, 
"I had treated seeing Catherine very lightly, I had gotten somewhat 
drunk and had nearly forgotten to come but when I could not see her 
there I was feeling lonely and hollow" (41), we see the passage as a 
very powerful signal of his movement past the attitudes expressed in 
the "I didn t care if she was crazy" passage. The importance of Fred­
eric's feelings here is further emphasized by Hemingway's use of 
"there." The adverb indicates that Frederic's vision is shifting in this 
passage from the time of the action (when he says "to come" he is lo­
cating himself at the hospital) to the time of the narration (he steps 
back and looks at himself "there") and thereby indicates the impor­
tance of the event in his memory. 
This passage, however, also illustrates Hemingway's habit of asking 
us to see more than Frederic tells us. Even as Frederic is moving past 
his "I don't care if she is crazy'' attitude, he remains self-centered. He 
does not think about Catherine and how she might be feeling, though 
Ferguson has told him that Catherine is "not awfully well." He thinks 
only about himself and his feelings: "I was lonely and hollow." 
In the second half of the novel, after his long convalescence in 
Milan with Catherine, Frederic does change—and so does his voice. 
When Frederic returns to the front after his summer in Milan, he dis­
cusses the war with the priest. 
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[Priest:] "I had hoped for something." 
[Frederic:] "Defeat?" 
[Priest:] "No. Something more." 
[Frederic:] "There isn't anything more. Except victory. It may 
be worse."(179) 
Frederic's voice here now echoes Passini's; the conventional wisdom 
has been replaced by the values of the Italian peasant. Furthermore, as 
Frederic voices values more in line with Hemingway's, the authorita­
tive quality of the voice is softened to some extent: victory "may be 
worse. As I have argued at some length in Reading People, Reading 
Plots, the main reason for Frederic's change is Catherine. His time 
with her in Milan has exposed him to a world based on values of com­
mitment, tenderness, and service, values that had been absent from his 
life before he met her. When he returns to the front, the contrast is 
sharp enough to shock him into articulate knowledge in this conversa­
tion with the priest. 
Perhaps the best evidence of the change in his attitude toward 
Catherine occurs in a scene during the retreat from Caporetto in 
which her voice inhabits his. Early in the narrative—-just before 
Frederic makes his comment about playing a game with Catherine— 
Catherine pretends that Frederic is her dead boyfriend, and she asks 
him to say, "I've come back to Catherine in the night." She then says, 
"Oh, darling, you have come back, haven't you." When Frederic says 
yes, she continues, "I love you so and it's been awful. You won't go 
away?" (30). Her voice here is romantic and committed at the same 
time that its dominant note is wistfulness: she knows she is only pre­
tending, reaching back beyond Frederic for her lost love. During the 
retreat, Frederic dreams that he is with Catherine again. Still in the 
dream, he is surprised that they are together: 
"Are you really there?"

"Of course I'm here. I wouldn't go away. This doesn't make any

difference between us.

"You're so lovely and sweet. You wouldn't go away in the night,

would you?"

"Of course I wouldn't go away. I'm always here. I come when­

ever you want me." (197-98)
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This time it is Frederic who says, "You wouldn't go away." Inter­
mingled with Catherine's voice this way, the utterance here conveys 
his attachment and dependence, his wistful desire to reach beyond the 
retreat and be reunited with Catherine. 
Just before this part of the dream, we hear Frederic adopt not 
Catherine's specific words but her voice and its values: 
"Good-night, Catherine," I said out loud. "I hope you sleep well. If 
it's too uncomfortable, darling, lie on the other side," I said. "I'll get 
you some cold water. In a little while it will be morning and then it 
won't be so bad. I'm sorry he makes you so uncomfortable. Try and 
go to sleep, sweet." (197) 
This is Catherine's voice of solicitude and service, a voice that we hear 
Frederic using for the first time in connection with Catherine's preg­
nancy. Away from Catherine but slowly moving back to her ("You 
could not go back. If you did not go forward what happened? You 
never got back to Milan" [216]), Frederic shows more concern for 
Catherine's pregnancy than he did at any time in Milan. Living in the 
gap between his life with her and his life at the front, Frederic is learn­
ing what Catherine already knows: what it means to be in love. Again, 
as he learns, his voice moves closer to Hemingway's. 
Both Frederic's changed understanding of the war and his commit­
ment to Catherine undergird his decision not just to save his own life 
by diving into the Tagliamento but also to defect from the Italian 
army. This development resolves the instabilities surrounding Fred­
eric's relation to the war, but those instabilities now give way to those 
surrounding Frederic and Catherine's attempt to construct their own 
haven from the malevolent world. In effect, they seek to establish a 
world based on the values of her voice. As they set about this task, 
there are further changes in Frederic's voice, but I will restrict my fo­
cus for now to those involving Frederic's relationship to and under­
standing of that larger world because in that way I will be best able to 
assess Frederic's voice at the very end of the narrative. 
Soon after he and Catherine are reunited, Frederic speaks from the 
time of narration; his voice merges temporarily with Hemingway's 
and he articulates what his experience has taught him about the world: 
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If people bring so much courage to this world the world has to kill 
them to break them, so of course it kills them. The world breaks 
every one and afterward many are strong at the broken places. But 
those that will not break it kills. It kills the very good and the very 
gentle and the very brave impartially. If you are none of these things 
you can be sure it will kill you too but there will be no special hurry. 
(249) 
The effectiveness of this famous passage is partially hindered be­
cause Hemingway's voice overrides Frederic's to some extent. The 
passage gives us a voice that is too great a departure from any of the 
voices that we have heard Frederic use to this point. Although the 
syntax is characteristic of Frederic, the sententiousness of the language 
is not. The passage sounds a little too much like a set piece of 
Hemingway's.7 
Frederic's voice is more authentically his own as he tells us his 
thoughts in the hospital after he learns of the baby's death: "That was 
what you did. You died. You did not know what it was about. They 
threw you in and didn't tell you the rules and the first time they caught 
you off base they killed you. Or they killed you gratuitously like 
Aymo. Or gave you the syphilis like Rinaldi. But they killed you in 
the end" (327). Given everything that the narrative has shown us to 
this point, from the rain and the cholera to the disastrous retreat, from 
Passini's death to Aymo's, Frederic's response here seems appropriate: 
he is articulating a vision of the world that Hemingway has presented 
as true. Nevertheless, through the repetition of the phrase "they killed 
you" and especially through its first disruptive appearance in the base­
ball metaphor ("the first time they caught you off base they killed 
you"), Frederic's voice also carries a heavy tone of frustration and 
complaint. It has not yet fully merged with Hemingway's; indeed, a 
distinctive element of the "If people bring so much courage to this 
world" passage is that, instead of a complaining tone, it incorporates a 
kind of ironic acceptance: "if you are none of these, it will kill you too 
but there will be no special hurry.' 
Now consider the final sentence, the ending that Hemingway pro­
duced so many alternatives to. "After a while I went out and left the 
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hospital and walked back to the hotel in the rain" (332). The emphasis 
on sequence and the use of coordination with and recalls a significant 
feature of the style of the opening paragraph: this happened and this 
and this. But the relation of Frederic's voice to Hemingway's is sub­
stantially different here. Just before this sentence, Frederic has told us 
about his attempt to say a melodramatically romantic good-bye to 
Catherine: 
"You can't come in now," one of the nurses said. 
"Yes I can," I said. 
"You can't come in yet." 
"You get out," I said. "The other one too.' 
He is imperious here because of the strength of his romantic fantasy. 
But the reality of Catherine's death destroys the fantasy: "But after I 
got them out and shut the door and turned off the light it wasn't any 
good. It was like saying good-by to a statue'' (332). The shift to hon­
est, matter-of-fact assertion beneath which lies very deep feeling sets 
up the last sentence. 
If the voice of the first passage was naive in its lack of evaluation, 
the voice of the last sentence is wise in that lack. If the author of the 
first passage spoke behind the style to reveal that naivete, he speaks 
here to reveal a strength in the face of knowledge. Frederic now 
knows the destructiveness not only of the war but also of the world; 
indeed, he has experienced that destruction firsthand in the most ex­
cruciating way imaginable. The world has destroyed his life by de­
stroying Catherine. He has no illusions about the finality of the 
destruction. But as the voice speaks and as we hear Hemingway's 
voice behind the sentence, we see that Frederic is not really destroyed. 
Despite what he knows he acts. Despite what he knows he speaks 
without frustration and without complaint. Both the voice and the ac­
tion are slow and deliberate, controlled and dignified (compare 
Hemingway's version to "Then I headed back to the hotel in the 
rain"). He has no reason to live, no hope for the future: "That was 
what you did. You died." But the control in the voice and the deliber­
ateness of the action signal a refusal to be crushed by that world. Fur­
thermore, in sending that signal, the control and the deliberateness 
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also signify that Frederic has taken the final step in his remarkable 
growth from authoritative spouter of conventional wisdom to under­
stated but informed source of Heming-way's own values. The final 
sentence is one of the times Hemingway got it just right. 
Problems with the Technique 
I have argued that by making Frederic a character who is not much 
given to reflection on his experience and a narrator who is an 
unselfconscious but faithful recorder of those experiences, Heming­
way has communicated more to us than Frederic realizes in two main 
ways. Hemingway double-voices Frederic's narration and he uses the 
dialogue of other characters to offer perspectives whose significance 
Frederic does not fathom. I turn now to consider the limits of what 
Hemingway can accomplish with this technique by focusing on two 
problematic segments of the narrative: Frederic's shooting the Italian 
sergeant and Frederic and Catherine's interlude in Switzerland. 
As I briefly indicated above, one of Hemingway's tasks in his repre­
sentation of the retreat from Caporetto is to trace Frederic's gradual 
evolution from a committed, competent leader of the ambulance 
corps to a justified fugitive who makes his separate peace. Early in the 
retreat, we see Frederic at his most decisive and most active: leading 
Aymo, Bonello, and Piani, he decides that Aymo can bring the virgins, 
that they can give a ride to the sergeants, that they should ride in a cer­
tain order, when they should ride, when they should eat, when they 
should rest, when they should get off the main road. In short, he is 
dedicated to carrying out their orders to get to Pordenone. He is also 
dedicated to certain group values: they share the food they find, they 
help each other out, they do not harm the young women, they help 
the sergeants, they do not plunder the farmhouse where they stop for 
food. The sergeants, on the other hand, violate many of these values: 
they take the ride, but they want to save their own skins; they enter the 
farmhouse to see what they can steal from it; having eaten, they don't 
care whether the others eat. Their greatest violation occurs when the 
ambulance gets stuck and they take ofF. All this comes through 
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Frederic's narration very clearly. The problems arise when Frederic 
reacts to their greatest offense by shooting at them and wounding one, 
who is then killed, with Frederic's approval, by Bonello. 
How much distance is there between Hemingway and Frederic at 
this point? Does Hemingway want us to see Frederic's response as jus­
tified in some way? Or is the shooting a sign that the violence of the 
war is infecting Frederic as well? What is the significance of the place­
ment of the incident so soon after Frederic's dream about being to­
gether with Catherine again? How does the incident fit in with the 
two other shootings during the retreat—Aymo's by the Germans, and 
those by the carbinieri at the Tagliamento? Developing satisfactory 
answers to these questions is an extremely murky business, and the 
murkiness is inextricably wound up with Hemingway's particular de­
ployment of the autodiegetic narration. 
Just as we can be confident that Hemingway does not endorse the 
values behind the assertion at the end of the first chapter, we can be 
confident that he does not fully endorse Frederic's reaction here. 
Given Hemingway's attitudes about the war's destruction, we can in­
fer that shooting to kill under these circumstances is overdoing it. One 
sign of Hemingway's disapproval is that he slightly distances Frederic 
from the killing by having Bonello fire the fatal shot. If Hemingway 
wholeheartedly endorsed the shooting, it would make sense to have 
one of Frederic's shots kill the man. Bonello's dialogue also provides a 
clue to Hemingway's values here. Bonello is proud of what he has 
done, but his boasting reveals the problems with his viewpoint: "all 
my life I've wanted to kill a sergeant" (207). His joke about what he 
will say in confession, "Bless me, father, I killed a sergeant,' also un­
derscores this reading of Frederic's action. When we recall the stan­
dard way of beginning a confession, "Bless me, father, for I have 
sinned," we can see how Hemingway is double-voicing Bonello's ut­
terance here. Bonello is not just melding the language of war onto the 
language of religion. He is also transforming the confession of guilt 
into a source of pride—bless me, I did something good in killing the 
sergeant. By asking us to read the religious formula underneath 
Bonello's line, Hemingway reminds us that Bonello has in one sense 
"sinned." Significantly, Bonello's joke does not succeed with 
Frederic; he reports not that "We all laughed" but that "They all 
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laughed" (208). Frederic's inability—or unwillingness—to laugh is a 
further sign that he has overreacted. Although Frederic never reflects 
on the incident, we see that one source of his uneasiness is that he has 
been operating by the same code of war that sanctions Bonello's ac­
tions and Bonello's comments. The code says that a commanding of­
ficer has the right to command obedience; violations of that command 
are punishable by death. Despite other moves Frederic has been mak­
ing away from the war, he is still bound by the military mentality. 
But Hemingway apparently wants to communicate other things 
with the scene as well. His representation of the sergeants as consis­
tently violating the values of sharing and respect being honored by 
Frederic and the others suggests that the scene is also showing Frederic 
taking some kind of stand about those values. This issue is important 
because Frederic has earlier been someone who simply did what was 
easiest. By showing Frederic reacting so strongly to the sergeants' vio­
lations of the group's values, Hemingway seems to be showing—or 
trying to show—some significant change in Frederic as well. Again, 
Hemingway's technique for conveying this aspect of the incident is 
the use of another character's dialogue. Immediately after the shoot­
ing, Piani delivers a judgment about the sergeants whose accuracy we 
must recognize: "the dirty scum'' (204). Later he returns the group's 
conversation to Frederic's action, saying with approval, "You cer­
tainly shot that sergeant, Tenente1' (207). 
Viewed in this way, the incident becomes an important checkpoint 
by which to measure the alterations Frederic undergoes during the 
retreat. When he shoots the sergeant he is simultaneously entrapped 
in the code of the military and committed to values that will eventu­
ally move him to make his separate peace. The subsequent events 
of the retreat, especially the shooting of Aymo and the executions at 
the Tagliamento, push him finally and completely away from the mili­
tary code. 
The trouble with this view of the incident is that I am not sure it is 
fully substantiated by the narration. The reading hangs heavily on the 
few lines of dialogue given to Bonello and Piani—and even more on 
my sense of how what Hemingway is doing with Frederic in the rest 
of the novel has implications for what he needs to do with his charac­
ter here. The dialogue of the minor characters, especially Piani's, 
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seems susceptible to alternative interpretations: Piani can be seen as 
closer to Bonello than my reading suggests; Piani does, after all, laugh 
at Bonello's joke. The more positive side of Frederic's action may not 
really be built into the incident. But then Hemingway's previous 
choices in representing the sergeants and in showing Frederic's com­
mitment to certain values seem problematic. This second-guessing of 
my reading is not meant to dislodge it, only to indicate that I do not 
believe it can be as well substantiated as the earlier interpretations I 
have offered. The larger point is that if Hemingway had given Fred­
eric different traits as a narrator and a character, if Frederic not only re­
corded but explicitly interpreted the incident through reflecting on it, 
Hemingway would be able to communicate its complexities far more 
firmly than he can through Frederic's tight-lipped, recording, time-
of-the-action perspective. But to alter Frederic that way would be to 
lose much of the power of the rest of the book. 
The situation with the events in Switzerland is both similar and dif­
ferent. Hemingway again wants to accomplish something complex: to 
show that Frederic and Catherine have reached a place that is both 
idyllic and impossible to maintain; to show also that Frederic and 
Catherine sense that their life has no future; to show further that if the 
world were different, Catherine and Frederic would always be very 
happy, and that the reason they are only sometimes so lies not with 
them but with that world and their knowledge of it. All these effects 
will serve the larger purposes of his narrative. By showing that their 
union is very attractive, he will increase the sense of loss we feel in 
Catherine's death. By showing that they have no real future, he will 
reinforce his thematic point about the malevolence of the world. By 
showing that they sense their own plight, he will add another dimen­
sion to their situation and will be able to make a further thematic point 
about how best to respond to a knowledge of the world.8 
Part of Hemingway's strategy in chapters 38 to 40 is to use 
Frederic's narration to achieve these different effects at different times, 
but there are places where the effects interact. Consider the end of 
chapter 38, Frederic reports that he and Catherine awaken in the 
night. She had been thinking, she says, about the time when they first 
met and she was a "little crazy"; she insists that she is no longer crazy, 
just "very, very, very happy'' (300), and she proposes that they both go 
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back to sleep at exactly the same moment. The disturbance under­
neath her waking and her proclamation of happiness prevents Frederic 
from going back to sleep when she does. "I was awake for a long time 
thinking about things and watching Catherine sleeping, the moon­
light on her face" (301). 
Why should Catherine wake? Because she, who has known about 
the world all along, knows that their idyll can't last and she is disturbed 
by that knowledge. Why should Frederic not be able to fall back 
asleep? Because he senses what she knows. He makes a similar point at 
the end of chapter 40: "We knew the baby was very close now and it 
gave us both a feeling as though something were hurrying us and we 
could not lose any time together'' (311). But earlier in chapter 38, 
Hemingway has also used Frederic's record of a long conversation 
with Catherine to show that she is worried about his feelings for her, a 
worry that also comes from her recognition that they have no real fu­
ture. In the conversation, Catherine asks Frederic whether he is bored 
or restless, asks him about his having gonorrhea and says that she 
wished she'd had it, says that she wants to be exactly like him. 
Hemingway's sexism comes through clearly here, but so does a rather 
different consequence of Catherine's worry about their future. Her 
fear of what's coming also makes her somewhat desperate about the 
present: there seems to be some lack in the here and now that she 
wants to fill. Thus, when she wakes at night and proclaims that she 
is very, very, very happy, we can't help inferring that she protests 
too much. 
But how do I know that it is her fear of the future that makes her 
desperate about the present? One could plausibly argue that her des­
peration is a sign of Frederic's present inadequacy and her own endless 
insecurity. Again, I think that what has happened is that Hemingway 
has run up against the limitations of his narrative perspective, only 
here those limitations become even stronger because of the sexism. 
Just as Hemingway turns in the shooting incident from Frederic's re­
cording to the dialogue of Piani and Bonello to create his effects, he 
turns here to Catherine's dialogue. In addition to the limits 
Hemingway faces as a consequence of Frederic's tight-lipped record­
ing, he faces the problem of the way the narrative perspective con­
strains our view of Catherine. Because the perspective allows us to see 
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Catherine only from outside—and because Hemingway has con­
ceived her character in a sexist way—her conversation can give rise to 
interpretations that the trouble with their life in Switzerland is not the 
world but the two of them. Such interpretations alter our view of 
Catherine's death: it becomes not the culmination of the tragedy but a 
convenient way for Frederic to escape from this sterile, constricted re­
lationship. Although I think that the larger progression of the narrative 
finally calls such interpretations into question, I would also suggest 
that the limits of the autodiegetic narration make them appear more 
plausible. 
The Paradox of Frederic's Narration 
I turn finally to the way in which much of what I have been saying 
about Frederic's narration implies that it is built on a paradox. Strik­
ingly, this paradox has the potential to undermine the novel's illusion 
of realism, yet that potential is never realized. The paradox arises from 
three features of the narration, two of which I have already discussed 
explicitly. (1) With few exceptions, Frederic speaks from his perspec­
tive at the time of the action. (2) The growth or change in Frederic's 
character occurs at the time of the action, not during the time of the 
narration or through the act of narration. Thus, when I read the last 
sentence of the novel ("After a while I went out and left the hospital 
and walked back to the hotel in the rain") as a sign of Frederic's 
growth, I am also understanding that the growth occurred then. The 
understated style is capturing Frederic's control during his walk, not a 
control that he has acquired through the act of writing. (3) Frederic is 
a recorder, not a self-conscious narrator. He is intent on telling his 
story, but he is no artist, no Humbert Humbert trying to render the 
most artistically effective narrative that he can muster for some rhe­
torical purpose that serves as his motivation for telling the story. 
Since it is always possible—even easy—to find confirmation for the 
hypothesis that Frederic is self-consciously crafting the narrative (it's 
clearly his story, and his story clearly shows evidence of careful craft­
ing), I want to pick up once again the issue of how we determine 
whether a homodiegetic or autodiegetic narrator is self-conscious. 
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One of the conventions of homodiegetic narration is that unselfcon­
scious narration is the unmarked case: that is, we take the homo­
diegetic narrator as unselfconscious unless we are given reason to do 
otherwise. Thus, we assume that the homodiegetic narrator is not the 
source of such things as foreshadowing, patterns of imagery, parallel­
ism of incidents, the lyricism of a particular style—unless we have 
some signal that calls our attention to the narrator's self-consciousness. 
For example, when Huck Finn describes the sunrise over the Missis­
sippi in sentences with impressive poetic power, we don't marvel at 
Huck's artistic prowess and his selective display of it; instead, we see 
Huck as the window through which Twain's artistry is being revealed. 
On the other hand, when Nabokov wants to create Humbert 
Humbert as a self-conscious narrator, he has Humbert frequently 
comment on his own narration: in chapter 1, he says, "You can always 
count on a murderer for a fancy prose style" (11); later, he says, "Oh 
my Lolita, I have only words to play with!" (34); and finally, of course, 
Humbert talks about his narrative—and its artistry—as an attempt to 
compensate for the crimes he has committed against Lolita: "I see 
nothing for the treatment of my misery but the melancholy and very 
local palliative of articulate art" (285). "One had to choose between 
[Clare Quilty] and H. H., and one wanted H. H. to exist at least a 
couple of months longer so as to have him make you live in the minds 
of later generations. I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the secret of 
durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the refuge of art" (311). Frederic 
is clearly more like Huck than like Humbert. 
The second reason that I want to argue for Frederic as recorder is 
the internal evidence of the narration. In addition to the evidence I 
have discussed earlier, I would like to add a final example, one in 
which Frederic does fluctuate between his perspective at the time of 
the action and his perspective at the time of the narration. In chapter 7 
just before Frederic proclaims that the war "was no more dangerous to 
me myself than war in the movies" (37), he mentions that he had met 
two British gunners when he was on his leave in Milan. "They were 
big and shy and embarrassed and very appreciative together of any­
thing that happened. I wish that I was with the British. It would have 
been much simpler. Still I would probably have been killed. Not in 
this ambulance business. Yes, even in the ambulance business. British 
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ambulance drivers were killed sometimes. Well, I knew I would not 
be killed" (37, emphasis mine). The passage indicates Frederic's habit 
as a recorder: his reactions here arise out of the stream of his recollec­
tions rather than being motivated by his conscious artistic purpose. 
When he thinks of the British gunners at the time of narration, he 
jumps to his wish of having been with them because it would have 
been much simpler. But then he catches himself up by thinking of the 
possible negative consequences of that situation, then he has a short 
dialogue with himself about whether he would have been killed, then 
he quickly ends that by giving his view that the war was not real to 
him. To say that Frederic has planned all these shifts for some artistic 
purpose of his own is to make an interpretive leap for which the narra­
tion provides no spring. 
The paradoxical consequence of these three features of the narra­
tion can be effectively illustrated by returning to my reading of the 
sentences ending the first chapter. "At the start of the winter came the 
permanent rain and with the rain came the cholera. But it was checked 
and in the end only seven thousand died of it in the army." The rub in 
seeing Frederic as the victim rather than the source of the irony is that 
if unselfconscious Frederic has learned about the war and the world at 
the time of the action, then this knowledge should always be a part of 
his perspective as he retells the story. In other words, Frederic writes as 
if he does not know what he in fact knows—and he is not deliberately 
suppressing his knowledge or manipulating our understanding of his 
knowledge for any conscious artistic purpose of his own. 
Genette has noticed and named this phenomenon of homodiegetic 
narration, calling it a paralipsis, a narration in which less information is 
given "than should presumably be given in terms of the focalization 
code governing the narrative," as Gerald Prince describes it in his Dic­
tionary ofNarratology.0 But neither Genette nor Prince has analyzed the 
rhetorical logic of paralipsis's paradoxical nature—as I now propose to 
do for the case ofA Farewell to Arms. 
Although there is a sense in which Frederic's paralipsis seems to vio­
late the conventions of mimesis, it does not actually destroy the mi­
metic illusion. Why? First, because the narration makes artistic sense 
and, second, because it makes sense in such a way that there is no rea­
son for the reader to register the paradox during the actual temporal 
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experience of the narrative. Hemingway, in effect, wants to write a 
Bildungsroman with a tragic twist. If he were to do that from a 
heterodiegetic perspective, there would be no problem in showing 
that the protagonist started out in ignorance and ended in knowledge. 
The narrator and the audience would start out ahead of the character, 
but eventually he would catch up to and perhaps surpass the audience. 
But to tell such a story from the perspective of a protagonist who 
would unselfconsciously record his experiences and some of his judg­
ments and beliefs at the time of the action would have some significant 
advantages. Such a narration would allow the audience to have a 
deeper, more intimate relationship with that protagonist, and such a 
relationship might be necessary for the audience to maintain partial 
sympathy for him in the early stages of the narrative. Such a narration 
would also necessarily involve the audience in a great deal of inferen­
tial activity that would in itself be a source of the narrative's pleasure. 
Furthermore, although this procedure would entail the paradoxical 
situation described above, it would not be noticed. It would not be 
noticed because as the audience reads the early chapters—and indeed, 
the middle and later chapters—it does not know whether the narrator 
will attain any more knowledge than he has at the time of the narra­
tion. Thus, when we read the last sentence of chapter 1 in the tempo­
ral progression of the novel, we are not aware of the paradox because 
we do not know that Frederic comes to an understanding of the war 
and the world that would make it impossible for him to utter such a 
sentence without being ironic. 
If the analysis of this chapter has been at all persuasive, then I think it 
suggests several noteworthy conclusions about Frederic's narration. 
First, it indicates the subtlety and skill with which Hemingway 
handles that narration. As Hemingway carefully constructs a progres­
sive action in which Frederic works through his unstable relations 
with the war, with Catherine, and finally with the destructive world, 
he also develops a highly nuanced but clearly discernible progression 
of voice. Though Frederic's style does remain recognizably the same 
from beginning to end, his voice does not. Instead, as Frederic takes 
on features of Passini's voice and Catherine's, he is gradually moving 
closer to the values of the Orchestrator of the voices, Hemingway 
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himself. Second, in showing that the technique has limits as well as 
powers, the analysis offers an account for some of the interpretive dis­
agreement about the novel that accuses neither Hemingway nor his 
critics of being butchers. The disagreements stem not from sloppiness 
but from divergent inferences that naturally arise as Hemingway 
bumps up against the limits of his technique. Third, in showing that 
according to the standards of naturalistic probability Frederic could 
not logically tell his story as he does, the analysis suggests something 
about the conventions of homodiegetic narration. We will overlook 
the mimetic impossibility to allow Hemingway to tell the story in the 
most effective way—provided that the awareness of the impossibility 
is not foregrounded by the narrative itself. Taken together, these con­
clusions suggest that the smooth surface of Hemingway's prose belies 
the dynamic interaction of voice, character, and action that we must 
attend to in order to feel the progression of the narrative. 
Part Two 
Mimetic Conventions,

Ethics, and Homodiegetic

Narration
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What Hemingway and a 
Rhetorical Theory of 
Narrative Can Do for Each 
Other* The Example of 
"My Old Man" 
Tliis essay returns to some previous issues—progression, naive narration, the 
paradox ofparalipsis—and looks at them in the context, first, of trying to solve 
some interpretive problems in the first short story Hemingway published in the 
United States and, second, of thinking about how those solutions might shed 
light on rhetorical theory. In addition, the essay continues some of the concerns 
of the analyses of voice by explicitly raising the question of the flesh-and-blood 
reader's response to the ethics of the story. 
My attempt to have theory and narrative be mutually illuminating here 
points to one important relation of theory and practice. More generally, this 
essay and the others in this volume seek not only to illustrate principles of my 
approach to narrative as rhetoric and to interpret the set of narratives under in­
vestigation but also to stretch my understanding of those principles and to sug­
gest that the analyses of the interpretive issues in these narratives will have 
implications for our reading of others. 
87 
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Interpretive Problems in "My Old Man" 
Just what happens at the end of "My Old Man"? And just how good is 
Hemingway's first published story? According to such early commen­
tators as Sheridan Baker, Carlos Baker, and Arthur Waldhom, the 
ending reveals Joe Butler's disillusionment with his father when Joe 
learns that he has mistakenly been admiring a crooked jockey. For 
them, the story is a rather unexceptional achievement, one derivative 
of Sherwood Anderson's "I Want to Know Why," another tale of 
boys and horses in which a naive narrator becomes disillusioned with 
an adult male whom he has valued above all others. 
According to more recent commentators such as Sydney J. Krause, 
Robert Lewis, Gerry Brenner, and Paul Smith, the ending is more 
complicated than that; in their view, Hemingway has given Joe's tale a 
"Jamesian" twist by providing evidence that Joe's disillusionment is 
unfounded. Brenner, who pushes this line the furthest, maintains that 
Hemingway asks his reader to see that Joe's father has been acting to 
reform the crooked world of horse racing and that the bettors' final 
complaints about "what he pulled" are testimony to his honesty (9). 
For this group, the Jamesian twist adds to the sophistication and qual­
ity of the story; rather than being derivative of "I Want to Know 
Why," "My Old Man" is a step beyond it. 
According to Philip Sipiora, who has offered the most recent ex­
tended treatment, the ending suggests that Joe recognizes both that his 
father was involved in fixing races and that he has reformed, a dual 
recognition that allows Joe to retain his respect for his father. Al­
though Sipiora does not explicitly address the question of the tale's 
quality, his treatment everywhere implicitly testifies to his belief that it 
is a significant achievement. 
These divergent views of the meaning and value of "My Old Man" 
present interpretive problems that constitute a theoretical opportu­
nity. The divergence is sufficient to give me pause before simply going 
ahead and proposing another contender to the title of Most Perspicu­
ous Reading. Instead, I would like to consider both the meaning and 
the value of the story in light of my approach to narrative as rhetoric, 
with special attention to the textual features most involved in the dis­
agreement. At the same time, I would like to make not just the story 
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but also the approach an object of investigation so that theory and 
story can be mutually illuminating. That is, rather than simply invoke 
rhetorical theory to "solve" the interpretive problems of the story, I 
would like the theory itself to be open to revision or complication by 
Hemingway's story. The traffic flow at this intersection of Theory and 
Story will become clearer as I proceed. For now, I want to consider 
the details of "My Old Man'' that lead to its interpretive problems. 
Two key elements of the tale are the sources of disagreement: 
Hemingway's choice of a naive narrator, and the suddenness with 
which Joe's feelings for his father alter at the end. Because the naivete 
of Joe-the-narrator matches that of Joe-the-character (and this feature 
of the story is one that we must come back to), he never fully articu­
lates his understanding of the final events of the story. Consequently, 
we are left to make our own inferences when we read the concluding 
sequence: the gamblers' remarks that Joe's father "got his all right"; 
George Gardner s reassuring words, "Your old man was one swell 
guy' ; and Joe's final comments, "But I don't know. Seems like when 
they get started they don't leave a guy nothing" (129). We reach dif­
ferent conclusions depending on (1) the emphases we put on these fi­
nal comments (is "But I don't know" a repudiation of Gardner or an 
expression of genuine doubt?) and (2) the way we add up the previous 
evidence about Joe's father's behavior and Joe's understanding of it. 
Given these sources of disagreement, the story presents a twofold 
theoretical opportunity: to explore the nature and functions of naive 
narration and to investigate endings as the conclusions not just of 
plots—some sequences of events—but also of progressions: audience's 
involvement with and response to such sequences. I begin with the 
larger, more overarching concern, the concept of narrative as a devel­
oping progression of readerly engagement. This discussion has some 
overlap with the account given in chapter 1 before my analysis of The 
Waves, but it has a slightly different emphasis. 
Character, Progression, and Narrative as Rhetoric 
In using a phrase such as "developing progression of readerly engage­
ment," I am calling attention to the way my rhetorical approach 
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focuses on the text as an invitation to an experience that is dynamic in 
at least two ways. First, the experience is crucially influenced by the 
movement of the narrative through time. Second, the experience is 
multilayered, one that engages a reader's intellect, emotions, judg­
ments, and ethics simultaneously. As noted in chapter 1, the general 
term I use to refer to the concept of narrative-as-dynamic-experience 
is progression. Since the discussion in chapter 1 began with character 
and moved toward progression, it will be helpful here to begin with 
progression and focus on response. 
Progression refers to the way in which a narrative establishes its 
own logic of forward movement (and thus addresses the first sense of 
narrative as dynamic experience), and it refers to the way that move­
ment carries with it invitations to different kinds of responses in the 
reader (and thus it addresses the second sense of narrative as dynamic 
experience). The structuralist distinction between story and discourse 
helps explain the way the logic of narrative movement can develop. 
Progressions can be generated through what happens with the ele­
ments of story, that is, through the introduction of instabilities— 
conflictual relations between or within characters that lead to 
complications in the action and sometimes eventually to resolution. 
Progressions can also be generated through what happens with the 
elements of discourse, that is, through tensions or conflictual rela­
tions—relations involving significant gaps in values, beliefs, or knowl­
edge—between authors and readers or narrators and readers. Unlike 
instabilities, tensions do not need to be resolved for narratives to 
achieve closure. One typical consequence of naive narration is that it 
establishes some tension between the narrator and the reader. 
For example, in the beginning of A Farewell to Arms, as I argued in 
chapter 3, Hemingway generates the movement of his narrative, first, 
by creating a tension between Frederic's unreflective beliefs about the 
war and the ones Hemingway asks us to adopt and, second, by placing 
Frederic in the unstable situation of war and in his complicated rela­
tionship with Catherine. The progression then develops from the 
complications arising from the instabilities, and those complications 
eventually alter the tension so that, as Frederic's beliefs gradually 
change, the tension is gradually resolved. 
To account for the multiple layers of our responses to narrative, I 
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suggest that as we follow the movement of instabilities and tensions, 
we respond to the text's—and especially to the characters'—mimetic, 
thematic, and synthetic components. That is, we respond to the char­
acters as human agents, as representing some ideas, beliefs, or values, 
and as artificial constructs playing particular roles in the larger con­
struct that is the whole work. In Farewell, we respond to Count Greffi, 
for example, as an individual with specific traits, as representing a set 
of attitudes that illustrate how to deal with the world's essential emp­
tiness, and as a device for instructing Frederic and the reader in those 
attitudes. These responses to Greffi become part of our larger experi­
ence because they interact with the dynamic sequences of responses 
we have been making to Frederic from the first page. That larger se­
quence influences our response to Greffi. Our judgments of his atti­
tudes, for example, depend in part on the judgments we have made 
about the attitudes espoused by Frederic, Rinaldi, the priest, 
Catherine, and others. Furthermore, our response to Greffi becomes 
a new part of the whole sequence, one that adds further nuances 
to our complex experience of the whole narrative, and then influ­
ences our response to later events such as Frederic's final action in the 
narrative. 
Count Greffi's role in Farewell illustrates another significant point: 
not every character or scene will directly contribute to the introduc­
tion, complication, or resolution of an instability or a tension, yet ev­
eryone will have some role in the progression. Nothing Greffi does 
affects the sequence of events, and nothing he does increases or re­
solves the tension between Frederic's views and Hemingway's. Nev­
ertheless, his appearance allows Hemingway to introduce for Frederic 
and the audience one admirable way of living with the knowledge of 
the world's destructiveness. Greffi thereby contributes to the progres­
sion by contributing to the audience's understanding of Frederic's 
eventual response to his own knowledge of that destructiveness. 
To avoid the trap of a priori analysis, I make no claims either about 
the kinds of progressions that narratives must follow or about the most 
effective or most frequent relationships among a text's mimetic, the­
matic, and synthetic components. Each progression will establish its 
own relationships, and different successful narratives can establish very 
different relationships. 
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The Progression of "My Old Man" 
Approaching "My Old Man" from this perspective, we can recognize 
something quite striking about its dynamics. Despite its apparent 
straightforwardness, the story actually develops from the intersection 
of two distinct paths: one created by the tensions in Joe's narration and 
the other created by the instabilities in his father's life as a jockey. The 
tensions focus our interest very strongly on Joe and his understanding 
of what he is telling us, whereas the instabilities focus our interest very 
strongly on Joe's father and what happens to him. Again quite strik­
ingly, the interaction of the tensions and instabilities makes the rela­
tionship between father and son a principal interest of the tale, but 
until the very end of the narrative that relationship is essentially stable: 
Joe loves and admires his father, and there is no conflict between them. 
This understanding of the developing progression already points to 
some special features of Hemingway's ending. He draws upon the 
previous tensions and instabilities, first, to make the relationship be­
tween father and son the most important focus of the whole story. 
The resolution of the instabilities in Butler's life becomes subordi­
nated to its effect on Joe's relation to him. Second, Hemingway draws 
upon the previous tensions and instabilities to transform the father-son 
relationship from one stable entity into another. Admiration is re­
placed by some other feeling, which in turn complicates the love. In­
deed, understanding more precisely how Hemingway transforms the 
progression of the whole after Butler's death will not only lead to my 
proposal about the ending but will also provide the key to seeing what 
"My Old Man" can do for narrative theory. But before we can analyze 
that transformation, we need to look more closely at the interaction 
between the tensions and the instabilities in the beginning and the 
middle of the tale. I will focus on those elements that are most relevant 
to our understanding of Joe as naive narrator, of Butler as a moral 
agent, and of the ending: Joe's opening account of how his father kept 
his weight down; the juxtapositions of Joe's views with his father's 
during their time in Milan; Joe's commentary on George Gardner af­
ter the fixed Kzar-Kircubbin race at St. Cloud; Butler's actions and re­
actions between that race and purchasing his own horse; and the final 
paragraphs of the story. 
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Joe's opening account does not introduce any instabilities, and, 
with the exception of minor indications of Joe's superior knowledge 
about what has happened to his father, it does not introduce tensions 
until its end. Instead, the account strongly establishes the initial stable 
situation between Joe and his father. It also introduces us to Joe as an 
unselfconscious narrator. His references to what he can "guess, look­
ing at it now" and to what his father was like "toward the last" (151) 
indicate that he has a story to tell, but Joe does not begin that story at 
the beginning or explain why he begins with this account of how his 
father kept his weight down. Indeed, because he plunges into the nar­
rative by telling us about habitual actions that do not lead to other ac­
tions in the story, he seems less interested in composing a narrative 
than in just talking about his father. But Hemingway, we realize, is us­
ing Joe's apparently unsophisticated narration in some sophisticated 
ways. To explain those uses more fully, it will be helpful to introduce 
another element of the rhetorical approach. 
Implicit in the discussion of Joe as unsophisticated narrator and 
Hemingway as sophisticated implied author is a distinction between 
two audiences, between what Peter J. Rabinowitz has called the au­
thorial and the narrative audiences. On Rabinowitz's account, which 
I shall examine more closely in chapter 7, the narrative audience is the 
one implicitly addressed by the narrator; it takes on the beliefs and val­
ues that the narrator ascribes to it, and in most cases it responds to the 
characters and events as if they were real. Joining the narrative audi­
ence is crucial for our experience of the mimetic component of the 
text and sometimes for the thematic and synthetic components as 
well. The authorial audience takes on the beliefs and knowledge that 
the author assumes it has, including the knowledge that it is reading a 
constructed text. Joining the authorial audience is crucial for our ex­
perience of all the invitations offered by the different components of 
the text. Engaging with the text involves entering both of these textu­
ally signaled audiences simultaneously; engaging also means that we 
bring our individual subjectivities, our flesh-and-blood selves to bear 
on our experience, a point I will pursue further when I discuss the 
evaluation of "My Old Man." 
In the opening pages of Joe's narration, we respond strongly to 
Joe's voice and immediately start reading numerically. At the same 
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time, as members of the authorial audience our covert awareness of 
the synthetic component of Joe's character helps us recognize how 
Hemingway uses Joe's talk as a brilliant beginning to the story, a be­
ginning that performs four important functions. 
First and most obviously, as Joe's narration establishes the initial 
stable situation, it reveals the strength and importance of his feelings 
for his father: "When I'd sit watching him working out in the hot sun 
I sure felt fond of him. He sure was fun and he done his work so hard" 
(116). Second, the account validates Joe's feelings—and contributes to 
the establishment of the audience's very positive initial evaluation of 
Butler. Joe's narration casually reveals how Butler included Joe in 
what he was doing, and it shows the way the two of them shared the 
pleasure of the workout: "I'd help him pull off his boots. 'Come 
on, kid,' he'd say, 'let's get moving.' Then we'd start off jogging 
around the infield. when he'd catch me looking at him, he'd grin 
and say, 'Sweating plenty?' When my old man grinned, nobody could 
help but grin too. We'd keep right on running out toward the moun­
tains'' (115). Third, the account reinforces this positive evaluation by 
linking Butler's workout with the elements of nature that surround it. 
(Roadwork has never sounded so appealing.) Joe and his father would 
start out "with the dew all over everything and the sun just starting to 
get going" (115). They'd be "running nice, along one of those roads 
with all the trees along both sides of them that run out from San Siro." 
They'd run out "toward the mountains' until Butler would decide to 
rest against one of the trees before beginning to skip rope in the sun 
(115-16). 
Fourth, the account implies an equivalence between Butler's 
working out and his working, and at the end it suggests that the work­
ing out is superior to the working. In Joe's description, his father's 
jumping rope is very much like riding: he'd move "up and down a 
patch of road" with "the rope going cloppetty, cloppetty, clop, clop, 
clop" (116). As he jumped, he'd often draw spectators. Most impor­
tant, the running and jumping would produce for Butler the effect 
that riding produced for other jockeys. "Most jocks can just about ride 
off all they want to. A jock loses about a kilo every time he rides, but 
my old man was sort of dried out and he couldn't keep his kilos down 
without all that running" (116). 
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David Lodge's way of talking about metaphor and metonymy in his 
essay on "Cat in the Rain" provides a helpful first step in understand­
ing this last point. At the level of story, the running has a metonymic 
relation to the riding: Butler runs in order to be fit to ride. The dis­
course, however, makes the running equivalent to—and hence puts it 
in a metaphoric relation to—the riding: Butler's running resembles 
and produces the same (or better) effects than his riding. The second 
step is recognizing that the shift from metonymy to metaphor high­
lights the narrative's first significant instability and tension—located in 
Joe's remark that his father was "sort of dried out." Joe has repeatedly 
stated that Butler sweats profusely when working out: Joe describes 
"the sweat pouring off his [father's] face" (116) and says that Butler 
would finish jumping with a "whirring that'd drive the sweat out on 
his face like water'' (116). In the authorial audience we cannot take 
Joe's remark about Butler's being dried out at face value, and so we 
begin to separate ourselves from Joe's perspective. At the same time, 
the odd physiological reaction to the riding—as well as the implication 
that the running and jumping rope are a better substitute—suggests 
that there is something unstable in Butler's relation to his work, that 
the psychological dimension of that relation is far more complicated 
than Joe knows. 
This suggestion is immediately reinforced by the next several 
moves of the narrative. First, Joe reports the way his father, "looking 
tired and red-faced and too big for his silks," stared at the "cool and 
kid-looking" Italian jockey, Regoli, as if Regoli had just bumped him 
and then in reply to Joe's question "What's the matter?" said, "Oh, to 
hell with it" (117).1 Second, Hemingway juxtaposes Joe's perspective 
with his father's in a single sentence: "San Siro was the swellest course 
I'd ever seen but the old man said it was a dog's life' (117). Third, 
Hemingway juxtaposes Joe's disquisition on how "nuts" he was about 
the horses with his father's statement, "None of these things are 
horses, Joe. They'd kill that bunch of skates for their hides and hoofs 
up at Paris" (118). 
These tensions between Joe's understanding and the authorial 
audience's and the corresponding hints at instabilities in Butler's work 
situation prepare the way for our understanding of the first major in­
stability in Butler's life story: the events surrounding his winning the 
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Primo Commercio. We see that Butler has been going along with the 
fixing of races and has agreed to participate in the fix at this race, too. 
But going along with the system means going against his basic na­
ture—it is drying him out and leaving him dissatisfied with his situa­
tion. Unable to take it anymore, he rebels and rides to win. The 
rebellion, however, gives him no satisfaction because it gives him no 
power. After the argument with Holbrook and the unnamed Italian, 
"his face was white and he looked sick as hell" (118) because he real­
izes that by rebelling he has jeopardized his livelihood. Every other 
event in Joe's father's life is a consequence of the resulting unstable 
situation. 
As we infer the instabilities in Butler's situation, we also begin to 
complicate our evaluation of his character. He is not the crook that 
early interpretations of the story have assumed, nor is he the crusading 
hero that Brenner depicts. Instead, he is a fundamentally decent man 
caught in a corrupt system, a man who has been complicit with that 
system but who also rebels against it. He tries not to undo the system 
but just to get out from under it. 
When his flight to Paris does not prove to be an effective escape be­
cause he remains blackballed and unable to make a living, Butler uses 
the system to his own advantage, taking George Gardner's inside in­
formation and betting heavily on the Kzar-Kircubbin race. This inci­
dent contributes to the progression by eventually making possible 
Butler's effort to ride without being controlled by the fixers, when he 
uses his winnings to buy his own horse. I will discuss that develop­
ment shortly, but for now I will focus on the more immediate effect of 
the incident itself on the progression: the further development of the 
tensions between Joe and the authorial audience, a development that 
has important implications for the ending. The development arises 
from Joe's response to his first clear look at the corruption of horse 
racing. 
When Butler reminds Joe that the race was fixed by saying that 
George had to be a "great jock" to keep Kzar from winning, Joe re­
marks: "I thought, I wish I were a jockey and could have rode him in­
stead of that son of a bitch. And that was funny, thinking of George 
Gardner as a son of a bitch because I'd always liked him and he'd given 
us the winner, but I guess that's what he is, all right" (124). By express­
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ing his conclusion this way, Joe reveals his value system: a jockey who 
would hold back a horse as magnificent as Kzar is a "son of a bitch," re­
gardless of whatever redeeming features he might have. Hemingway, 
however, has written the scene so that in the authorial audience we 
recognize the limits of that value system. Joe's last sentence about 
Gardner indicates that he thinks he is admitting a difficult truth, but in 
the authorial audience we recognize that Joe's conclusion is based on 
his partial view of the situation, a recognition that largely depends on 
the way the story builds a link between Gardner and Butler. 
Hemingway links Gardner and Butler, first, by giving them a com­
mon voice: as Joe records their dialogue, he unwittingly shows how 
much knowledge the two men share—when Butler asks, "What's the 
dope, George?" Gardner simply answers, "He won't win" (121)—and 
how attuned they are to each other. Butler's first question is asked "in 
an ordinary tone of voice," and then when George replies in a low 
one, Butler asks his second question, "Who will?" in an equally low 
voice (121). Furthermore, they are comfortable enough with each 
other and with what they are doing to joke. In addition to linking 
them through voice, Hemingway also links them through action: 
once Butler uses George's information to make his bet, he is again as 
complicit in the fixed system as George is. What Joe doesn't see is that 
if Gardner is a son of a bitch, his father is, too. But just as we depart 
from Holbrook's evaluation of Butler as a "son of a bitch," we also de­
part from Joe's judgment of Gardner. Gardner, too, is a man caught in 
the system. He is acting as Butler has acted many times in Milan, ex­
cept that he is now also trying to help his friend beat the system. 
Above all, what we see is that Joe's condemnation is misdirected. His 
moral sense rightly tells him that he should feel angry, but he under­
stands the system so dimly that he condemns the jockey rather than 
those like Holbrook who control him. At the same time, neither 
Gardner nor Butler is off Hemingway's hook: complicity is complic­
ity, not necessity. 
Butler's actions after collecting his winnings further shade our 
evaluation of him. Brenner suggests that Butler's motive has been 
noble: he takes advantage of Gardner's information to buy his own 
horse and battle the corrupt system. Had the progression been such 
that Butler's next act was the purchase of Gilford, then Brenner would 
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be right on target. But Butler's winnings seem to create another varia­
tion of the basic instability established after the Primo Commercio: 
what will he do with his life now? Joe describes their days: "We'd sit at 
the Cafe de la Paix, my old man and me, and we had a big drag with 
the waiter because my old man drank whisky and it cost five francs, 
and that meant a good tip when the saucers were counted up. My old 
man was drinking more than I'd ever seen him, but he wasn't riding at 
all now and besides he said that whisky kept his weight down. But I 
noticed he was putting it on, all right, just the same. . he was drop­
ping money every day at the track. He'd feel sort of doleful after the 
last race, if he'd lost on that day, until we'd get to our table and he'd 
have his first whisky and then he'd be fine" (125). 
Butler's taking advantage of Gardner's information is the flip side of 
Butler's winning the Primo Commercio. There he asserted himself 
against the system of fixing by refusing to go along with it. Here he as­
serts himself against it by taking advantage of it. But each rebellion is 
an isolated act, and each one leaves him dissatisfied. He cannot take 
satisfaction in the first act because of its consequences for his work, 
and he cannot take satisfaction in the second because it has again made 
him complicit in the system. Buying his own horse, however, is 
clearly a step toward a positive resolution of these instabilities. Not 
only does Butler start his "running and sweating again," but when he 
stands in the place stall after his first race, he is "all sweating and 
happy"—as he is after working out (126, my emphasis). Now that he 
is outside the system of fixing, Butler is no longer dried out. 
When Butler's brief happiness ends in the Prix du Marat, Joe is left 
to deal with the consequences, and like the situation after the Kzar-
Kircubbin race, he assesses his situation as a result of the perspective 
offered by someone else, this time the bettors. But the situation—and 
our relation to Joe—is more complicated here. As I noted earlier, the 
ending suddenly and completely transforms the stable relationship be­
tween Joe and his father. It remains unstable only for as long as it takes 
Joe to assimilate the bettors' harsh words and react to George's com­
forting ones; then it takes a new—and apparently permanent—stable 
shape. 
Hemingway is able to effect this transformation because the source 
of the tensions between narrator and authorial audience has also al­
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ways been a potential source of instability between Joe and his father: 
the gap between the complex reality of Butler's life and Joe's limited 
understanding of it always had the potential to affect the relationship 
between the two of them, either through the misunderstanding itself 
or through the consequences of its diminishment. Hemingway uses 
the bettors' words to activate the potential. In a sense, then, the ques­
tion about the ending is whether the activation and resolution of this 
instability also resolve the tensions between Joe and the authorial 
audience. 
The analysis I've offered so far points to an answer. Joe reacts to the 
bettors' words the way he reacts to his father's words after the Kzar-
Kircubbin race, that is, he believes that he now sees something that he 
had been blind to before. To be sure, the bettors' harshness is directed 
at "the stuff he's pulled"—at his not always going along with the fix. 
What Joe sees is that his father was, in some way or other, part of the 
corrupt world of horse racing. Thus, he finds no solace in George's 
words—"your old man was one swell guy"—because George only re­
peats Joe's old truth and because Joe believes that George himself is a 
son of a bitch. Although Joe stops short of fully repudiating Gardner's 
words and adopting the bettors' views, his "But I don't know'' in 
combination with his final words does indicate that his admiration for 
his father is completely undermined—and that he has a new, deeper 
sense of the harshness of the world: "Seems like when they get started 
they don't leave a guy nothing."2 
In the authorial audience we recognize that Joe's understanding is 
still limited. The nuanced evaluation of Butler that we have developed 
through the course of the progression now functions as the standard 
against which we measure Joe's conclusions. In that measuring, we see 
that the tension is altered but not resolved. Joe rightly understands that 
there was more to his father than he knew, but he gets stuck on his 
father's participation in the crooked world of horse racing, blinding 
himself both to his father's rebellion and to his genuine love. Further­
more, following a point made by Robert Lewis, we can see that Joe's 
failure to appreciate Gardner's kindness to him here is itself a sign of 
Joe's occluded vision. 
Strikingly, the tension between Joe and the authorial audience 
gives his final sentence, which he uses to thematize his experience, an 
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added twist. We are deeply moved by Joe's devastation. In losing his 
father, he has essentially lost his world. Although he is now an adoles­
cent, he has made only the smallest of steps toward establishing his in­
dependence—occasionally going off bumming with other kids and 
once showing interest in a girl. But Butler's acquiring Gilford brought 
Joe completely back within the orbit of his father's life. Now that life 
is gone and so is his sense of who his father was. Accompanying this 
loss is a new awareness of the world's capacity for inflicting pain. Fur­
thermore, the gap between Joe's understanding of Butler and ours 
gives the loss an additional poignance. We see that although Joe has 
lost all his admiration for his father, there is still much about Butler to 
be admired. Thus, we agree with Joe's last sentence because it captures 
something about the world's potential for cruelty, but we also disagree 
with Joe's needless overgeneralization: "Seems like when they get 
started they don't leave a guy nothing." 
Ethics, Evaluation, and the Flesh-and-Blood Reader 
Even as we participate in the authorial and narrative audiences, we 
never lose our identities as flesh-and-blood readers, and that fact adds a 
further layer to our experience. Just as the authorial audience evaluates 
the narrator's values, so too does the flesh-and-blood audience evalu­
ate the author's. Entering the authorial audience allows us to recog­
nize the ethical and ideological bases of the author's invitations. 
Comparing those values to the ones we bring to the text leads us into a 
dialogue about those values. Sometimes our values may be confirmed 
by those of the text, sometimes they may be challenged, and some­
times they may be ignored or insulted. When our values conflict with 
those of the text, we either will alter ours or resist those of the text (in 
whole or in part). The ethical dimension of the story involves the val­
ues upon which the authorial audience's judgments are based, the way 
those values are deployed in the narrative, and, finally, the values and 
beliefs implicit in the thematizing of the character's experience. 
Some of the values underlying "My Old Man" are time-honored 
ones in our culture: the importance of love between father and son, 
the superiority of honesty to dishonesty. Some indicate a more mod­
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em view: individual actions such as the jockeys' participating in the 
rigged system cannot be judged without regard to the whole context 
in which they occur. Yet none of the values represents a major depar­
ture from or a major challenge to the values that most readers are likely 
to bring to the story. The values are deployed with considerable skill 
and sophistication. I believe that this recognition partially underlies 
the claims that "My Old Man" is less an homage to Anderson than a 
demonstration of Hemingway's superiority to him. The deployment 
of the values leads the authorial audience to carefully nuanced judg­
ments of Butler and of Joe. In responding to Butler, we are responding 
to a man who senses what is right but cannot always act according to 
that sense. In responding to Joe at the end, we are responding to a boy 
who is understandably devastated, yet devastated in a way that his 
fuller understanding would have prevented. Consequently, we are 
asked to respond in complex ways, asked to draw upon our own expe­
riences with complicity, with undue admiration of a revered figure, 
and with undue disillusionment. In short, I think Hemingway's de­
ployment of the basic values involves us in a progression whose ethical 
quality is rich and satisfying. In that sense, "My Old Man" is a very 
fine achievement, one whose quality has not been fully appreciated. 
The values and beliefs associated with the thematizing are likely, I 
think, to evoke more variation among flesh-and-blood readers. For 
some, they may be very problematic or even harmful: a person trying 
to recover from an experience that has left him or her feeling stripped 
of everything may be seriously set back by experiencing Joe's account 
of how he came to conclude that "once they get started they don't 
leave a guy nothing.'' On the other hand, someone who is further 
along in such a recovery may find something to build on in recogniz­
ing that Joe's conclusion is severely limited. Other readers will resist 
the general negativism of the thematizing. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that the resistance leads them to an honest reexamination of their al­
ternative beliefs, their reading will be a positive experience. Those 
who already agree with Joe's conclusion will have their belief rein­
forced by reading the story, and they may either engage very power­
fully and productively with the story or minimally and unfruitfully. 
A second step here is to recognize that the values and beliefs im­
plicit in the thematizing in "My Old Man'' are part of Hemingway's 
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larger set of values and beliefs. Although that set has often been too 
easily summarized and made systematic, two of its important elements 
are that the world is a destructive place and that men should face that 
truth with toughness and dignity and strength. Flesh-and-blood read­
ers again vary in their responses to these truths. Some readers build 
from them a code to live by. Some accept the belief about the world 
but refuse the stipulation about how best to respond. Others vehe­
mently argue about the problems with Hemingway's focus on men, 
asserting that his so-called truths are themselves undermined by his 
failure to represent women acting in accord with them. Still others 
refuse the initial characterization of the world. And in each case, 
Hemingway's success in pulling readers into his authorial audience 
will have consequences for the depth of one's engagement—positive 
or negative—with his values, just as the outcome of each reader's en­
gagement will have consequences for the way he or she reacts to 
Hemingway's next invitation. 
From Text to Theory 
If "My Old Man" works something like the way I have claimed, then 
it provides three insights into our general understanding of the way 
narratives, when viewed rhetorically, work—and all three are related 
to Hemingway's use of the naive narrator. The first insight depends on 
taking one step further my discussion of the deployment of the 
narrative's values. The rich ethical quality of the transaction is inti­
mately tied up with Hemingway's handling of Joe's narration: the 
ethical quality depends not just on our seeing the complexity of 
Butler's and Joe's situations but also on how we see it. Because the 
tensions in Joe's narration so strongly activate our powers of inference, 
we become strongly engaged in the characters' situations, mimetically 
and ethically. Since our inferences are directed by Hemingway, we 
rely very heavily on both his craft and his moral vision—and on his 
way of revealing the vision through his skill with the naive narration. 
Hemingway's tale is far from the first to show us this potential in naive 
narration, but "My Old Man'7 should, I think, deepen our apprecia­
tion of the ways in which technique and vision function interdepen­
dently as we read. 
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Second, Hemingway's management of the ending gives "My Old 
Man" a progression unlike any other that I know, even as it teaches us 
something about the categories of our analysis. Structuralists distin­
guish between story and discourse in order to be able to specify the 
different bases of a narrative's construction, and structuralists such as 
Chatman go to great lengths to keep the two parts of narrative dis­
tinct.3 I follow the structuralist distinction because separating tensions 
from instabilities enables me to identify distinct sources of narrative 
movement. Unlike the structuralists, however, I do not regard the dis­
tinction as absolute, and "My Old Man" provides evidence that it is 
not: Joe's unreliable narration indicates that the same element of a nar­
rative can function simultaneously as discourse (the unreliability cre­
ates a tension) and as story (the unreliability simultaneously generates 
an instability—or at least the potential for an instability). In other 
words, Hemingway's story suggests that, from a rhetorical perspective, 
the story-discourse distinction is better seen as a heuristic than as an 
absolute. 
The third insight is more complicated. Even more than A Farewell 
to Arms, the story exposes the paradox of this kind of paralipsis, in 
which a naive narrator apparently sheds his naivete. Joe Butler narrates 
the tale of his disillusionment at some unspecified point after he has 
experienced that disillusionment. Logically, his new attitude toward 
his father should permeate his narration. But it does not.4 
If Joe's new attitude did permeate his narration, the ending would 
lose all its power. Yet we feel neither that Joe is being insincere nor 
that he is deliberately withholding his knowledge from us for his own 
artistic purposes (if he were, then he would not be a naive character 
but a highly sophisticated narrator). In this respect, the story exposes 
the inescapably synthetic nature of apparently mimetic naive narra­
tion, and it points to one difference between fictional and nonfictional 
homodiegetic narration. In nonfiction, the homodiegetic or autodi­
egetic narrator can employ paralipsis, but such employment will al­
ways reflect some self-consciousness. A real-life narrator cannot tell a 
story of self-enlightenment and simultaneously be unaware of that en­
lightenment until it occurs in the action. (The other alternative, of 
course, would be that the real-life narrator would have his knowledge 
inform his narration.) 
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In the case of "My Old Man," however, Hemingway is able to 
have the paralipsis and Joe's unselfconsciousness peacefully, albeit 
paradoxically, coexist: as with A Farewell to Arms, the story retains its 
mimetic power, even after the paradox is exposed. 
There are two related reasons for this effect. First, mimesis is always 
a matter of conventions, and one convention of mimetic narrative is 
that narration from the time of the action enhances the mimetic ef­
fect.5 Such narration creates the impression that the action is unfolding 
before us rather than being told after the fact. Second, as in A Farewell 
to Arms, we experience the progression. We do not know that the nar­
rator will lose his naivete and so are not aware that the logic of mimesis 
rules out the kind of narration we are reading. It is not until our expe­
rience of the narrative is over that mimetic logic steps in and says that 
we can't have experienced what we just experienced. But that mi­
metic logic must yield to the commonsense logic that points out we 
have already experienced it. 
Just what happens at the end of "My Old Man"? And how good is 
the first story Hemingway published in the United States? In answer­
ing these questions by saying, in effect, "something complicated and 
subtle" and "very good indeed," I have also tried to sketch one ap­
proach to answering similar questions about other narratives. For 
now, I want to stand by these answers, but just as Hemingway's story 
has something to offer narrative theory, I am very much aware that 
other critics and theorists may lead me to revise them. Progression 
ought not be a concept limited to narrative dynamics. 
Reexamining Reliability:

The Multiple Functions of

Nick Carraway

In a sense, this chapter follows out the logic underlying my analysis of the para­
dox ofparalipsis in the two Hemingway narratives. It starts with a look at an 
instance ofparalepsis. If that paradoxical situation is rhetorically effective, then 
perhaps an author may also create an effective homodiegetic narrator who fluctu­
ates between being unreliable and being (apparently) omniscient. The key to 
recognizing such possibilities is to recognize that although any homodiegetic ut­
terance simultaneously brings into existence both a narrator and a character, the 
narrator functions and the character functions need not coincide or even be 
complementary. Nick Carraway is a very instructive case in point. The general 
point in these two chapters about the conventional nature of mimesis is also a 
feature of my analysis of the simultaneous present-tense narration in J. M. 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians in Understanding Narrative, ed­
ited by fames Phelan and Peter f. Rabinowitz (Columbus: Ohio State Uni­
versity Press, 1994). 
In chapter 8 of The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald has Nick narrate the 
events that occur in George Wilson's garage the night after Myrtle 
Wilson is killed by the driver of Gatsby's automobile. Here is the first 
sentence of this five-page section and a short excerpt from the middle: 
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Now I want to go back a little and tell what happened at the

garage after we left there the night before. . . .

The effort of answering broke the rhythm of [Wilson's] rock­
ing—for a moment he was silent. Then the same half knowing, half 
bewildered look came back into his faded eyes. 
"Look in the drawer there," he said, pointing at the desk.

"Which drawer?"

"That drawer—that one.'

Michaelis opened the drawer nearest his hand. There was noth­

ing in it but a small expensive dog leash made of leather and braided 
silver. It was apparently new. 
"This?" he inquired, holding it up. 
Wilson stared and nodded. 
"I found it yesterday afternoon. She tried to tell me about it but I 
knew it was something funny."

"You mean your wife bought it?"

"She had it wrapped in tissue paper on her bureau.'

Michaelis didn't see anything odd in that and he gave Wilson a

dozen reasons why his wife might have bought the dog leash. But 
conceivably Wilson had heard some of these same explanations 
before, from Myrtle, because he began saying "Oh, my God!" again 
in a whisper—his comforter left several explanations in the air. 
(165-66) 
This section of the narrative is striking for several reasons. First, al­
though Nick announces that he is going to "go back a little and tell 
what happened at the garage" after he, Jordan, and Tom left, Fitz­
gerald never bothers to have Nick explain how he learned what hap­
pened. We might suppose that either Fitzgerald made a mistake or 
assumed that he did not need to include any such explanation. Sec­
ond, the narration is not summary but scene: Nick is a New Journalist 
avant la lettre as he not only gives a verbatim report of a conversation he 
did not overhear but also includes numerous small dramatic details. 
Notice, for example, Nick's careful description of Wilsons look as 
"half knowing, half bewildered" and his drawing out the identifica­
tion of the drawer Wilson wants Michaelis to open—"Look in the 
drawer there." "Which drawer?" "That drawer—that one" (165). In­
deed, at first glance, the only sign in this excerpt that Nick may be 
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anything other than an omniscient heterodiegetic narrator is the word 
conceivably in the final sentence: "But conceivably Wilson had heard 
some of these same explanations before, from Myrtle" (166). 
In a sense, Nick's narration represents the flip side of Joe Butler's: 
where Joe's is marked by the absence of knowledge and opinion that 
we eventually learn he should have, Nick's is marked by the presence of 
knowledge that he presumably should not (because he could not) 
have. Genette, again, has noticed and named this variation of 
homodiegetic narration, calling it a paralepsis, but he does not address 
its effects. In attending to these effects in The Great Gatsby, I want to 
focus on three questions: (1) Has Fitzgerald violated the terms of his 
own novel by introducing this paralepsis, by converting Nick from 
witness-narrator to nearly omniscient narrator? (2) What bearing, if 
any, does Nick's function here have on our understanding of his 
much-debated reliability?' If Nick's near omniscience can be shown 
to be legitimate, then perhaps we have evidence to support the view 
that he is fundamentally reliable. If, however, Nick's near omni­
science suggests some violation of the terms Fitzgerald wants to be 
working within, then perhaps we should conclude that Nick is not 
merely unreliable but incoherent.2 (3) How does answering these 
questions about Nick's narration illuminate other features of Fitz­
gerald's narrative? 
In light of my argument about the paralipsis in Joe Butler's narra­
tion, it will come as no surprise that my hypothesis about the first 
question is that the paralepsis in Nick's narration is no violation. Fur­
thermore, although understanding why the paralepsis fits the logic of 
the narrative will not directly answer the question about Nick's reli­
ability, it will offer some ways to rethink the reliability/unreliability 
distinction. These ways, in turn, will then help us recognize the diver­
sity of potential functions a character-narrator such as Nick can be 
asked to perform within the space of single narrative. Finally, by seek­
ing to understand why Fitzgerald needs Nick to serve multiple func­
tions, we should learn something about the larger workings of 
Fitzgerald's narrative. 
Let us return to the narration of the scene between Michaelis and 
Wilson. For the most part, Fitzgerald has Nick render the scene in his 
own voice but through Michaelis's vision. That is, the diction and 
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syntax of the narration are Nick's: descriptions such as "The effort of 
answering broke the rhythm of his rocking—for a moment he was si­
lent. Then the same half knowing, half bewildered look came into his 
faded eyes'' (165) are perfectly consistent with the voice we have been 
hearing throughout the narrative. The visual perspective of the scene, 
however, is Michaelis's. Wilson is always seen from the outside as he 
would look to Michaelis. Furthermore, Michaelis is occasionally seen 
from the inside: we are told that "Michaelis didn't like to go into the 
garage because the work bench was stained where the body had been 
lying" (165); that Michaelis "believed that Mrs. Wilson had been run­
ning away from her husband" (167); that he had a "forlorn hope" that 
Wilson had a friend whom Michaelis could telephone (167); and that 
he "saw with a shock" (167) that Wilson seemed to be equating God 
and the eyes of Dr. T. J. Eckleburg. Fitzgerald's technique makes Nick 
function as a kind of invisible witness positioned over Michaelis's 
shoulder with the additional privilege of occasionally being able to of­
fer brief inside views of him. 
The way Fitzgerald is in violation of the terms of his narrative can 
be succinctly expressed in the following question: How can a witness-
narrator narrate what he didn't witness? Indeed, even if we supply an 
explanation that seeks to preserve the mimetic illusion Fitzgerald 
seems to be working within, for example, that Michaelis related these 
events at the inquest following Myrtle's and George's deaths or that 
Nick interviewed Michaelis a few days after these events, we still must 
recognize that the scene gives Nick a kind of privilege that his report­
ing of someone else's report could not have. As long as we are operat­
ing with the logic of strict mimesis, we would have to acknowledge 
that Michaelis's account could not have been as careful, detailed, and 
precise as Nick's narration is. Finally, if Fitzgerald were concerned 
about strict mimesis, he could have easily indicated that Michaelis was 
the chief source for Nick's knowledge and that Nick's imagination 
supplied the rest. 
Obviously, Fitzgerald was not so concerned, and it is my conten­
tion that he was right not to be. What matters at this point in the nar­
rative is not how Nick knows what he narrates but that this scene be 
narrated and that the information it contains come to us as authorita­
tive. After the excerpt I have quoted, the passage continues this way: 
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"Then he killed her," said Wilson. His mouth dropped open 
suddenly. 
"Who did?" 
"I have a way of finding out.1' 
"You're morbid, George," said his friend. "This has been a strain 
to you and you don't know what you're saying. You'd better try 
and sit quiet till morning." 
"He murdered her." 
"It was an accident, George.' 
Wilson shook his head. His eyes narrowed and his mouth wid­
ened slightly with the ghost of a superior "Hm!" 
"I know," he said definitely. "I'm one of these trusting fellas, and 
I don't think any harm to nobody, but when I get to know a thing, I 
know it. It was the man in the car. She ran out to speak to him and 
he wouldn't stop.' 
Michaelis had seen this too but it hadn't occurred to him that 
there was any special significance in it. He believed that Mrs. Wilson 
was running away from her husband rather than trying to stop any 
particular car. (166—67) 
This information, of course, is crucial to the reader's inferences 
about the death of Myrtle Wilson and about the deaths of Gatsby and 
Wilson himself, which Nick will report very shortly—indeed, within 
a few pages. If Fitzgerald does not present this information scenically, 
it will interfere with the reader s inferential activity in piecing the 
story together, in coming to our own understanding of how neatly 
Wilson ends up serving Tom Buchanan's purposes. If Fitzgerald calls 
attention to how Nick learned what he tells us, Fitzgerald will also call 
attention to the limits of Nick's knowledge, since Nick's research 
could never give him the full knowledge that his account presumes. In 
that way, if Fitzgerald tried to supply the source of Nick's knowledge, 
he would very likely weaken the authority of the scene. By having 
Nick narrate the scene in his own voice as if he were there on Mich­
aelis's shoulder, Fitzgerald both gives the narration some continuity 
with Nick's other reporting and invests the scene with full authority. 
One small sign of his success is that most readers do not even register 
the paralepsis as anomalous. 
If this analysis is correct, it suggests two other important conclu­
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sions: (1) as with the paralipsis in Joe Butler's narration, the paralepsis 
is not violating the conventions of mimesis; those conventions are 
somewhat elastic and the criterion "what is probable or possible in 
life" can sometimes give way, even in otherwise realistic narrative, to 
the criterion "what is needed by the narrative at this point." In other 
words, mimesis is not a matter of faithfully imitating the real (what­
ever that is) but is rather a set of conventions for representing what we 
provisionally and temporarily agree to be the real. In this larger view, 
Joe's paralipsis and Nick's paralepsis violate a narrow standard of mime­
sis, one based only on imitation-of-the-real ("knowledge alters per­
ception"; "you can't narrate authoritatively what you haven't wit­
nessed"); but Joe's paralipsis and Nick's paralepsis are consistent with a 
broader standard of mimesis, one that looks both to the real and to 
conventions for imitating it. Judgments about whether violations of 
the narrow standard of mimesis are problematic or not depend in part 
on what they make possible: both "My Old Man" and The Great 
Gatsby are more rhetorically effective as a result of their violations of 
the narrow mimetic logic. (2) Although a character-narrator's func­
tions as character and as narrator typically influence each other, some­
times these functions operate independently. Both of these conclu­
sions have a significant bearing on the debate about Nick's reliability. 
Though Wayne C. Booth was not the first to comment upon the 
phenomenon of an untrustworthy narrator, his treatment of reliable 
and unreliable narration in The Rhetoric of Fiction remains the chief 
source of the distinction. Booth defines a reliable narrator as one who 
shares the norms of the implied author and perceives the facts of the 
narrative as the implied author does; Booth defines an unreliable nar­
rator as one who deviates from the implied author's norms and/or 
from the implied author's perceptions of the narrative's facts. The 
widespread adoption of Booth's distinction has led to two important 
interpretive habits. First, the distinction is seen as most often relevant 
to homodiegetic narration. George Eliot's narrator in Middlemarch can 
be distinguished from the implied author by regarding the narrator as a 
wise, ironic, and gender-neutral persona that the implied Eliot adopts, 
but almost no one questions whether this narrator shares Eliot's 
norms. However, any time we have a character-narrator, whether that 
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character is protagonist, witness, or reporter at several removes from 
the action, the question of reliability is inevitable. 
Second, Booth's distinction assumes an equivalence, or perhaps 
better, a continuity between narrator and character, and so critics look 
at the character function to shed light on the narrator function and 
vice versa. That is, the narrator's discourse is assumed to be relevant to 
our understanding of his or her character, and the character's actions 
are assumed to be relevant to our understanding of his or her dis­
course. Thus, interpreters will examine the homodiegetic narrator's 
character—including such aspects of character as motives, values, be­
liefs, interests, psychology, race, class, and gender (to the extent these 
matters can be inferred from events and descriptions)—for clues to the 
narration and the character's narration for clues to the character. Kent 
Cartwright's complaint about Nick's narration in the final chapter 
shows how this assumption operates in practical criticism: "In the 
novel's final chapter, a peculiar dislocation or reorientation of the 
story's direction takes place which again connects Nick's personal 
limitations with his blurred narrative judgment" (227). 
The assumption is significant because it means that once we have 
evidence of some unreliability it is possible (though not necessary) to 
argue for unreliability all the way down. The debate about Nick pro­
vides a wonderful example of this reasoning in Ernest Lockridge's tour 
de force 1987 essay, "F. Scott Fitzgerald's Trompe I'Oeil and The Great 
Gatsby's Buried Plot." Lockridge uses a small amount of evidence of 
Nick's unreliability as a warrant for finding in Fitzgerald's novel a plot 
in which the following events occur: (1) Daisy uses Gatsby to win 
back Tom; (2) Daisy finishes off her artful scheme by deliberately run­
ning over Myrtle Wilson; (3) Wolfsheim, worried about what Tom's 
investigation of Gatsby will turn up, has his men murder Gatsby; and 
(4) these men, seeing Wilson arrive on the scene, kill him, too, and 
make it look like a murder-suicide.3 
Nick's narration of the events in Wilson's garage suggests that the 
assumption of continuity between character and narrator may not al­
ways be warranted: regardless of the biases and flaws Nick as character 
has previously revealed, in this segment of the narrative his character is 
all but irrelevant. Recognizing the possibility of divergence between 
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the character's functions and the narrator's functions also entails recog­
nizing that sometimes the reliability of a homodiegetic narrator can 
fluctuate wildly throughout the progression of a narrative. Fluctua­
tions that depend on the variable distance between the narratorial and 
the character functions are different from the gradual movement to­
ward reliability we have seen in Frederic Henry because in Frederic's 
case the change in narratorial function is directly tied to alterations in 
his character. These fluctuations are also different from anything that 
we have seen in Joe Butler, a character-narrator where the effect of the 
whole narrative depends on the continuity between the two functions. 
When the narratorial functions are operating independently of the 
character functions, then the narration will be reliable and authorita­
tive. Indeed, at such junctures, the narration will be so authoritative 
that the question of reliability is no more likely to arise than it does in 
relation to the narrator of Middlemarch. When the character and nar­
ratorial functions are operating interdependently, the narration may 
be either reliable or unreliable and the degree of the narrator's privi­
lege will vary depending on his or her relation to the action being re­
ported. Because a particular narrative may require a homodiegetic 
narrator's functions to vary over the course of a particular narrative, 
the narrator may, without violating the conventions of mimesis, fluc­
tuate between being highly unreliable, being reliable with a limited 
privilege, and being fully reliable and authoritative. 
Furthermore, recognizing the varying relations between the char­
acter and narratorial functions of a homodiegetic narrator facilitates 
our recognizing two other important relations: (1) the homodiegetic 
narrator's retrospective perspective may drop out and the character's 
action may be presented for the reader's judgment in much the way 
that a dramatic scene works in heterodiegetic narration. That is, the 
implied author leaves the reader to infer the appropriate conclusions 
from the scene, regardless of whether the narrator makes the same in­
ferences. Such moments can occur even when the homodiegetic nar­
rator is, like Nick, fairly self-conscious.4 (2) The character may 
function as a mask through which the implied author speaks. That is, a 
narrator's character may be functional to the extent that it provides a 
persona through which the implied author can express his or her be­
liefs about the world. In some cases, the persona may actually be less 
important than the character's experiences, but again the same effect is 
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achieved: the implied author's beliefs take on a particular significance 
because they are expressed through this particular consciousness at this 
particular point in the narrative. 
These conclusions suggest that it would be helpful to subsume the 
question about Nick's reliability within a larger account of the rela­
tionships between his narratorial and his character functions. All five 
of the relationships I've just described occur in Fitzgerald's novel: au­
thoritative narration with character backgrounded, limited privilege 
based on location relative to the scene, effaced narration with charac­
ter foregrounded, unreliable narration, and mask narration. Before I 
demonstrate this point by analyzing specific instances of Nick's narra­
tion, it will be helpful to consider the rhetorical task Fitzgerald has set 
for himself in The Great Gatsby. 
Consider some of the novel's distinctive features. The story is 
about a self-made man, not long on scruples, who tries to recapture 
the love of a woman from a higher class, seems to be on the verge of 
success, but then fails. His effort entangles him in the lives of the 
woman's husband, his mistress, and the mistress's husband. This en­
tanglement leads to the self-made man's murder at the hands of the 
mistress's husband through the betrayal of the woman he loves. The 
narration is by a young Midwesterner, distantly related to the woman, 
living, for much of the story, next door to the self-made man and try­
ing to find his own way in the world. The narrative begins with a 
short, though somewhat cryptic, summary of the narrator's conclu­
sions about the events he is to narrate: "No—Gatsby turned out all 
right at the end; it is what preyed on Gatsby, what foul dust floated in 
the wake of his dreams that temporarily closed out my interest in the 
abortive sorrows and short-winded relations of men" (6-7). But then 
this Gatsby remains a shadowy presence until the narrative is almost 
one-third complete, and our perceptions of him are almost always fil­
tered through the narrator's consciousness. The events surrounding 
Gatsby's death are not rendered directly but are rather pieced together 
after the fact by the narrator—or simply presented as speculation. The 
narrative closes with the narrator's philosophical meditation linking 
Gatsby's quest and the dream underlying it to the quests and dreams 
fueling the exploration of the New World. 
This combination of features, I submit, is not a very promising 
package: the action is tawdry, the central characters neither admirable 
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nor sympathetic, the narration puzzling, and the ending bordering on 
the ludicrous. Yet, though the narrative is not without its problems 
(nor its detractors), Fitzgerald designs The Great Gatsby according to a 
logic that is not evident in my list of its unpromising central elements. 
This logic is to move the audience's understanding of Gatsby along 
two parallel but quite different tracks. The first track is one that asks 
the audience to recognize the serious limits—indeed, the social and 
ethical deficiencies—of Gatsby's actual dreams: to be the self-made 
man who by force of wealth and personal charm will win back the 
heart (and body) of Daisy Fay Buchanan. The second track is one that 
asks the audience to recognize that there is a potential in Gatsby, 
rooted in the grandness and audacity of his dream and his way of pur­
suing it, that remains in its way an object of wonder, despite the limits 
of the actual dream. If the narrative works for us, it works because we 
feel the pull between these two tracks of our engagement with Gatsby. 
This narrative logic and the experience it offers readers clearly partakes 
of the American ideal of individualism that is so bound up with the 
myth of the American dream and that is therefore subject to serious 
ideological critique.5 I share many of the reservations of those who 
find the novel's ideology problematic, but my interest here is on how 
Fitzgerald seeks to make the narrative logic work. The answer, I 
think, lies in the multiple functions of Nick. 
There are two main features of Nick's functions within the novel 
that provide the key to the effectiveness of the narrative logic. First, al­
though the beginning establishes him in a fixed position after the 
events he is about to narrate, the rest of the narrative shows him in a 
developing relationship to the ongoing events. Consequently, part of 
the significance of Gatsby's quest can by seen by Fitzgerald's audience 
in how it affects Nick as character. Indeed, some such effect is abso­
lutely necessary if the audience is going to recognize that there is 
something in Gatsby beyond the particular form of his dreams. For 
this part of the narrative, it makes sense that occasionally Nick's func­
tion as narrator will be effaced and his function as character will be 
foregrounded. 
Second, as noted above, Nick performs a wide range of narratorial 
functions. Some facts about Gatsby's life must be solid and indisputable 
so that he can be a genuine presence for the audience; for this reason, 
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Nick needs to be able to offer authoritative narration. At the same 
time, some parts of Gatsby's life need to be left in shadow so that he 
can seem, at times, to be larger than life and so that the audience's focus 
can shift from the specific facts (did he help Wolfsheim fix the World 
Series?) to the larger picture: he has gotten all his money, regardless of 
the means, in order to win back Daisy. For this reason, Nick's privilege 
must frequently be limited. Furthermore, if Nick is to be affected by 
Gatsby s life, then one way to show that effect is to show how Nick 
moves from occasional unreliability, in the sense that he expresses 
norms that are not in accord with Fitzgerald's, to reliability. Finally, 
given the difficulty of making Gatsby seem greater than his particular 
dreams, Fitzgerald occasionally wants to be able to use Nick as a mask 
that he can speak through. To flesh out these points, let me turn to 
specific examples of each of these narrator-character relationships. 
As I have argued above, the authoritative narration in the scene in 
Michaelis's garage is crucial. Without this scene, we do not have the 
information necessary to piece together either the events surrounding 
Myrtle Wilson's death or those leading to George Wilson s murder of 
Gatsby and subsequent suicide. But Fitzgerald's employment of the 
paralepsis presents all that information with marvelous efficiency. This 
process, furthermore, draws us further into the drama of Gatsby's final 
hours. But its effect also needs to be seen in combination with Fitz­
gerald's shift back not just to Nick's limited-privilege narration when 
he tells of Wilson's movements before Gatsby's murder but to a pas­
sage of paralipsis: "By half past two he was in West Egg where he 
asked some one the way to Gatsby's house. So by that time he knew 
Gatsby s name" (168). We learn later that Nick is withholding his 
knowledge that Wilson has learned Gatsby's name from Tom 
Buchanan, a delayed revelation that makes Daisy's betrayal of Gatsby 
and Tom's callousness toward Wilson, Myrtle, and Gatsby all the 
more chilling. This revelation deepens the gulf between Gatsby's ac­
tual dreams and the potential in his capacity for dreaming. And all 
these effects are a result of Fitzgerald's realization of the protean possi­
bilities of a witness-narrator such as Nick. 
Nick is unreliable—indeed, perhaps most unreliable—in his state­
ment that "I am one of the few honest people I have ever known." 
The statement itself seems to invite doubt: what are you trying to hide 
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by professing your honesty? Nick offers it as a way to explain why he 
doesn't move faster in his relationship with Jordan Baker: he cannot, 
he says, get seriously involved with Jordan when he still has a "vague 
understanding" with a woman back home. Yet in describing his rela­
tionship with that woman, he tells us that he is far from honest with 
her: "I'd been writing letters once a week and signing them 'Love, 
Nick/ and all I could think of was how, when that certain girl played 
tennis, a faint mustache of perspiration appeared on her upper lip" 
(64). Furthermore, Nick's declaration about his own honesty comes 
after his testimony about Jordan's dishonesty not making "any differ­
ence" to him (63). This hardly seems like a logical preliminary to his 
own declaration. 
In addition to showing that Nick does not know himself as well as 
he thinks, this unreliable narration requires us to puzzle over his rela­
tionship with Jordan, the way that he is both strongly attracted to her 
and simultaneously reluctant to get involved. We can see, in a way 
that he cannot, that Jordan represents for him the life of the wealthy 
Easterner and that he is both attracted to and frightened by what that 
life represents. As the narrative develops, Nick gives in more and 
more to the attraction—until he sees what happens to Gatsby. By end­
ing his relationship with Jordan, Nick signals the end of his interest in 
succeeding in New York, the end of his desire to move in the same 
circles with the Buchanans. Gatsby has no effect on anyone except 
Nick, and the effect is not exactly heroic. But Nick's admission to 
himself of his own problematic values is based largely on his recogni­
tion of the gap between Gatsby's potential and his actual life. This ef­
fect of Gatsby's life is crucial for the audience's acceptance of the view 
that he is potentially better than his particular dreams.6 
Nick's visit to Wolfsheim provides an excellent example of a scene 
where Nick the narrator recedes into the background and Nick the 
character becomes all-important. 
"Now he's dead," I said after a moment. "You were his closest 
friend, so I know you'll want to come to his funeral this afternoon." 
"I'd like to come." 
"Well, come then." 
The hair in his nostrils quivered slighdy and as he shook his head 
his eyesfilled with tears. 
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"I can't do it—I can't get mixed up in it," he said.

"There's nothing to get mixed up in. It's all over now.''

"When a man gets killed, I never like to get mixed up in it in any

way. I keep out. When I was a young man, it was different—if a 
friend of mine died, no matter how, I stuck with them to the end. 
You may think that's sentimental but I mean it—to the bitter end.' 
I saw that for some reason of his own he was determined not to 
come, so I stood up. (179-80) 
Fitzgerald presents the scene without Nick's commentary, and it is 
not at all clear that Nick makes the inferences about himself and 
Wolfsheim that Fitzgerald invites the audience to make. Nick sees that 
Wolfsheim is determined not to come, but we see that Wolfsheim 
cries crocodile tears. Nick acknowledges his investment in doing 
something for Gatsby after his death, but we see that this investment is 
deeper than he admits. If Gatsby represents everything for which he 
has always had unaffected scorn, what does Wolfsheim represent? Yet 
here he is, trying to convince Wolfsheim to do the decent thing and 
attend the funeral. Again the scene testifies to Gatsby's effect on Nick, 
to Nick's desire to have someone recognize something important 
about Gatsby's life, and in this sense, it points to Nick's motivation for 
telling the tale. Paradoxically, then, the semi-erasure of Nick's narra­
tional filter and the foregrounding of his actions as character in this 
scene also link up with his larger role as narrator of Gatsby's story. 
Finally, the famous last paragraphs of the novel provide the best ex­
ample of Nick functioning as Fitzgerald's mask. 
gradually I became aware of the old island here that flowered once 
for Dutch sailors' eyes—a fresh, green breast of the new world. Its 
vanished trees, the trees that had made way for Gatsby's house, had 
once pandered in whispers to the last and greatest of all human 
dreams; for a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his 
breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic 
contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for 
the last time in history with something commensurate to his capac­
ity for wonder. 
And as I sat there, brooding on the old unknown world, I 
thought of Gatsby's wonder when hefirst picked out the green light 
at the end of Daisy's dock. He had come a long way to this blue 
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lawn and his dream must have seemed so close that he could hardly 
fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind him, 
somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the 
darkfields of the republic rolled on under the night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by 
year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter— 
tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. .. . And 
one fine morning— 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly

into the past. (189)

It matters that Nick, who has witnessed the last days of Gatsby's life 
and whose own life has been changed in the process, speaks these 
words. But like Frederic Henry's "If people bring so much courage to 
this world" utterance in A Farewell to Amis, this passage is given its 
shape and point more by the beliefs of the implied author than by the 
character of the narrator. What is striking about these beliefs is their 
mixture of romanticism and cynicism. Although the object of the sail­
ors' dream is far more exalted than Gatsby's, although it is, indeed, 
"commensurate" with man's capacity for wonder, the sailors' dream 
has much the same outcome as Gatsby's: despite its intensity and mag­
nificence, it is doomed to disappointment. In this passage, then, 
Fitzgerald speaks through Nick in an effort to convey his authorial vi­
sion of the strange amalgam of wonder and futility that defines the ro­
mantic dreamer. Fitzgerald leaves us to contemplate this mixture as a 
final reflection on Gatsby, on Nick—and, if we have been caught by 
the narrative, on ourselves. 
Sharing Secrets

77ii5 chapter foregrounds the ethical dimension of reading through a meditation 
on reading "The Secret Sharer" as an experience of sharing secrets. This medi­
tation leads to the hypothesis that the captain's narrative about his secret rela­
tionship with Leggatt itself contains a further secret, an implicit communication 
"whispered in the interstices of the narrative." I consider how an awareness of 
this secret transforms the understanding of the narrative, leading us to 
reconfigure the events the captain narrates. By looking for the secret in the 
captain's discourse, I am again postulating that discourse can simultaneously be 
story, that discourse can function not just as an important angle of vision on the 
action but also as part of the action itself. But determining the captain's secret 
and recognizing how its presence transforms the story he tells is only part of my 
concern here. I am even more interested in accounting for the ethics of entering 
the captain's and Conrad's audiences. If to read this narrative is, both meta­
phorically and literally, to become a secret sharer with the captain, then how 
does this secret sharing influence the ethical dimension of our reading experi­
ence? In answering the question, this essay also reconsiders the relations among 
authorial agency, textual phenomena, and readerly subjectivity. Rather than 
emphasizing the authorial audience's position in reconstructing an author's 
purpose, I argue for a more dynamic, synergistic model, one in which the lines 
between authorial agency, textual phenomena, and readerly subjectivity are not 
easily distinguishable. 
"As long as I know that you understand. . . . But of course you do. It's a 
great satisfaction to have got somebody to understand. You seem to 
have been there on purpose. . . . It's very wonderful." 
—Leggatt to the captain (135) 
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Reading Secrets: Ethical Questions 
"The Secret Sharer": Conrad's alliterative title plays peekaboo with 
any reader who pauses to puzzle over its meanings. Pondering matters 
of event and character, we can see the following significations emerge: 
a secret shared; a sharer who is secret; and a sharer who reveals a se­
cret.1 As a title, "The Secret Sharer" creates for the reader the expecta­
tion that the secret, the sharing, and the sharers will all be identified 
before story's end.2 Pondering matters of telling and listening, we can 
glimpse other, less immediately apparent significations: "The Secret 
Sharer" names the narrator, the narratee, and, indeed, Conrad and 
each of his readers. To narrate is to tell secrets; to read narrative is to 
share in them. "The Secret Sharer, c'est moi—et lui et vous. 
These significations about telling and listening (or writing and 
reading) in turn call attention to the ethical dimensions of Conrad's 
narrative, both in its events and in its telling and reception.3 Secrets 
may be about matters honorable, shameful, or indifferent, may be rev­
elations of virtue, vice, or mediocrity, but, regardless of their content, 
secrets always have some ethical valence. Furthermore, the keeping or 
telling of secrets also always has an ethical dimension. We keep or tell 
secrets to inform or mislead, to titillate or ingratiate, to submit or 
dominate, repel or seduce, protect or hurt. 
In the case of Conrad's narrative, the ethical dimensions of the 
action are everywhere apparent: the reader's involvement in "The Se­
cret Sharer" is built on the conflict between the captain's responsibil­
ity to his crew and his decisions to keep Leggatt's existence a secret 
and to help him escape. The ethical dimensions of the telling, by con­
trast, are not so immediately evident. Strikingly, the occasion of the 
captain's narration is left unspecified. Conrad does not have him indi­
cate any motive for his telling, identify his narratee, or locate himself 
in space. Even the one marker of the narrative situation Conrad sup­
plies—its temporal location—lacks precision: the narrator comments 
that "at this distance of years" (123) he cannot be sure that "Archbold" 
was the name of the Sephora's captain, but the distance is not measured 
by a specific number. Furthermore, although the narrator is very 
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aware of himself as an actor and frequently comments on his behavior, 
that commentary almost never comes from his vantage point at the 
time of the narration.4 
The unspecified occasion of narration is all the more noteworthy 
because Conrad has, by 1909,5 already created several works in which 
the occasion and audience of the first-person narrator are explicitly 
defined—and made crucial to the effect of the whole narrative. To 
take just the two most celebrated cases, in Heart of Darkness and Lord 
Jim, Conrad includes information about Marlow, Marlow's audience, 
and the occasions of Marlow's narrations in order to influence sub­
stantially the reader's understanding of Marlow's investment in the ex­
periences of Kurtz and Jim. Indeed, our overall response to these texts 
involves the interaction of our responses to Marlow's narratives about 
Kurtz and Jim with our responses to Conrad's narratives about 
Marlow. In other words, by the time he is writing "The Secret 
Sharer," Conrad has already demonstrated that the technique of speci­
fying narrative situations can extend the meaning and power of some 
narratives far beyond the meaning and power attendant upon the 
straight narration of their primary sequences of events. 
The material of "The Secret Sharer" certainly seems ripe for such 
treatment: a young and uncertain captain, trying to establish himself 
with a suspicious crew, harbors and protects a fugitive from justice be­
cause the fugitive seems to be his second self; through his determina­
tion to help the fugitive escape and through a surprising assist from the 
fugitive, he manages to establish his authority with the crew, the ship, 
and himself. If Conrad had, say, employed Marlow to pass on the 
captain's story to a group of veteran British seamen, Conrad could 
have made this tale Lord Jim Revisited, with Jim's traits split between 
the captain and Leggatt, with Marlow once again posing the ethical 
questions about what it means to be "one of us" and with Conrad's 
audience attending to the interaction between the captain's narrative 
and Marlow's quest for its meaning. 
Why, then, would Conrad eschew the approach that he had em­
ployed so successfully before? What effects and purposes are likely 
to be guiding his choice of this different technique, which leaves the 
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occasion and audience of the narration unspecified? More particularly, 
in this narrative of secrets, what is the relationship between the ethical 
dimensions of the captain's story and the ethical dimensions of his tell­
ing? How does a reader's effort to participate in sharing the secrets of 
"The Secret Sharer" implicate him or her in the ethical dimensions of 
the story and its telling? Just what is at stake for us when we try to be 
for Conrad what the captain is for Leggatt—the wonderful somebody 
who understands? 
Detecting Secrets 
Let us begin to answer by looking at Conrad's structuring of the ac­
tion. Conrad evokes and guides the authorial and the narrative audi­
ences' initial interests through his intertwining of two main 
instabilities: (1) The uneasy relationship between the captain and the 
crew. In command of his first ship, the young captain must prove both 
to his older, initially suspicious crew and to himself that he is a capable 
commander. As he says early in his account, "I wondered how far I 
should turn out faithful to that ideal conception of one's own person­
ality every man sets up for himself secretly" (107). (2) The uncertainty 
of whether he will be able to keep Leggatt's presence a secret from the 
crew, from the captain of the Sephora, from everyone. 
Conrad's intertwining of these instabilities heightens the suspense 
we feel in the narrative and authorial audiences, because they pull in 
opposite directions. The more the captain devotes himself to setting 
the crew at ease by working closely with them and otherwise follow­
ing the conventions of command, the more he increases the chances 
for Leggatt's exposure. The more he gives in to his desires to protect 
Leggatt and his secret, the more he increases his crew's doubts about 
his ability. Reading the final episode is so intense partly because the 
two instabilities fully converge there, raising the conflict to its highest 
point. As the captain brings the boat near the shore of Koh-ring, he si­
multaneously risks the two things he has been struggling mightily to 
maintain: Leggatt's secret existence and the effective command of the 
ship. Conrad's resolution is wonderfully efficient and—to the autho­
rial audience—satisfying. The captain chooses to endanger the crew, 
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the ship, and his own future for the sake of Leggatt; when he manages, 
with the assist from the hat he had given Leggatt, to turn the ship in 
time and to pick up the land breezes, the very dangerous course he has 
taken becomes, in the eyes of the crew, incontrovertible evidence of 
his ability and his courage. 
Even as Conrad's structuring of the action evokes this sequence of 
instability, suspense, and satisfaction, his narrative discourse deepens 
and complicates our involvement in the captain's story. As noted 
above, although Conrad indicates that the captain is looking back on 
his earlier experience, the captain only rarely speaks from his perspec­
tive at the time of the narration. As we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, 
this method of autodiegetic narration frequently accompanies unreli­
able narration, that is, a telling in which a significant gap exists be­
tween the values and/or the understanding of the narrator and 
narrative audience and those of the implied author and authorial audi­
ence. Although Conrad does not leave any clear signals that his norms 
are markedly different from the captains/' both the narrative method 
and the focus on secrets invite us to ask whether there is more to this 
narrative than initially appears. More specifically, the technique and 
the subject matter encourage us to look for an important subtext, 
some secret whispered in the interstices of the narrative, perhaps even 
one that the captain himself may not be fully aware of. In other words, 
the technique and the subject matter authorize the authorial audience 
to search for a subtext.7 
The search yields two possibilities I want to consider here: (1) the 
captain has been having hallucinations, and Leggatt exists only as his 
fantasy; (2) the captain's fellow feeling for Leggatt arises less from their 
common background and values than from their mutual sexual attrac­
tion." The first possibility, hinted at in the captain's question of 
whether Leggatt is "visible to eyes other than mine" (134), is intrigu­
ing because it suggests a way of rereading the captain's psychology. 
Rather than a reasonably healthy man facing a difficult set of circum­
stances, he becomes a seriously unhealthy one whose anxieties about 
his new command lead him to invent an imaginary friend whom he 
fully understands and whom he can shelter and protect. On this view, 
then, the narrative is a study in the development, complication, and fi­
nal resolution of this anxiety. 
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This hypothesis, however, is difficult to sustain because it must ex­
plain away too much recalcitrant evidence. The greatest recalcitrance 
is provided by Archbold's visit with its independent confirmation of 
Leggatt's existence and of the main lines of his story. Other, more mi­
nor, evidence includes the steward's hearing Leggatt's movement at a 
time when the captain is away from his cabin and the appearance of 
the captain's white hat floating in the sea after Leggatt leaves. Of 
course, it would be possible to argue that these events are all part of the 
captain's fantasy, that the captain has used Archbold's visit as the basis 
for his creation of Leggatt, and that after the event he has imagina­
tively re-created the version of that visit—and virtually everything 
else—that we get. In a reader response criticism that emphasized the 
reader's role in creating the meaning of texts, these arguments might 
be sufficient to allow the hypothesis to stand. Within a rhetorical ap­
proach, however, some significant problems arise. Since the tech­
nique gives us the captain's experience as he felt it at the time of the 
action, how do we explain—without even a covert clue from 
Conrad—that the captain encounters Leggatt before he encounters 
Archbold? More generally, the problem with this hypothesis is that it 
makes the subtext almost a complete secret, something that is pointed 
to only by the captain's single moment of doubt, a moment which on 
other accounts is explained as a vivid sign of the strain the captain is 
feeling. 
By contrast, the hypothesis that the authorial audience is supposed 
to recognize the secret of the homosexual attraction is quite persua­
sive. The text abounds in evidence—some covert, some not so co­
vert—that invites us to catch on to the secret. The captain's very first 
glimpse of Leggatt is charged with a sexual electricity: "I saw at once 
something elongated and pale floating very close to the ladder. Before 
I could form a guess a faint flash of phosphorescent light, which 
seemed to issue suddenly from the naked body of a man, flickered in 
the sleeping water with the elusive, silent play of summer lightning in 
the night sky'' (110). Other elements of the scene also invite attention 
to its sexual undertones, even as the surface of the text attends more to 
Leggatt's apparent rising from the dead, his transformation from 
corpse into living man. The captain's gaze follows the line of Leggatt's 
naked body from foot to neck: "With a gasp I saw revealed to my stare 
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a pair of feet, the long legs, a broad livid back immersed right up to the 
neck in a greenish cadaverous glow" (110). When the captain thinks 
that the naked man is a "headless corpse," he involuntarily drops the 
cigar he is smoking out of his mouth: a loss of potency and heat. When 
he realizes that the man is still alive, the heat returns: "the horrid, 
frost-bound sensation which had gripped me about the chest" passed 
off(llO).9 
More generally, the captain's consistent gazing upon Leggatt's 
body suggests that a likely source of their "mysterious communica­
tion" is their mutual, unspoken recognition of their attraction: "I, 
coming back on deck, saw the naked man from the sea sitting on the 
main hatch, glimmering white in the darkness, his elbows on his knees 
and his head in his hands" (111). Later the captain says of Leggatt that 
"with his face nearly hidden, he must have looked exactly as I used to 
look in that bed. I gazed upon my other self for a while" (120). Fur­
thermore, the captain arranges matters so that he must bathe before 
Leggatt's gaze: "I took a bath and did most of my dressing, splashing, 
and whistling softly for the steward's edification, while the secret 
sharer of my life stood drawn up bolt upright in that little space" (122). 
After this description, we may feel compelled to ask: If he did most of 
the dressing, splashing, and whistling for the steward's edification, for 
whom did he do the rest of it?10 
This evidence speaks strongly of the captain's attraction, but what 
of Leggatt's? The narrative perspective necessarily limits our access to 
his thoughts and feelings, but his part in the "mysterious communica­
tion" between the two, especially his confidence that the captain 
would understand everything, suggests that he too feels the unspoken 
bond. And one of his early speeches strongly suggests that the attrac­
tion is mutual: referring to his naked arrival at the ladder of the 
Sephora, he tells the captain, "I didn't mind being looked at [by you]. 
I-I liked it. And then you speaking to me so quietly—as if you had ex­
pected me—made me hold on a little longer" (119). 
As the story continues, the evidence for the secret becomes less co­
vert. The first night, the captain reports that "we stood leaning over 
my bed-place, whispering side by side, with our dark heads to­
gether and our backs to the door" (115). Later, he tells us that at night 
"I would smuggle him into my bed-place, and we would whisper 
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together, with the regular footfalls of the watch passing and repassing 
over our heads. It was an infinitely miserable time" (131). Why "infi­
nitely miserable"? Perhaps because of sexual frustration. Perhaps their 
intimacy stopped at whispering, for fear that other expressions of it 
might become loud enough to alert the watch and expose them both. 
The ellipsis in Leggatt's comment about the captain's wonderful un­
derstanding that I use as my epigraph contains this description: "And in 
the same whisper, as if we two whenever we talked had to say things to 
each other which were not fit for the world to hear" (135): what is this 
but the love which dare not speak its name? Finally, the captain's overt 
description of their final communication—significantly nonverbal—is 
charged with the language of desire: "our hands met gropingly, lin­
gered united in a steady, motionless clasp for a second. No word 
was breathed by either of us when they separated" (140). 
The hypothesis encounters no significant recalcitrance, and attend­
ing to this subtext has significant consequences for our response. 
As flesh-and-blood readers, we have our own, sometimes highly 
charged, responses to representations of homosexuality, responses that 
range from homophobia to celebratory identification. Second, as 
members of the authorial audience, attending to this secret alters our 
understanding of the action. Part of the captain's anxiety about his ac­
ceptance by the crew now becomes anxiety over whether they will 
suspect his sexual orientation. Archbold's talk about why he never 
liked Leggatt can now be seen as rooted in—may even be a coded way 
of voicing—Archbold's suspicion that Leggatt was homosexual. The 
captain's initial negative response to Leggatt's request that they ma­
roon him on one of the islands becomes the response of the selfish, 
unfulfilled lover. His need to take the ship as close to Koh-ring as pos­
sible then becomes his way of atoning for this selfishness. Leggatt's 
words about knowing that the captain understands come to encom­
pass the whole situation—why Leggatt decided to come on board, 
why he confided in the captain, why their bond is so strong, why they 
don't speak about it overtly or act on it differently, why he must leave. 
The captain's giving Leggatt his hat becomes a substitute for giving 
him a ring or any other token of remembrance and identification that 
one lover gives to another. Leaving the hat in the water becomes 
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Leggatt's way of giving the ring back and a powerful symbol of their 
unconsummated relationship: the good that they do each other does 
not depend on possession. 
The ethics of attending to the secret of homosexual attraction are 
fairly complex.11 The narrative's treatment of the relationship cer­
tainly valorizes it: the action is structured so that the authorial 
audience's pleasure and satisfaction in the story depend on acceptance 
and approval of the bond between the captain and Leggatt. Further­
more, the uncharacteristically triumphant ending sends a strong signal 
about how this story endorses that bond and the actions to which it 
leads. And, as I suggested earlier, Conrad makes the authorial audience 
yet another "secret sharer"—in the sense of sharing in the secret and in 
the sense of sharing it secretly. That is, we not only share the secret but 
do so without any explicit revelation of it. It is debatable whether the 
captain realizes that his narration reveals the secret. This point is worth 
dwelling on not for the sake of trying to settle the question but for the 
sake of assessing the captain's self-understanding after the events. If he 
is deliberately conveying the secret to readers astute enough to hear it, 
then he becomes more self-aware and sophisticated as a narrator than 
his silence about the narrative occasion suggests. If, however, he is in­
advertently revealing the secret, then we recognize that although he 
may have passed a critical test of his captaincy, he still needs to face 
other fundamental questions of identity. 
Conrad's relation to the homosexual secret is even harder to pin 
down. If we opt for the understanding of the captain as in control of 
his narrative, we will also see Conrad as carefully in control behind the 
captain. If, however, we see the captain's revelation as unwitting, we 
may decide that Conrad has planned it that way or that Conrad him­
self is not fully aware of the homosexual subtext. In fact, articulating 
the secret and specifying the evidence for it helps to illuminate one of 
the fault lines in rhetorical reader response: the one running between 
the authorial and the flesh-and-blood audiences. On the one hand, 
the evidence points to a design on Conrad's part that the authorial au­
dience needs to discern; indeed, without such a pattern of evidence, I 
would not suggest that this secret is a plausible one. On the other 
hand, I can't help wondering how much my perception of this secret 
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is a consequence of my historical moment, in particular, the way in 
which the gay studies movement has made me and numerous other 
academic readers especially attuned to representations of same-sex de­
sire. Is the secret constructed by the implied Conrad or the flesh-and­
blood critic? I don't fully know. Furthermore, there is a sense in 
which, within the rhetorical approach, it is not all that important to 
know. When the situated subjectivity of the reader encounters the 
otherness of the text, the analyst cannot always definitively locate the 
boundaries that mark off flesh-and-blood and authorial audiences—or 
more generally, reader, text, and author—from each other. The syn­
ergy among these different elements of the rhetorical transaction is 
precisely what the rhetorical approach wants to acknowledge. 
In any case, Conrad's strategy of suggesting that there is a secret in 
the captain's narration without calling explicit attention to any par­
ticular secret can be seen as a sign of his confidence in his readers. On 
this view, Conrad is not only complimenting his audience but subtly 
collaring us to share his positive view of the captain and Leggatt. 
Nevertheless, even this very positive construction of the ethical di­
mension of reading this story is complicated by the very reliance upon 
secrets. If homosexuality must remain secret, how can it be genuinely 
valorized? To participate, as the story asks us to do, in the secretiveness 
surrounding homosexuality is to be complicit with the forces who 
would repress homosexuality entirely. For this reason, I find it hard 
not to become a partially resistant reader of Conrad's text. But the na­
ture of that resistance is itself further complicated by other responses 
that arise from Conrad's technique for representing the dynamic be­
tween the captain and Leggatt. 
Guilty Secrets 
As some readers have no doubt already noticed, there has been a con­
spicuous absence from my discussion to this point: I have not said any­
thing about Leggatt's taking the life of another man. I use the phrase 
"taking the life" rather than "murdering" because Conrad's treatment 
of the event allows for our reasonable doubt. Leggatt tells his own 
story, making it clear that the man died at his hands, but he does not 
take full responsibility for the death: 
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We closed just as an awful sea made for the ship. All hands saw it 
coining and took to the rigging, but I had him by the throat and 
went on shaking him like a rat, the men above us yelling, "Look 
out! look out!" Then a crash as if the sky had fallen on my head. 
They say that for over ten minutes hardly anything was to be seen of 
the ship. . . . It was a miracle that they found us, jammed together 
behind the forebits. It's clear that I meant business, because I was 
holding him by the throat still when they picked us up. (113) 
The most striking feature of Conrad's handling of this event is that 
the captain never explicitly says how he thinks about it and never di­
rects the narratee how to think about it. In reading the report of his 
conversation with Archbold, we can infer that he has been unwilling 
to admit Leggatt's role in the man's death. "Don't you think," he sug­
gests, "that the heavy sea might have killed the man?" But 
Archbold is having none of that: "Good God! The sea! No man 
killed by the sea ever looked like that. And to demonstrate, "he ad­
vanced his head close to mine and thrust his tongue out at me so sud­
denly that I couldn't help starting back" (124). Though the captain 
starts back here, he never reaches the place where he assesses Leggatt's 
conduct for himself or the reader. 
Instead, he assumes that the narratee will share his acceptance of it, 
his willingness to think that Leggatt's ending another man's life is less 
important than Leggatt's current plight and less important than 
Leggatt's bonding with him. Since the narratee is unspecified and 
since Conrad does not clearly depict Leggatt as murderer, we are also 
likely to feel—as both flesh-and-blood and authorial readers—the pull 
of the captain's assumptions. To be the secret sharer of this narrative is 
to adopt these assumptions, at least for the moments when we project 
ourselves into the narratee's position; to be the secret sharer of the nar­
rative is also to endorse the captains plan to protect Leggatt. It is, I 
find, a rather uncomfortable ethical position. 
It is uncomfortable because even while we feel the pull of the 
captain s assumptions as we read from the narratee's position, we re­
main aware of other complex considerations in the authorial audience 
position. On the one hand, the captains assumptions are defensible: 
Leggatt's plight is serious and the mutual understanding he and the 
captain share is impressive. On the other hand, the assumptions are 
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questionable: Leggatt may be a murderer, and the captain's efforts to 
keep him hidden clearly interfere with the captain's performance of 
his primary responsibilities. In this way, hiding Leggatt's existence be­
comes the captain's guilty secret, a guilt made all the more complicated 
by the captain's unspoken homosexual attraction. Indeed, Conrad is 
presenting us with a situation in which the two main internal threats 
to a "proper" company of sailors—homosexuality and murder—be­
come located, albeit not clearly realized, in the captain's second self. 
Once we recognize this dimension of the situation, the captain's iden­
tification with Leggatt puts the captain in an even greater conflict with 
his responsibility to the crew. Although the captain seems in one way 
to have no trouble with the ethics of his behavior, he and we also 
know that the captain could not successfully defend himself to his 
crew on ethical grounds. As readers, we become the sharers of the 
captain's guilty secret, with the added burden of not being sure we can 
justify it to ourselves. Moreover, once Conrad makes us such secret 
sharers, once we are in this position of reading guilty secrets, we are at 
least temporarily in the uncomfortable position of living with them, 
carrying guilty secrets in our consciousnesses. 
The increasing intensity of the narrative, then, depends not just on 
Conrad's skillful complication and then convergence of the instabili­
ties, not just on our increasing recognition of the subtextual secret, but 
also on the complication of the reader's feelings of sharing and living 
with guilty secrets. Conrad's handling of the visit from Archbold and 
the crew of the Sephora nicely illustrates the point. The key instability 
in the scene is whether the captain can successfully protect Leggatt, 
and the captains narration is primarily concerned with that. At the 
same time, details such as the exchange between the captain and the 
first mate emphasize that Leggatt is, indeed, a secret to feel guilty 
about. The mate comments that the story he has heard about Leggatt 
"beats all these tales we hear about murders in Yankee ships" (128). 
He also reports the crew's reaction to the idea that Leggatt might be 
hiding on the ship: "Our chaps took offense. 'As if we would harbor a 
thing like that,' they said. 'Wouldn't you like to look for him in our 
coal hole?' Quite a tiff" (128). At this point, the tension is running 
high between our efforts to read from the narratee position, where we 
remain sympathetic to the captain, and from the authorial audience 
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position, where we recognize the responsibility to the crew. If the 
suggestion that Leggatt is on the ship provokes this reaction among 
"our chaps," we can only imagine what actually discovering him 
would provoke. Even as we recognize that the crew's position is prob­
lematic in its assumption of Leggatt's guilt, the mate's comments also 
function to underline the captain's need for secrecy and to deepen the 
guilt associated with the secret. 
By the time the captain is bringing the boat to the shore of Koh-
ring, we are being pulled in different directions: toward compassion 
for Leggatt and hope for the captain, toward complicitous guilt that 
the captain is recklessly endangering the ship, putting his own con­
cerns above those of the crew and the ship. These feelings are mingled 
with the fear that he will end up grounding the ship. Fear, hope, guilt 
all come together in the moment where the captain violently speaks to 
and shakes the first mate—a moment that, as many critics note (see es­
pecially Leiter), puts the captain in essentially the position occupied by 
Leggatt during the crisis on the Sephora. As the captain shouts at the 
mate, our feelings may move us to be shouting to ourselves: Shake 
some sense into the mate; no, don't touch him at all; bring the ship all 
the way in; how can you value the secret over the ship; listen to the 
mate; forget the mate. 
In this context, Conrad's successful resolution of the instabilities 
brings a welcome release from the conflict of our feelings. The release 
seems all the more satisfying when we reflect that the captain now 
never has to reveal his secret; the torment that made him feel as if he 
"had come creeping quietly as near insanity as any man who has not 
actually gone over the border'' (134) is permanently over. But further 
reflection brings back some uneasiness. For some reason, the captain 
has decided to reveal the secret—and to some extent relive the tor­
ment—by telling the story. Our release is not thereby ruined, but the 
fragility of the captain's release is underlined. So, too, is the captain's 
great good fortune in having events work out this way: the ending 
could so easily have been different. But after such a reading experi­
ence, after such discomfort and such welcome release, that is a conclu­
sion we may want, at least for a while, to keep secret.12 
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Narratee, Narrative Audience, 
and Second-Person Narration: 
How I—and You?—Read 
Lorrie Moore s "How" 
This chapter is the most technical one in the book, focusing on clarifying the con­
cepts of audience I have been using. More particularly, the essay uses the com­
plex addresses of second-person narrative (Lorrie Moore's "How'' is my 
example) as the framework within which to examine the relation between rhe­
torical theory's concept of narrative audience and narratology's concept of 
narratee. I argue that the two concepts are not competing but complementary, 
and I suggest a way of redefining narrative audience to reflect this 
complementarity. The multiplication of distinctions in this essay does raise the 
broader practical question of when the terministic screen of rhetorical analysis 
may become too thick, may, that is, become less of a visual aid and more of an 
obstruction. Do we always need to distinguish among narrative audience, 
narratee, ideal narrative audience, authorial audience, and flesh-and-blood au­
dience, when we are focusing on questions of address? No, because in many 
narratives the differences are nonexistent or negligible. At the same time, how­
ever, an awareness of the different roles and of the different kinds of relations be­
tween them does provide an important means of explaining the complexity of 
some narrative discourse, especially in second-person narrative, which typically 
plays with these audience roles. 
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How Are You? 
A voice addresses you. Not from clouds, a mountaintop, or a burning 
bush. From this page. It asks how you are and what you're up to. It is a 
friendly voice, though not immediately recognizable. You are unsure 
how to react. You have an impulse to shout out that you're fine, 
you're reading, you'd be grateful not to be disturbed. But you also 
don't want to be rude, so you just say, "OK" and "Studying second-
person narration." The voice wants to know if you've read Lorrie 
Moore's Self-Help. Oh yes, you say—in fact, you've just begun read­
ing an essay about it. The voice asks what the essay's about and if it's 
any good. You can't tell yet; so far the critic seems more interested in 
showing off his cleverness than in saying anything about Moore's 
book. If he doesn't quit, you'll quit reading. OK, says the voice, fair 
enough; I'll go mute, if you promise to stick around. In fact, to erase 
the sound of my voice, let's listen to Lorrie Moore's at the beginning 
of her short story "How' : 
Begin by meeting him in a class, a bar, at a rummage sale. Maybe 
he teaches sixth grade. Manages a hardware store. Foreman at a 
carton factory. He will be a good dancer. He will have perfectly cut 
hair. He will laugh at your jokes. 
A week, a month, a year. Feel discovered, comforted, needed, 
loved, and start sometimes, somehow, to feel bored. When sad or 
confused, walk uptown to the movies. Buy popcorn. These things 
come and go. A week, a month, a year. (55) 
Who Are You? 
Perhaps this question would be better phrased as "Who are the 
YOUs?" to indicate that it refers to the second-person addressees in 
the two texts of the previous section (i.e., the text of this chapter and 
Moore's text) rather than to you who are now reading the words of 
this sentence. The rephrasing does sharpen the question, but, as we 
shall soon see, trying to answer it will call the logic that motivates the 
sharpening into doubt. The rephrased question depends on a clear and 
stable distinction between an intrinsic, textual "you"—a narratee­
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protagonist—and an extrinsic, extratextual "you"—a flesh-and-blood 
reader. Both texts, however, undermine the clarity and stability of the 
distinction. In the first text, the you addressed by the voice "from this 
page" is both textual and extratextual; it refers not only to the 
narratee-protagonist but also to you the actual reader.' The you who is 
unsure how to react may or may not be both narratee and actual 
reader—at that moment, the discourse is blurring the boundaries be­
tween them. At the end of the paragraph, the you addressed by the 
voice is again textual and extratextual, and the shift to homodiegetic 
narration (from "the voice" to "I") foregrounds that dual address. 
Moreover, this play with the location (textual and/or extratextual) 
of the addressee is only part of the text's story of reading. When we 
read, "You are unsure how to react," and recognize that the you who 
is narratee-protagonist need not coincide with you the actual reader, 
another audience position becomes prominent: the observer role fa­
miliar to us in reading homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narration, the 
position from which we watch characters think, move, talk, act. In 
fact, what happens as we read "You are unsure how to react" is fre­
quently an important dimension of reading second-person narration: 
When the second-person address to a narratee-protagonist both over­
laps with and differentiates itself from an address to actual readers, 
those readers will simultaneously occupy the positions of addressee 
and observer. Furthermore, the fuller the characterization of the you, 
the more aware actual readers will be of their differences from that 
you, and thus the more fully they will move into the observer role— 
and the less likely that this role will overlap with the addressee posi­
tion. In other words, the greater the characterization of the you, the 
more like a standard protagonist the you becomes, and, consequently, 
the more actual readers can employ their standard strategies for read­
ing narrative. However, as recent commentators on second-person 
narration have consistently observed, most writers who employ this 
technique take advantage of the opportunity to move readers between 
the positions of observer and addressee and, indeed, to blur the 
boundaries between these positions (Fludernik, Kacandes, McHale, 
Richardson).2 In short, it's not easy to say who you are. 
The same difficulty is present in the opening section of Moore's 
story. Because Moore begins by narrating an event in which the actual 
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reader is not directly involved—girl meets boy3—the observer role is 
initially more prominent. But in the second paragraph, where the 
gender of the you is not specified and the general trajectory of the 
you's experience is widely recognizable, the actual reader is likely to 
feel the pull of the addressee role. In fact, by showing the movement 
from observer to addressee rather than from addressee to observer, the 
passage illustrates how second-person narration almost always retains 
the potential to pull the actual reader back into the addressee role. 
Again, with Moore's text, the question "who are you?" does not have 
a clear and simple answer. 
Although it is not easy to say who you are, watching you read can 
be highly instructive. In the rest of this essay, I would like to pursue 
that instruction by attending to the way in which the dynamics of sec­
ond-person narration invite a reexamination of concepts of audience 
from two distinct but related traditions of narrative study: narratology's 
"narratee" and rhetorical theory's "narrative audience." My conten­
tion will be that each tradition has something to teach the other and 
that both concepts are necessary to understand the complexities of 
reading second-person narration. I shall then illustrate the usefulness of 
the two concepts in a rhetorical analysis of Moore's "How." 
Narratee and Narrative Audience 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the widely circulating concepts 
of narratee and narrative audience is that no one has carefully consid­
ered their relationship to each other. Are the concepts synonyms and 
the terms interchangeable? Does one concept subsume the other? If 
so, which is the more encompassing? Alternatively, are the two terms 
complementary, overlapping, or incompatible? What does their rela­
tionship tell us about the similarities and differences of structuralist 
narratology and the rhetorical theory of narrative? Second-person nar­
ration will help us answer these questions, but it will be helpful first to 
review the essays in which these two concepts were first formalized, 
Gerald Prince's "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee" (1973) 
and Peter J. Rabinowitz's "Truth in Fiction: A Re-examination of 
Audiences" (1977). 
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Prince's purpose is to call attention to a previously neglected link in 
the chain of narrative communication and to demonstrate that 
"narratees deserve to be studied" (8). He argues, in effect, that the 
logic of differentiating between authors, implied authors, and narrators 
applies as well to readers (or receivers), implied readers (or addressees), 
and narratees (or enunciatees).4 The author addresses actual readers 
(receivers); the implied author the implied reader (addressee); and the 
narrator the narratee (enunciatee). Prince shows that a narrator's dis­
course frequently reveals evidence of the narratee's identity, even in 
narratives where there is no explicit address to the narratee. In charac­
teristic structuralist fashion, Prince seeks to find the underlying com­
monality of diverse narratees and, as a result, proposes the idea of a 
"zero degree" narratee, an enunciatee with minimal positive traits: 
knowing the narrator's language, being able to infer presuppositions 
and consequences as they are reflected in that language, having an ex­
cellent memory. Different narratives will then assign further traits to 
their different narratees. In "The Narratee Revisited" (1985), how­
ever, Prince acknowledges that the approach through the zero degree 
violates Ockham's razor because, in effect, it describes virtually all 
narratees as deviations from a nonexistent standard. He therefore pro­
poses to "specify all and only classes of signs particularizing any 
narratee, all and only signs of the 'you' in narrative discourse" (300). 
More generally, Prince's structuralist narratology assumes that the 
narrative text is an object with a communicative purpose. In "Intro­
duction," he attempts to locate the presence and delineate the func­
tions of the narratee within that object. These functions, tellingly, are 
all instrumental, all part of the narratee's possible role in the communi­
cation: the narratee "constitutes a relay between the narrator and the 
reader, he helps establish the narrative framework, he serves to charac­
terize the narrator, he emphasizes certain themes, he contributes to 
the development of the plot, he becomes the spokesman for the moral 
ofthework"(23). 
Rabinowitz, as his title suggests, frames his discussion of audiences 
as part of a larger inquiry into "truth in fiction," specifically an inquiry 
into how certain "facts" of a fictional narrative may be true at one level 
of reading but not at another. Indeed, my phrase "level of reading" 
turns out to be a synonym for "kind of audience." Rabinowitz posits 
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four: (1) the actual or flesh-and-blood audience—you and me in both 
our idiosyncratic particularity and our socially constructed identities; 
(2) the authorial audience—the hypothetical ideal audience for whom 
the author designs the work, a design that includes assumptions about 
what that audience knows and believes; (3) the narrative audience— 
the "imaginary audience for which the narrator is writing" (127), an 
audience upon whom the narrator projects a set of beliefs and a body 
of knowledge; and (4) the ideal narrative audience—the audience "for 
which the narrator wishes he were writing" (134), the audience that 
accepts every statement of the narrator as true and reliable. 
Rabinowitz emphasizes that readers take up places in the four audi­
ences simultaneously and that this simultaneity is largely responsible 
for readers' complex relations to truth in fiction. When we enter the 
authorial and narrative audiences of, say, Jane Eyre, we find that there 
is no significant difference between the narrative audience and the 
ideal narrative audience and that there is some significant overlap in 
what the authorial audience and the narrative audience take to be true. 
Both of the latter two audiences, for example, operate with the same 
world maps; both attach the same social significance to a marriage be­
tween a master and a governess; both have some faith in the power of 
romantic love. But the audiences' beliefs also significantly diverge. 
Most obviously—and importantly—in the authorial audience we 
know that Jane is a fictional character narrating fictional events, 
whereas in the narrative audience, we assume that a historical person­
age is recounting her autobiography. Furthermore, it is arguable that 
each audience has a different view of the narrative's supernatural 
events, for example, Jane's hearing Rochester call her name, despite 
being miles away from him. In the authorial audience, we recognize 
that this event is possible only in fiction.5 In the narrative audience, we 
accept the event as Jane does—wonderful and strange, but true. In­
deed, the very fact that Jane does not try to convince skeptics in her 
audience is evidence that she assumes her audience will accept its 
truth. 
Since the publication of "Truth in Fiction," rhetorical theorists 
have not found much practical use for the concept of "ideal narrative 
audience." In the afterword to the second edition o(The Rhetoric of Fic­
tion (1983), Wayne C. Booth adopts Rabinowitz's model minus the 
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ideal narrative audience. Rabinowitz himself drops the category from 
his discussion of audiences in Before Reading (1987). In Reading People, 
Reading Plots (1989), I claim that "although the ideal narrative audi­
ence is a logical category of analysis, it has insufficient analytical payoff 
for me to want to invoke it" (141). Studying second-person narration 
and trying to understand the relation between the concepts of narratee 
and narrative audience has made me rethink that conclusion. 
As the essays in this book indicate, the rhetorical approach is very 
concerned with the relation between narrative strategies and the ac­
tivities of readers—in the way that what occurs on the levels of both 
story and discourse influences what readers know, believe, think, 
judge, and feel. In the case of, say, an author who employs an unreli­
able narrator, one important readerly activity is the rejection of the 
narrator's assumptions, knowledge, or values. (Many other activities 
will follow from this rejection, but those activities will vary from one 
narrative to the next.) In explaining the relation between narrative 
strategy and readerly activity, the rhetorical critic focuses on how an 
actual reader can recognize the signs of unreliability and infer the 
author's different assumptions, knowledge, or values. The key to the 
rhetorical transaction, then, is the gap between the narrator's assump­
tions about her audience and the author's assumptions about hers. In 
explaining the transaction, the rhetorical critic focuses on the way in 
which an actual reader can recognize that gap and the way in which 
that recognition is itself a part of the authorial audience's understand­
ing of the narrative. In this way, the activity of the narrative audience 
is subsumed by the activity of the authorial, and differentiating be­
tween the narrative audience and the ideal narrative audience has 
seemed less important than attending to this subsumption. For ex­
ample, in "Haircut,"' answering the question of whether Whitey s 
customer is Whitey's narrative or ideal narrative audience seems less 
important than recognizing that Whitey assumes he is an ideal audi­
ence and that Lardner assumes readers will recognize Whitey's moral 
obtuseness. By focusing on the difference between what Whitey 
expects his audience (ideally) to believe and what Lardner expects 
his audience to do with Whitey's expectations, the rhetorical critic 
erases the distinction between the narrative and the ideal narrative 
audiences. And, as this example of "Haircut" suggests, erasing the 
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distinction means that all narrative audiences are ideal narrative audi­
ences. So while the term ideal narrative audience has dropped out of use, 
the concept has not; it is more accurate to say that, in practice, 
Rabinowitz's third and fourth audiences have been conflated into the 
single category of narrative audience. As I turn to look more closely at 
the relation between this concept and Prince's concept of the 
narratee, I will suggest why I think it is useful to separate the two audi­
ences once again. 
Having seen all this about narratee and narrative audience, what 
can we conclude about the relationship between them? Rabinowitz, 
who naturally wants to distinguish his concept from Prince's, offers 
two answers in "Truth in Fiction." First, the "narrataire... is someone 
perceived by the reader as "out there,' a separate person who often 
serves as a mediator between narrator and reader. The 'narrative audi­
ence,' in contrast, is a role which the text forces the reader to take on. I 
think that my analysis, centering on an activity on the part of the 
reader, more successfully explains why certain texts evoke certain re­
sponses" (127n). Second, the default position of "narrative audience" 
is not zero degree; instead, it is much closer to "actual audience." 
Rabinowitz puts it this way: the "narrative audience is much like our­
selves, with our beliefs, prejudices, our hopes, fears, and expectations, 
and our knowledge of society and literature—unless there is some evi­
dence (textual or historical) to the contrary'' (128-29n). 
These answers initially do more to sharpen the differences between 
the rhetorical approach and the structuralist one than to distinguish 
narratee from narrative audience. The key difference in the ap­
proaches is encapsulated by Rabinowitz's claims that his model 
"center[s] on an activity on the part of the reader" and that the narra­
tive audience is "a role the text forces the reader to take on1' (127n). 
Activity, force, and experience are key terms for the rhetorical theorists. 
Prince's model, by contrast, sees the text as a message and wants to 
identify the structural properties of that message. Component, relay, and 
framework are key terms for him and other narratologists. The rhetori­
cal and the narratological approaches are not entirely incompatible—a 
text that exerts a force upon its reader is a communicative object of a 
certain kind. But the approaches are not exactly the same suit traveling 
under two different designer labels, and it is not surprising that they 
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view the narrator's audience differently. As Rabinowitz says, Prince's 
narratee remains "out there," distinct from the actual reader; a narra­
tive audience, by contrast, occupies some part of the actual reader's 
consciousness and, given the default position, the actual reader also 
gives traits to the narrative audience. 
Confronting this difference, we might be tempted to decide that 
each concept is adequate within its own theoretical framework—that 
is, that the concepts overlap but are ultimately neither interchangeable 
nor in conflict. Consequently, such a response might go, when we 
want to do structuralist analysis, we should talk about narratees, and 
when we want to do rhetorical analysis, we should talk about narrative 
audiences. I would yield to this temptation if it were not for my read­
ing of second-person narration. Second-person narration shows that 
the two concepts are ultimately complementary—and that both struc­
turalist narratology and rhetorical theory need to recognize that 
complementarity. It shows further, as I mentioned above, that there 
are good reasons for reintroducing the distinction between the narra­
tive and ideal narrative audiences. 
Let us return to the basic definitions: a narratee is "someone whom 
the narrator addresses" (Prince, "Introduction," 7). A narrative audi­
ence is "the imaginary audience for which the narrator is writing" 
(Rabinowitz, "Truth," 127). An ideal narrative audience is "the audi­
ence for which the narrator wishes he were writing" (Rabinowitz, 
"Truth," 134). Let us also return to the beginning of Moore's story: 
Begin by meeting him in a class, a bar, at a rummage sale. Maybe 
he teaches sixth grade. Manages a hardware store. Foreman at a 
carton factory. He will be a good dancer. He will have perfecdy cut 
hair. He will laugh at your jokes. 
A week, a month, a year. Feel discovered, comforted, needed, 
loved, and start sometimes, somehow, to feel bored. When sad or 
confused, walk uptown to the movies. Buy popcorn. These things 
come and go. A week, a month, a year. (55) 
Is it adequate to say, as structuralist narratology would, that the un­
named you addressed by the narrator is the narratee and the protago­
nist, that the narrative's implied reader is different from this narratee, 
someone who infers from the narrator's address a larger cultural story 
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about female-male relationships? Although this account gets at a good 
part of the communicative structure of the text, it is not fully ad­
equate. It leaves out the way that the second-person address exerts 
pressure on the actual reader—even the male reader, as in the second 
paragraph—"to take on the role" of the narratee-protagonist as "you' 
experience(s) the ups and downs (especially the downs) of the rela­
tionship. In other words, continuing to assume that the narratee is a 
distinct character who is "out there" will mean not just that we prefer 
the structuralist to the rhetorical framework; it also will mean that the 
structuralist analysis will neglect a significant aspect of how the text at­
tempts to communicate. 
Perhaps, then, the rhetorical approach will be more adequate. It 
would say that in Moore's text the unnamed you addressed by the nar­
rator is the narrative audience and the protagonist and that the autho­
rial audience needs to infer the larger story about female-male 
relationships that Moore is telling.6 This approach does enable us to 
account better for the effects that follow from "taking on the role" of 
the "you," but again the account is unsatisfactory according to its own 
criteria of explanatory adequacy. Equating the narrative audience with 
"'you" leaves out the way in which we take on an observer role within 
thefiction, the way in which we recognize our difference from "you" 
and regard her as a person "out there" being addressed by the narrator. 
This observer role is different from the role we adopt as implied read­
ers (or members of the authorial audience) because in the observer 
role we believe in the reality of the events. Some of "what happens to 
us" when we read "How' depends on our dual perspective inside the 
fiction, on the way that we step into and out of the enunciatee posi­
tion, while we remain in the observer position and discover what the 
narrator assumes about our knowledge and beliefs in the enunciatee 
role. Furthermore, moving into the enunciatee role means that we 
move into the ideal narrative audience—the narrator tells us what we 
believe, think, feel, do—while in the observer role we evaluate our 
position in the ideal narrative audience. 
If this analysis is correct, then structuralist narratology needs the 
concept of "narrative audience" to complement its concept of 
"narratee," and rhetorical theory needs the concept of "narratee'' to 
complement its concept of "narrative audience." And both ap­
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proaches need the further concept of "ideal narrative audience.' For 
the sake of clarity and consistency, I propose that we adjust the defini­
tions to reflect the complementarity. Let Prince's definition of 
narratee stand: the audience addressed by the narrator (the enun­
ciatee). Let Rabinowitz's definition of narrative audience be modi­
fied: the actual audience's projection of itself into the observer role 
within the fiction. In taking on that role, we will always become be­
lievers in the reality of the fictional world; consequently, much of our 
emotional response to narrative derives from our participation in this 
role. Furthermore, let Rabinowitz's definition of the ideal narrative 
audience stand: "the audience for which the narrator wishes he were 
writing" ("Truth,' 134). The ideal narrative audience may or may not 
coincide with the narratee, and the narrative audience may or may not 
find itself in accord with the assumptions of the ideal narrative audi­
ence. In "How," as in most second-person narration, the ideal narra­
tive audience and the narratee coincide in the figure of "You," while 
the narrative audience fluctuates in its relation to "You"—sometimes 
coinciding (and feeling addressed), sometimes observing from some 
emotional, ethical, and/or psychological distance. In Tristram Shandy, 
however, Sterne orchestrates the relationships between narratee, ideal 
narrative audience, and narrative audience in a different way: he has 
Tristram correct the responses of particular narratees, thereby indicat­
ing the beliefs of the ideal narrative audience and offering the narrative 
audience the pleasure of observing Tristram's corrections without be­
ing implicated in them. 
The situation of watching traditional drama clarifies the distinc­
tions. For the mimetic illusion and the emotional force of a play to 
work, we must enter the observer position of the "narrative" ("dra­
matic"?) audience and believe in the reality of, say, Othello, Iago, and 
Desdemona. Indeed, the oft-discussed instances of people leaping 
upon the stage to stop the action are, in these terms, examples of what 
happens when we enter so deeply into the narrative audience position 
that we fail to maintain our simultaneous participation in the authorial 
audience. This role is clearly distinct from that of an enunciatee or 
"narratee," someone addressed by a speaker. However, in a soliloquy 
or aside addressed to (rather than overheard by) the audience, the roles 
of observer and enunciatee, of "narrative audience" and "narratee, 
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are likely to overlap. But again, the degree of overlap will depend on 
the relationship between the narrative audience and the ideal narrative 
audience. In a soliloquy addressed to the audience, the narratee and 
the ideal narrative audience will coincide; these roles will converge 
with that of the narrative audience to the extent that the observer can 
share in the assumptions the soliloquist makes about the audience's 
beliefs, knowledge, and values. The soliloquies of Shakespeare's vil­
lains, for example, create distance between the audience as narratee 
(or ideal narrative audience) and the audience as observer within the 
fiction. 
In narrative, where we always have narrative audiences and nar­
ratees, one of the variables in narrative discourse will be how much 
the narratee and the narrative audience overlap. As I suggested earlier, 
what second-person narration shows is that the more fully the narratee 
is characterized, the greater the distance between narratee and narra­
tive audience; similarly, the less the narratee is characterized, the 
greater the coincidence between the two.7 If we return again to the 
two texts with which I opened this essay, we can see that in the first 
the identity boundaries between narratee and narrative audience are 
blurred and that the blurring depends on the lack of characterization 
of the narratee. In Moore's text, on the other hand, the narratee is des­
ignated as female and as moving in a certain kind of social milieu, and 
these designations allow individual readers to differentiate themselves 
from her, even as they remain in the observer position.8 
How I—and You?—Read "How" 
Before turning to a rhetorical analysis of "How," I want to consider 
once again the kind of claims about reading that the rhetorical ap­
proach wants to make. By focusing on the text's designs on its reader, 
the rhetorical approach seems to promise an account not just of the 
structure and form of the text but also of the experience of reading. 
But in that promise also lies the problem. Recall Rabinowitz's de­
scription of the difference between narrative audience and narratee: 
the 'narrative audience is much like ourselves, with our beliefs, preju­
dices, our hopes, fears, and expectations, and our knowledge of soci­
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ety and literature—unless there is some evidence (textual or historical) 
to the contrary" ("Truth" 128-29n). In the mid-1990s, after many 
years of work on the difference that difference makes in reading, 
Rabinowitz himself would, I am confident, be among the first to ask, 
"Who are "we'?" and to point out that attention to difference suggests 
that the text will not necessarily exert its force on all readers in the 
same way. 
Rabinowitz's distinction between the actual and the authorial au­
diences is helpful for negotiating between the force of the text and in­
dividual difference, though I do not believe it completely solves the 
problem. The concept of authorial audience has the advantage of pos­
iting a hypothetical reader addressed by the implied author who is able 
to discern a text's intended force (just as you might be my hypothetical 
reader who fully understands all my points). The concept of actual 
reader enables Rabinowitz to acknowledge that many readers will not 
feel that intended force—and that those who do may have widely dif­
ferent responses to it. The model, then, seems as if it can stand as a 
heuristic for reading, a delineation of various roles available to the ac­
tual reader. As long as the model does not say that authorial reading is 
the best or only worthy kind of reading, it seems not entirely incom­
patible with the recognition of difference. 
If we probe more deeply, however, the consequences of difference 
reemerge. If we are a diverse group of readers, then our different cul­
tural experiences and the resulting differences in beliefs, hopes, fears, 
prejudices, and knowledge will lead us to hypothesize different autho­
rial and narrative audiences as we infer these positions from the details 
of any given narrative. Consequently, I propose that the model be 
taken as a helpful heuristic in a different way. It describes the experi­
ences of reading: an entry into a narrative audience, a recognition of a 
narrator's ideal audience and narratee, an effort to step into the 
author's intended audience, a relation of those positions to our actual 
beliefs. It does not, however, judge those experiences according to 
their proximity to some single standard. Instead, the model invites a 
sharing of experiences, especially sharing that involves discussion of 
the textual grounds for those experiences, so that different readers can 
continue to learn from each other.9 
In "How," the functions of the narratee and narrative audience 
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cannot be separated from the authorial audience's knowledge of the 
story's dialogic relation to three especially significant intertexts: (1) the 
common cultural narrative (especially among young to middle-aged 
adults of the middle and upper-middle classes) of developing an unsat­
isfactory relationship and trying to disentangle from it; (2) the standard 
narrative in self-help books (especially of the kind that end up on the 
New York Times best-seller list); and (3) the previous short stories in 
Self-Help, especially "How to Be an Other Woman." As I noted 
above, "How1' identifies the narratee as female, but the second-person 
address blurs the separation of narratee and narrative audience fre­
quently enough for the observer of either sex to be pulled into the 
narrative's subject position: you fall in love, become part of a couple, 
meet your partner's family, feel uneasy about the relationship, try— 
unsuccessfully—to find a good time to leave, try being with someone 
else, have your partner need you because of illness (or weakness), feel 
a renewed tenderness, discover that it is not enough, slowly resolve to 
leave, feel very guilty, finally muster the courage to say good-bye, sur­
vive the partner's anger but find that you are unable to escape the sad­
ness of the whole experience.10 
Even as Moore uses the second person to make the narrative audi­
ence feel the pull into the subject position, she uses the narratee to put a 
distinctive spin on the general narrative by switching the standard gen­
der roles: not only is the "you" female but the male expresses stereo­
typical female desires: "The touchiest point will always be this: he 
craves a family, a neat nest of human bowls; he wants to have your chil­
dren" (57). In this way, Moore is reclaiming a subject position for 
women in this general cultural narrative. But it is hardly a position to be 
envied, as the interaction with the other two intertexts reveals. Where 
the standard narrative in the self-help genre always leads its audiences 
(actual and authorial) onward and upward toward Self-Fulfillment and 
the Better Life (if genres had official songs, self-help's would be 
"Nearer My God to Thee"), Moore's narratee-protagonist is on a slow 
course to nowhere. Moore's critique of the self-help genre combines 
with the very generality and even triteness of the narrative to underline 
the story's satiric strain and mitigate the narrative audience's involve­
ment with the narratee-protagonist as a mimetic character. Strong 
emotions for the narratee seem less appropriate than knowing laughter 
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about modern relationships and self-help books. Yet the story's rela­
tionship to "How to Be an Other Woman1' and Moore's skill with the 
second-person address result in the knowing laughter itself existing 
alongside—and in some uneasy tension with—the narrative and au­
thorial audiences' genuine feeling for the narratee's situation. 
"How to Be an Other Woman" is a companion piece to "How" 
because it places the female narratee in a different relationship. In that 
story, the narratee-protagonist desires a deeper, more reliable relation­
ship with the man she loves but must face the frustration of always be­
ing of secondary importance to him and the pain of his ultimate 
rejection. Together the stories paint a very bleak picture of women's 
chances for satisfying relationships. When you want him, he's mar­
ried (or otherwise committed; one twist in "How to Be an Other 
Woman" is that the man is separated from his wife and cheating on the 
woman he lives with, a twist that certainly expands the circle of hurt 
women). When you decide that you don't want him, you are too kind 
and too weak to be able to leave. And when you finally do, you do not 
escape to happiness. This effect of the intertextuality invites the au­
thorial audience to entertain multiple ways of completing Moore's la­
conic title—yet these ways seem to point back to the wisdom of her 
choice. She leaves it at "How" because what else is there to say? Add­
ing "It Usually Goes'' or "It Hurts'' or even an interrogative that cuts 
off the last part of the earlier title—"to Be?"—seems redundant. 
" 'How?'" you ask. This is "How." 
Even more than this intertextuality, Moore's specific modulation 
of the narrative discourse enables her both to flaunt the triteness of her 
narrative and to generate genuine feeling with it. I will look once 
more at the opening paragraphs and then at just two more of the 
story's many highly nuanced passages. 
Begin by meeting him in a class, a bar, at a rummage sale. Maybe

he teaches sixth grade. Manages a hardware store. Foreman at a

carton factory. He will be a good dancer. He will have perfectly cut

hair. He will laugh at your jokes.

A week, a month, a year. Feel discovered, comforted, needed,

loved, and start sometimes, somehow, to feel bored. When sad or

confused, walk uptown to the movies. Buy popcorn. These things

come and go. A week, a month, a year. (55)
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I have already discussed the way that this passage begins the fluctua­
tion for the actual reader between the positions of the narratee and the 
narrative audience; now I would like to focus on some features of the 
narrative discourse that are characteristic of the whole story. First, the 
presentation of various alternatives, which goes along with the story's 
relation to the self-help genre, establishes a separation between the 
narrator and the narratee; unlike the case of Jay Mclnerney's Bright 
Lights, Big City, where the protagonist uses second person to narrate 
his own story, Moore uses an external narrator to address her narratee­
protagonist. Second, although many of the sentences have the surface 
form of imperatives ("Begin by meeting him," "walk uptown," "buy 
popcorn"), the very fact that the story is about the desire for love also 
gives the sentences another effect. They are not just imperatives but 
also descriptions of the narratee's willing actions. At the same time, the 
imperative tone and the consistency of the second-person address 
make it clear that the narratee and the ideal narrative audience will co­
incide in this story: the narratee is always doing the bidding of the nar­
rator. Third, this dual-directed quality of the verbs is continued by the 
frequent but not ubiquitous use of the future tense, a technique that 
allows the narrator simultaneously to predict and to report the events 
of the story. Thus, on the one hand, the story appears to remain within 
the confines of a self-help book: rather than being the account of one 
person's actual experience, it is a primer on how one might behave in 
a relationship. On the other hand, the story appears very much to be 
an account of one person s experience as it unfolds. Through these 
techniques and effects, Moore invites us to attend both to the satiric 
and to the mimetic elements of the story. 
The second passage I want to consider occurs just after "you" have 
met an actor, who can quote Coriolanus's mother, and with whom 
you go to bed or from whom you run as fast as you can: 
Back at home, days later, feel cranky and tired. Sit on the couch 
and tell him he's stupid. That you bet he doesn't know who Corio­
lanus is. That since you moved in you've noticed he rarely reads. He 
will give you a hurt, hungry-to-learn look, with his James Cagney 
eyes. He will try to kiss you. Turn your head. Feel suffocated. (57) 
The narratee-protagonist/ideal narrative audience here remains 
clearly distinct from the narrative audience. The narrative audience in 
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the observer position recognizes how much is going on beneath the 
surface of the narratee's actions. Her complaints are stand-ins for her 
larger unhappiness. The problem is not that this man does not know 
Coriolanus or does not read enough; the problem is that he is not 
someone else. The narratee is cranky because she is not as forthright as 
Coriolanus, not able to say what is really on her mind. Thus, though 
her complaints apparently point to ways that he might change his be­
havior to please her, these changes will not be enough. So, his "hurt, 
hungry-to-learn look" is not a response that offers her any real hope. 
He can learn all he wants, but he will still be himself. That is what is 
suffocating. 
All this takes on a special cast because of the second-person narra­
tion. While the clear distinction between the narratee and the narra­
tive audience allows us to infer so much about the narratee's behavior 
and situation, the "you" address also invites us to project ourselves—as 
narrative audience, authorial audience, and actual readers—into the 
narratee's subject position. Consequently, the inferences we make as 
we occupy the narrative audience position lead us to a complicated vi­
sion that mingles narratee and self in the narratee's position. We both 
occupy the position and know what the position is like in a way that 
the narratee herself does not. In this way, we feel addressed by the nar­
rator but not fully coincident with the narratee. Different flesh-and­
blood readers will then respond differently to this complicated 
positioning: some may empathize more fully with the narratee, some 
may grow impatient or indifferent or condemnatory, and others may 
turn away from this involvement and refocus on the story's mockery 
of its own triteness and of the self-help genre. If Moore had employed 
a standard homodiegetic or heterodiegetic narration, she could have 
built the same inferences into the passage, but it is difficult to see how 
she could have also retained the effects resulting from this complicated 
mingling and separation of narratee and narrative audience. 
The third passage I would like to examine more closely is the 
story's last three paragraphs: 
You will never see him again. Or perhaps you will be sitting in

Central Park one April eating your lunch and he will trundle by on

roller skates. You will greet him with a wave and a mouth full of

sandwich. He will nod, but he will not stop.
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There will be an endless series of tests. 
A week, a month, a year. The sadness will die like an old dog. 
You will feel nothing but indifference. The logy whine of a cowboy 
harmonica, plaintive, weary, it will fade into the hills as slow Hank 
Williams. One of those endings. (64) 
Again the narratee/ideal narrative audience and narrative audience 
are clearly distinct. This time, however, there is much less of a gap be­
tween the two audiences' understandings of the events and the dis­
course. The first paragraph here reminds the authorial audience of the 
narrative's triteness: you might see him, you might not, it happens 
both ways. In either case, though, it won't make much difference. In­
stead, "There will be an endless series of tests." This sentence is ironic 
for both narratee and narrative audience. The narrator has previously 
employed the same sentence in discussing the mans illness. Here it 
glosses the previous paragraph and extends its meaning: whether the 
narratee never sees him or sees him functioning fine without her, life 
after the relationship will be an endless series of tests to diagnose what 
is now her illness, the lingering sadness of the whole experience. And 
the last paragraph underscores the endlessness by suggesting that even 
the apparent end, the death of that sadness, does not bring renewal. 
Stretched out over yet another of the story's many spans of "a week, a 
month, a year," the dying gives way to the emptiness of indifference, 
"one of those endings." Narratee, ideal narrative audience, and narra­
tive audience all nod their heads in understanding here. This close po­
sitioning of the complementary audiences strengthens the second 
person's general invitation for the narrative, authorial, and actual audi­
ences to project themselves into the narratee's position. Despite the 
triteness of the narrative, underscored by the allusion to country music 
and then one last time by "One of those endings," that position con­
tains real pain. By keeping the narratee, the ideal narrative audience, 
and the narrative audience closely aligned here, Moore is able to build 
genuine emotion into her ending. Again, as actual readers we may 
choose to turn from this emotion or critique it as sentimental. But 
Moore's ending can be usefully compared to Umberto Eco's example 
of how to generate sincere emotion within a postmodern conscious­
ness that is aware of language as already worn out, overloaded with 
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meaning from other contexts: the man who wants to tell a woman that 
he loves her madly but worries that romance novels have turned a di­
rect expression of love into cliche can say, "As Barbara Cartland 
would put it, I love you madly" (227). Even as Moore's narrative 
flaunts its triteness and engages in the send-up of the self-help genre, 
it also invites its readers to respond as we do to traditional mimetic 
fiction. 
You, Me, and Lome Moore 
Having focused so much on the relations between narratee, ideal nar­
rative audience, and narrative audience in second-person fiction, I 
would like to close with a comment on those between authors, actual 
or implied, and actual readers. Brian McHale has suggested that one of 
the metathemes of postmodernism that is apparent in second-person 
narration is love, since the mode depends on violating traditional on­
tological boundaries (between the fictional and the nonfictional 
realms) in such a way that reading and writing themselves take on an 
erotic charge (227). I believe that McHale's point is sound, though I 
also find applying it wholesale to the reading of Self-Help runs the risk 
of violating the thematic spirit of Moore's book. What I would like to 
propose instead is that the complexities of the reading-writing transac­
tion in "How" and the other second-person stories add another layer 
to Moore's undermining of the self-help genre. In using the second-
person address to invite her actual readers to adopt multiple 
positionings, Moore implicitly comments on the simplistic assump­
tions about readers operating in the self-help books. In extending her 
invitations, Moore compliments her readers' intelligence by implicitly 
expressing confidence that we can find our ways. When we summon 
the requisite intelligence and we experience the satisfactions that fol­
low from accepting the invitations, we also turn Self-Help into mutual-
help, with author and reader once again affirming the value of their 
activities for themselves and for each other. 
In other words, the voice from this page offers you testimony about 
the value of rhetorical transactions. One of those conclusions." 
8

Narrating the PC

Controversies: Thoughts

on Dinesh D'Souza's

Illiberal Education 
This essay takes a different subject from the others: neither a fictional narrative 
nor a canonical text but an entry in the so-called culture wars being conducted in 
the early 1990s: D'Souza's Illiberal Education. For that reason, the essay 
runs the risks of dealing with dated material and giving D'Souza's text more 
prominence than it deserves. I want to emphasize that the essay is interested in 
D'Souza's book as a representative case: as D'Souza's new book, The End 
of Racism, illustrates, narrative continues to be used in the day-to-day politi­
cal and ideological battles over the nature of our institutions, and ideologically 
committed partisans continue to employ at least some of the tactics found in Il­
liberal Education. If the analysis I offer is persuasive, then it has relevance for 
current and future situations. Furthermore, the essay engages the more general 
theoretical question of how ideology influences interpretation by reflecting on 
how my own commitments influence my discussion of D'Souza. Finally,
think it is important for those who disagree with books such as Illiberal Educa­
tion, which have achieved a certain cultural influence, not to ignore them but to 
take them seriously. 
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Narrative, Narrative Theory, and 
the Case of Illiberal Education 
Although the media storm swirling around the term political correctness 
has now abated, universities and their publics are still debating such 
important issues as affirmative action, multiculturalism, speech codes, 
and faculty accountability to students and taxpayers.1 As these debates 
continue, I want to consider Dinesh D'Souza's Illiberal Education from 
the perspective offered by my approach to narrative as rhetoric, be­
cause I believe that the book shows—both in its own strategies and in 
the reception that made it a best-seller—how much the debates are in­
fluenced by the narratives that surround them. Indeed, my first reac­
tion to D'Souza's heavily documented book2 is to echo E. M. Forster: 
"Illiberal Education tells a story. Yes—oh dear, yes—it tells a story." For 
out of the book's welter of statistics, interviews, case studies, and dis­
cursive analysis arises D'Souza's tale of the decline and fall of the con­
temporary American university. The villain of the piece is what 
D'Souza calls the "victim's revolution," the efforts by leftist academics 
to do such things as promote affirmative action, revise the traditional 
canoi., and curb so-called hate speech—in short, to take race and gen­
der into account in admissions, in the curriculum, and in the conduct 
of campus life. According to D'Souza's narrative, these efforts have 
undermined the ideal of a liberal education: the university, rather than 
being a place for open, unfettered inquiry in which students are taught 
values of toleration and fairness, has become a place beset by a rigid 
and constricting ideology of victim's rights, a place in which students 
get "an education in close-mindedness and intolerance, which is to 
say, illiberal education" (229). 
Clearly, much of the attention, both positive and negative, Illiberal 
Education received rests on the perception that its story is important 
and/or well told. Here I will take the story's importance as a given and 
focus on its telling. Indeed, my primary interests are how D'Souza tells 
the story, how he views his own narrative—and why, after studying 
these matters, I remain unconvinced by the story. I shall employ tools 
of rhetorical analysis to move both inside and outside D'Souza's ideo­
logical and narrative perspectives—in other words, both to listen care­
fully to his story and to question it seriously. More particularly, I shall, 
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first, analyze the powerful claims D'Souza implicitly makes for his nar­
rative by examining the way he views the relationships between facts, 
interpretations, and that narrative. Second, I shall argue that many of 
D'Souza's local narratives do not make—at least as straightforwardly as 
he thinks—the points that he presents them as making. Third, I shall 
interrogate my own interested relation to D'Souza's narratives as a 
way of considering the role of ideology in his construction of those 
narratives and in my analysis of them. Finally, I shall consider some 
general conclusions that follow from this exploration of narrative, nar­
rative analysis, and the debates over the university. 
Facts, Interpretations, and Narratives 
Here the reader will find a wealth of concrete information and spe­
cific detail that has withstood the most searching factual scrutiny. It 
is possible to come up with varying interpretations, but while 
people are entided to their own opinions, they are not entitled to 
their own facts. What it is important to recognize is not horror 
stories or excess but the fact that these are the logical consequences 
of a set of principles, indeed of an ideological world view. 
—Dinesh D'Souza, introduction 
to the Vintage edition, xx 
D'Souza's statement proposes a very strict connection between fact, 
interpretation, and narrative: solid fact provides the firm foundation 
on which (proper) interpretation and narrative should be built. Al­
though the statement gives lip service to the variability of interpreta­
tion, it actually works to control and close off interpretation by claim­
ing that interpretation follows directly from fact. If facts are given, not 
chosen, and if they point directly to conclusions (as "horror stories" 
point to an underlying ideological view of the world), then alterna­
tive interpretations of the facts, though possible, are anally wrong. 
D'Souza tightens the link between fact and interpretation through the 
rhetorical moves of his last sentence: "What it is important to recog­
nize is not horror stories [about the way Political Correctness is ruin­
ing campus life] or excess but the fact that these are the logical conse­
quences of a set of principles, indeed of an ideological world view." 
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The first half of the sentence graciously denies any interest in sensa­
tionalism ("horror stories are not important"), but the second half 
reclaims sensationalism's importance by subsuming it in its alleged un­
derlying cause ("a logical consequence of a set of principles"). More 
significantly, in light of D'Souza's seemingly commonsensical asser­
tion that you can't choose your facts, the otherwise inelegant phrase 
"the fact that" raises the stakes of his claim here. That "horror stories" 
have a dangerous ideological perspective as their underlying cause is 
not just D'Souza's opinion or interpretation—this is a matter of fact. 
And just as we cannot choose to accept or reject this fact, we cannot 
choose to accept or reject the narrative that follows from it, because 
this narrative is now also rooted in the indisputable. 
If we look more closely at the passage, however, we can see that, 
despite D'Souza's skillful rhetoric (and to some extent, because of it), 
this passage actually indicates that facts and interpretations are much 
less tightly connected than it overtly claims. D'Souza's confident as­
sertion in the last sentence indicates that he regards the close link be­
tween facts and interpretations as fairly straightforward and 
unproblematic. The rhetorical strategy of the whole passage tells a dif­
ferent story, however. D'Souza is worrying here about those readers 
who have disputed his evidence and especially those who have tried to 
interpret it differently. So he makes his assertion about the 
indisputability of his facts, and then tries to make this tight link be­
tween fact, interpretation, and narrative. But he must also deal with 
the inconvenient^art that his evidence has been—and will be—used as 
the basis for different interpretations. As we have seen, he tries to ac­
knowledge this fact and then gloss over it. But the glossing over does 
not work. If it is a fact that people are entitled to their different in­
terpretations, then it cannot indisputably be a fact that the "horror 
stories" are a logical consequence of an "ideological world view"— 
unless, of course, there is only one correct interpretation of the facts. 
But if there is only one correct interpretation, people are not entitled 
to their own (differing) interpretations—unless, of course, they are 
entitled to ignore the truth. And if they are entitled to ignore the 
truth, they are entitled to ignore the (indisputable) facts. In other 
words, they can choose their own facts. If D'Souza is serious about 
people being able to form differing interpretations, then his conclu­
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sion about the link between fact and interpretation does not follow. If 
he is serious about the link between fact and interpretation, then 
people cannot choose their own interpretations. 
To come at this point about the gap between facts and interpreta­
tions from another direction, let us imagine a reader who believes that 
the horror stories are not "a logical consequence" of an underlying set 
of principles but rather a consequence of some people's overzeal­
ousness. According to this reader, these well-intentioned people be­
come so committed to one principle (e.g., speech that mocks minority 
groups should be discouraged) that they ignore other equally impor­
tant principles (even distasteful speech deserves First Amendment 
protection because otherwise all unpopular speech is subject to cen­
sorship). Clearly, D'Souza's assertions in this passage will not convince 
this reader because what D'Souza points at—the "fact" that the horror 
stories are the consequence of an underlying set of principles—is 
something this reader disputes. In effect, he says to D'Souza, "You see 
the wrong thing when you look at the horror stories." Indeed, this 
reader would be inclined to point to the horror stories and say, "Mr. 
D'Souza, can't you see that they stem from overzealousness?" To 
which D'Souza would probably reply, "You see the wrong thing 
when you look at the facts." 
Neither act of pointing to the horror stories will settle the dispute 
about how to interpret their meaning. The facts of the horror stories 
are susceptible to more than one interpretation. Indeed, whether a 
particular incident deserves to be designated as a "horror story" will 
frequently be a matter of dispute. By insisting on the gap between facts 
and interpretations, I have only complicated the issue of how the ar­
guments and controversies surrounding the role of the university 
should be narrated. Insisting on the gap immediately raises two related 
questions: (1) why does a given observer develop one interpretation 
rather than another? and (2) how is it possible to adjudicate among dif­
ferent interpretations of the same phenomena? I think I can better ad­
dress these questions—and the larger issue of narrating the political 
correctness controversy—after analyzing a few of the many places in 
Illiberal Education where the relations D'Souza finds between facts, in­
terpretations, and narratives seem highly questionable. My purpose is 
neither to disprove D'Souza's entire narrative (I work with too small a 
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portion of his book) nor to develop a counternarrative; instead, I want 
to focus attention on the broader question of the role of narrative and 
narrative analysis in the debate over the university. 
D'Souza at Tufts: Narrative Thematizing 
In his introduction to the paperback edition, D'Souza recounts an in­
cident during his visit to Tufts University shortly after the original 
hardcover came out: 
I was berated by a white student who maintained that my defense 
of academic standards amounted to nothing more than an apology 
for the "white perspective." Universities needed to give equal 
prominence in the classroom to black, Hispanic, and non-Western 
perspectives, he argued. 
When I asked him to identity the white perspective, he looked 
appalled and threw out his arms, as if to say it was so obvious that it 
needed no elaboration. I insisted, however, that he provide two or 
three specific examples of a white perspective. 
"How about rationality?" he said with a confident grin.

I wrote that down on the blackboard. "What else?"

"How about logocentrism?" That's how they talk on many

campuses these days. 
"What's that?" I asked. 
"The white man's obsession with big words," he maintained, so I 
wrote down logocentrism, and asked for another example.

"How about sexual restraint?"

"Not in my experience," I said. But I wrote that down too.

For students in the audience, this proved to be an exercise in

getting the joke a few minutes after the punch line. There were

titters in the crowd, but the laughter came almost in slow motion.

Gradually, students realized that the concession to white norms of

all qualities of logic, clarity of expression, and decency of behav­

ior—and the implication that sucli things could not be expected

from other groups—was profoundly condescending and ultimately

demeaning to the minorities. Angrily, the advocate of race-based

knowledge accused me of "insensitivity1 and of unconsciously

advancing the goals of "white America." (xii-xiii)
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D'Souza goes on to give an interpretation of this narrative—and 
one of another incident at Tufts in which a professor tells D'Souza 
that, although his speech is racist, he is not because only whites can be 
racists: 
As my experience at Tufts indicates, the First Amendment re­
mains in force at many American universities, but there is also a 
pervasive illiberalism of mind. Instead of cultivating in young 
people those qualities of critical thought and civil argument that are 
the essence of a liberal education, university leaders have created 
sham communities where serious and honest discussion is frequently 
drowned out by a combination of sloganeering, accusation, and 
intimidation, (xiii) 
D'Souza's way of telling the story also implies other features of his in­
terpretation. Because the student is initially unable to give any content 
to the phrase "white perspective," the narrative implies that it is 
merely a bit of liberal cant, a phrase devoid of meaning. Even better 
for D'Souza's purposes, when pressed, the student comes up with 
meanings that can't be considered the exclusive property of whites— 
unless one is hopelessly racist. The student is thus caught in self-con­
tradiction, and the concept of a "white perspective" seems fatuous. 
Furthermore, in making the point about the student's self-contradic­
tion, D'Souza appears to show that he is actually more sensitive about 
race and racism than the student. All in all, from D'Souza's perspec­
tive, it's hard to imagine a better way to begin. 
But let's look more closely at how this narrative works. One appar­
ently slippery maneuver D'Souza makes is to leap from rationality, 
logocentrism, and sexual restraint to "all qualities of logic, clarity of 
expression, and decency of behavior," but I don't want to make too 
much of this point because it is possible that the student's other an­
swers justify D'Souza's leap. More central to the narrative's argumen­
tative point is the thematic function of the student. The narrative will 
work for D'Souza to the extent that we regard the student not as an 
isolated individual but as a representative of a much larger group 
of white, liberal-minded undergraduates who share his beliefs. The 
narrative signals the student's representativeness in large part by the 
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minimal development of his mimetic function, that is, by not indi­
vidualizing him. D'Souza gives him no name, no physical characteris­
tics; D'Souza refers to the student simply as "he"—until the end of the 
narrative when "he" is replaced by a clear thematic designation, "the 
advocate of race-based knowledge." D'Souza gives the student mini­
mal mimetic life in brief descriptions of the student's demeanor and 
affect at different points of the narrative, but these all highlight a gen­
eral progression from arrogant confidence to anger, and the narrative 
implies that both emotions are unjustified. 
Is D'Souza's thematizing of the student warranted? Is the student's 
definition of a "white perspective1' widely shared? Do most people 
who believe that a white perspective on academic standards could be 
usefully supplemented by the perspectives of other races define the 
white perspective as rationality, use of big words, and sexual restraint? 
The answer is clearly no. The link between the facts of D'Souza's nar­
rative and his interpretation starts to loosen. To be sure, the narrative 
effectively shows that the student does not understand his own posi­
tion very well, but it does not succeed in discrediting the more general 
idea about the importance of cultural perspectives. 
Furthermore, once we loosen the connection between fact and 
D'Souza's interpretation, we open the space for another interpreta­
tion, one that is less flattering to D'Souza. Once the student confi­
dently says that "rationality'' is part of the white perspective, D'Souza 
must know that he will be easy game. Rather than stepping in at that 
point and talking about the dangers of making a concept such as ratio­
nality the distinctive property of one race, D'Souza strings the student 
along, makes a joke about one of his answers ("Sexual restraint'V'Not 
in my experience"), and lets the larger joke gradually dawn on the rest 
of the audience—a surefire way to humiliate the student. If we adopt 
this interpretation, then this early narrative has almost the opposite ef­
fect of the one D'Souza wants: rather than showing him to be open-
minded and tolerant, the narrative shows him to be, well, an 
intellectual bully; rather than being sympathetic to him, we are in­
clined to be sympathetic to his opponents. Consequently, rather than 
being disposed to accept D'Souza's narrative about the way things are 
on campus these days, we are inclined to doubt it. 
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D'Souza's Case Studies: The Powers 
and Limits of Monologism 
In chapter 7, "The Tyranny of the Minority,' D'Souza offers a long 
series of "case studies" designed to show the epidemic of abuses com­
mitted in the name of the new political orthodoxy accompanying the 
victim's revolution. D'Souza's strategy of piling up the cases makes 
good sense because it overwhelms the objection that he is arguing 
merely by anecdote. The message of quantity is that these stories are 
the rule, not the exception. But the way D'Souza tells and juxtaposes 
some of these cases again invites a narrative theorist to loosen the link 
between fact and interpretation. The following two cases occur con­
secutively in D'Souza's text. 
The Case of Murray Dolfman 
Nobody in Professor Dolfman's class in legal studies at the Uni­
versity of Pennsylvania could identify where the term "servitude" 
could be found in the American Constitution, so Dolfman com­
mented that there were "ex-slaves" in the class who should have an 
idea. "I don't know if I should have used that term," Dolfman re­
called, "but it got students to think of the Thirteenth Amendment 
right away." 
Shortly afterwards, a few minority students came up to Dolfman 
and accused him of racial insensitivity. A second charge against 
Dolfman was that he had once told a black student to change his 
pronunciation from "de" to "the." Dolfman said that he met with 
the students, and apologized if they had taken offense. "I told them 
that I understood and shared their concerns, that I amjewish and 
during .serfer we pray: When we were slaves unto Pharaoh." 
Dolfman also pointed out that it would be important for students, in 
courtroom argument in later years, to speak in a clear and compre­
hensible manner. 
"They seemed to understand," Dolfman recalled, and the matter 
was dropped fora few months. But after that, during Black History 
Month, it was brought up again and again, Dolfman said, "to illus­
trate just how bad things are at Penn." 
The adrenalin generated by the Black History Month rhetoric 
brought about a demonstration of minority students, several dozens 
of whom occupied Dolfman's class and prevented him from teach­
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ing. "They read a document of indictment to my students,'' 
Dolfman said. President Sheldon Hackney met with Dolfman and 
asked him to refrain from public comment, even to abstain from 
defending himself against accusations. Then Hackney joined the 
ranks of the accusers, telling the campus newspaper that conduct 
such as Dolfman's was "absolutely intolerable." Dolfman was pres­
sured to issue what he termed a "forced apology" and to attend 
"racial awareness" sessions on campus. The university subsequently 
decided not to renew Dolfman's teaching contract for one year. 
Dolfman is now back at Penn, a chastened man. "The message 
has been driven home very clearly," Dolfman said. "You can't open 
your mouth on these issues now without fear of being humiliated." 
The Case of Pete Schaub 
When Pete Schaub, a business major at the University of Wash­
ington at Seattle, enrolled in a Women's Studies class in early 1988, 
he expected to learn about the "history of women and the contribu­
tions they have made." Schaub said his mother was a 1960's rebel 
who divorced his father and moved to rural Washington state to live 
"close to the land." 
"Introduction to Women s Studies," taught by Donna Langston 
and Dan-Michele Brown, was not what Schaub had expected. On 
the first day of class Brown asserted that "the traditional American 
family represents a dysfunctional family unit." Students who pro­
tested that their families were functional were shouted down by 
teaching assistants hired by Langston and Brown. "Denial, denial," 
they yelled in unison. A few days later Langston brought guest 
speakers to talk about masturbation. "They said you don't need a 
man," Schaub said. "They proceeded to show how to masturbate 
with a feather duster, and they had dildos right there." 
When Professor Brown claimed that U.S. statistics showed that 
lesbians could raise children better than married couples, Schaub 
asked for the source. "I asked after class," Schaub said. "I wasn't 
challenging her." But the teacher "wouldn't hear of it. She said: 
'Why are you challenging me? Get away from me. Just leave me 
alone.'" A member of Brown's undergraduate circle called Schaub a 
"chauvinist goddamn bastard." The next day, Schaub was banned 
from class. The teacher had two campus police officers waiting in 
the hall to escort him away. 
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Schaub protested to the administration, but nothing happened 
for several weeks. Finally he was permitted to go back to class, but 
advised by Associate Dean James Nason to drop the course. (201-3) 
On the one hand, I am prepared to believe that here we have two 
genuine horror stories and that, if I investigated these cases, I would 
reach conclusions similar to D'Souza's. On the other hand, I am also 
struck by how D'Souza's narration of each and his juxtaposition of the 
two actually undermine their force and begin to open each of them up 
to alternative interpretations. The problem here is not the way 
D'Souza thematizes the characters but rather the combination of point 
of view and what Bakhtin calls monologism—D'Souza's strategy of 
giving weight to only one ideology in the narrative. D'Souza tells each 
story from the perspective of the protagonist; he asks us to see every­
thing just as Dolfrnan and Schaub do. In one way, of course, this re­
stricted perspective makes the stories more powerful; there is very 
little recalcitrant material in them—almost everything points to the 
interpretation that D'Souza gives them. If one is already convinced of 
the tyranny of the minority, these narratives will surely reinforce one's 
conviction. But if one is not already convinced, the restriction to one 
ideology is likely to seem suspicious. These are narratives about dis­
putes and about the kinds of disputes that many people are now famil­
iar with. It seems reasonable to ask about how the "antagonists" 
would interpret the facts of these stories. 
Once we become conscious of the monologism, the little bit of re­
calcitrant material in each becomes available as the basis, if not for 
counternarratives, at least for complications of these two. Dolfman's 
singling out the African American students as "ex-slaves'" who should 
know what "servitude" means appears to mark them as Other and put 
them in the role of educating those in the mainstream. Such a judg­
ment does not mean that Dolfman deserved to have his teaching con­
tract suspended, but it certainly alters the sense of "horror" in this 
story. Schaub's apparent belief that talk of masturbation and lesbian sex 
is somehow beyond the pale opens the question of whether his teach­
ers, however mistakenly, were picking up signs of homophobia in his 
behavior. That is, one may legitimately wonder whether the teachers' 
past experience with genuinely homophobic students might be influ­
 165 Narrating the PC Controversies
encing the dynamics of their interaction with Schaub. Again, raising 
this question does not justify what happened to Schaub, but it does 
suggest a more complicated situation than D'Souza's account admits. 
Even if D'Souza's narratives by themselves don't give us much 
sense of a possible other side, the juxtaposition of the two stories 
makes me wonder about how he handles the narration. In the first 
story, the professor is without fault and the students are tyrannical; in 
the second, these roles are reversed. This switch reinforces the desire 
to know how the African American students in Dolfman's class would 
tell their story and how Professors Brown and Langston would tell 
theirs. Surely their interpretations of the same basic facts would not 
coincide with D'Souzas. The question then arises: why should we 
accept D'Souza's monological interpretations as final? 
D'Souza and Atwater at Howard:

Reading Cultural Narratives

In chapter 4 of Illiberal Education, D'Souza discusses the efforts of 
Howard University students to resist the appointment of Lee Atwater 
to the Board of Trustees. The main reason for the students' resistance 
was Atwater's role as the man behind the Willie Horton ad in George 
Bush's 1988 campaign against Michael Dukakis. Through this ad, as 
D'Souza reminds us, "Atwater helped destroy Dukakis' electoral 
base in the South by exposing the Massachusetts governor's furlough 
program, exemplified by black convict Willie Horton, who used a 
weekend release to assault and rape a white woman in Maryland" (96). 
The passage I want to focus on here is argument rather than narrative, 
but matters of narrative and narrative analysis are crucial to under­
standing and evaluating that argument. 
Atwater's initial claim that Horton's race was totally irrelevant is 
perhaps a bit much. The students' point that, even if anchored in the 
crime statistics, Atwater used Horton to play on fears of black crime 
is probably valid. The irony, however, is that one of the biggest 
complaints at Howard—if the campus newspaper's reports are any 
indication—is the crime rate in Washington, D.C., that is hurting 
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Howard students. The Hilltop echoes this in issue after issue. The 
April 7, 1989 edition, for instance, coming right after the Atwater 
controversy, reported as its lead story, "Donald Hatch, the AIDS 
rapist, who terrorized the Howard community in the fall of 1987, 
was sentenced last week." It turns out that Hatch "raped and orally 
sodomized a Howard student after threatening her with a hypoder­
mic needle which he claimed was contaminated with the AIDS 
virus." Hatch was black but got no sympathy; rather, Howard stu­
dents proclaimed the sentence "marvelous." Alonza Robertson said 
that burglaries are common at Howard, especially during breaks 
when students go home, and the campus does not provide adequate 
security. "A couple of girls were raped here recently," Robertson 
said matter-of-factly. 
In the Horton case, however, both the convict and his crimes 
were far from home base. Howard students tended to think of 
Horton as an issue, not as a dangerous con who sadistically attacked 
an innocent couple. The entire moral equation would be changed if 
Horton attacked a black family. Yet Howard protesters did not find 
it at all inconsistent that they would protest Atwater's political use of 
Horton while insisting that the administration bolster campus secu­
rity to avoid further burglary and rape. (106—7) 
The underlying logic of this argument goes like this: if you're an 
African American who wants protection from crimes by other African 
Americans, you have no right to call Atwater's Willie Horton ad rac­
ist. If you admit that some African Americans have committed rape, 
how can you object to Atwater's ad? If there are African American 
rapists, how can Atwater's reference to one be racist? In this case, 
D'Souza's interpretation seems not just questionable but seriously— 
even shockingly—inadequate. The interpretation is wanting because 
D'Souza fails to recognize how Atwater's ad about Willie Horton in­
tersects with a larger cultural narrative of black-white relations, a nar­
rative that is both patriarchal and racist. In this narrative, the white 
man's fear of the racial Other mixes with his hatred for the black man, 
and the hatred and fear fuel each other. Because the white man also 
convinces himself of the black man's inferiority, he does not fear the 
black man's intelligence or his strength or his spirituality; instead, the 
white man fears the black man's allegedly unrestrained sexuality, be­
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cause sexual intercourse between races leads to the contamination or 
pollution of white blood. Those who intermarry must be ostracized, 
and black men who rape white women must be severely punished. 
Atwater's ad appeals to this racist narrative by using Willie Horton s 
crime as a representation of the racial anarchy threatened by Dukakis's 
being soft on crime.3 
Despite D'Souza's acknowledgment that the ad did "play on fears 
of black crime," his main argument about the inconsistency of the 
Howard students misses the connection between Atwater's ad and the 
larger narrative. From the perspective of rhetorical theory, we can say 
that D'Souza's argument fails to recognize that Horton is not just a 
person but also a thematic character with this large thematic function. 
To put the point another way, D'Souza does not recognize how the 
relations between facts and their symbolic weight change from one 
discourse to the next. In the Howard students' discourse about safety 
on campus, an African American rapist is as dangerous—for all races of 
women—as a white rapist. The symbolic dimensions of the rapist's 
and the victim's racial identities are less important than the threat the 
rapist presents. In the discourse of political advertisements, however, 
when a white politician chooses a black rapist's attack on a white 
woman as the symbol of another white politician's softness toward 
crime, the situation is very different. Here race matters and takes on 
significant symbolic weight precisely because the discourse of the ad 
intersects with the larger cultural narrative. D'Souza's handling of the 
local narrative here seems to be the weakest part of the book. 
Narrative, Analysis, and Ideology 
Let us return to the two questions I raised earlier: (1) what causes a 
given observer to choose one interpretation rather than another? and 
(2) how can we adjudicate among different interpretations of the same 
phenomena? My examination of these few narrative moments in Illib­
eral Education suggests that one (unsurprising) answer to the first ques­
tion is ideological commitments. D'Souza is clearly interpreting the 
facts in a way that advances his conservative view of the American 
university. If he had less of an a priori commitment to this view and its 
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correctness, he would be less likely to overthematize the Tufts stu­
dent, more likely to allow the other side of the Dolfman and Schaub 
cases into his narratives, and more likely to recognize the difference 
between the Atwater ad's use of Willie Horton and the presence of 
African American rapists in the neighborhood of Howard University. 
But if this conclusion is unsurprising, the relation between it and 
D'Souza's initial claim about facts, interpretations, and analysis is per­
haps less immediately evident. The overthematizing of the Tufts stu­
dent, the monologism of the case studies, and the attention to the 
"facts" at Howard in the absence of the larger cultural narrative are all 
consistent with a belief that facts directly point to their own interpre­
tations. Once we see this consistency, we can also see what D'Souza 
does not acknowledge and would probably deny: his statement about 
facts and interpretations itself reveals two significant, closely related as­
sumptions: (1) one can unproblematically separate facts from their 
contexts, the complex situatedness that sometimes makes facts diffi­
cult to ascertain, and (2) once abstracted, they will tell their own story. 
The analysis of D'Souza's narratives suggests not only that these as­
sumptions are highly questionable but also that they function to keep 
him from recognizing the powerful role ideology plays as he moves 
from his facts to his interpretations. 
As D'Souza would no doubt himself be quick to point out, this at­
tention to ideology needs to be turned on the arguments I have been 
making about Illiberal Education. If ideology plays such an important 
role in D'Souza's moving from facts to interpretations to narratives, 
then it follows that ideology also plays a significant role in my evalua­
tion of those narratives. If I shared D'Souza's ideological commit­
ments, I would no doubt praise his book as highly as Roger Kimball 
does in his review for the New Criterion ("indispensable reading"; 
"D'Souza has chronicled the intellectual and moral degradation of a 
great liberal institution" [8]). Because my ideological commitments 
are different, however, I am more inclined to see alternative interpre­
tations of the same facts and, consequently, I end up challenging these 
local narratives and remaining skeptical about Illiberal Education's glo­
bal narrative. 
Having acknowledged the importance of ideological commitments 
in both the construction and analysis of these narratives, should we 
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conclude that in these matters ideology finally determines interpreta­
tion? If so, then any genuine adjudication is impossible, since any 
judge will simply decide on the basis of her own ideological commit­
ments. Anyone who has spent much time reading the debates about 
the university is likely to be tempted to answer this question in the af­
firmative. Anyone who has dipped into Kimball's Tenured Radicals will 
find his praise of D'Souza to be entirely predictable, but Gerry 
O'Sullivan's negative review seems no less a consequence of his ideo­
logical commitments: "In the continuing devolution of the conserva­
tive critique of academic life, few have aspired to the depths of Dinesh 
D'Souza's Illiberal Education" (43). To consent to the view that com­
mitments determine interpretations, however, is to deny the existence 
of facts as anything but the product of interpretation. To do that in this 
realm is to deny that people on all sides of the debates have experi­
enced pain, oppression, and injustice, while others have experienced 
profit and pleasure.4 
Ideological commitments, then, inevitably influence interpreta­
tions of facts, and to some extent such commitments help shape facts 
in one way rather than another—as we have seen in considering the 
cases of Dolfman and Schaub. But this phenomenon of commitments 
influencing interpretations that in turn shape facts—let me call this 
phenomenon a fact—can itself be a reason to question our interpreta­
tions. This questioning, of course, will not itself be totally neutral and 
objective, but it can—and should—come from the commitments of a 
competing perspective. That is the strategy I have employed with 
D'Souza's narratives, and I would expect him to employ a similar 
strategy in assessing my interpretations. If the questioning is serious, 
then it can have genuine consequences—can make us change our in­
terpretations—because in some cases facts are sufficiently recalcitrant 
to resist the interpretations that our commitments would encourage us 
to make. It seems to me that D'Souza's interpretation of the situation 
at Howard is a clear example of such a case. 
At the same time, these very principles mean that I must be open to 
the possibility that D'Souza will be able to show me that this conclu­
sion about his handling of the Howard situation needs to be revised. 
This awareness does not, however, prevent me from taking my stand, 
from claiming that my interpretation of his account should persuade, if 
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not him, then most other readers of our exchange. In other words, be­
cause commitments influence interpretations that in turn shape but do 
not create facts, the narratives we tell about those facts legitimately 
make truth claims, but those claims are likely to be highly contested. 
This contestation is one important means by which we can revise the 
narratives and refine their truth claims, though our reaching the stage 
where our narratives are beyond contestation is as unlikely as the 
eventuality that facts will speak their own interpretations. Further­
more, because the narratives we tell about our world themselves rein­
force or revise our ideological commitments and our interpretations 
of that world, we have a very big stake in the ongoing negotiation of 
those narratives.5 
For that very reason, narrative theorists in the academy have an­
other lesson to learn from Illiberal Education: the importance of telling 
stories about the university to the larger public in a way that is both 
engaged and accessible. If we speak only to ourselves or if we speak to 
our publics without recognizing the importance of adapting our lan­
guage to our audience, we will not be shaping the public narrative 
about university life, and we will be left in the position of reacting to 
the stories told by others. Narrative theory offers us valuable tools not 
only for the serious analysis of Illiberal Education, Tenured Radicals, and 
other such attacks but also for the task of constructing alternative nar­
ratives for the public. Narrative theorists, I believe, have a vital role to 
play in the ongoing debates about the university; it is time we both 
recognized and embraced that role. 
Postscript 
D'Souza wrote a brief reply to this essay when it first appeared in Nar­
rative, one in which he makes the general point that he is appealing to 
liberals "on their own terms" and asking them to combat the way "lib­
eralism is being betrayed by political correctness" ("Response," 268). 
The only specific analysis he responds to is the one about Murray 
Dolfman and Pete Schaub, arguing that my discussion offends "what 
Aristotle has called common sense" because my ability to imagine al­
ternative voices shows that he has, in some sense, included them: 
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When Professor Phelan says it is possible to read the record dif­
ferently, I am not sure whether he means that the facts are not as I 
describe. (No one, to my knowledge, has demonstrated that.) Per­
haps he means that Dolfman's and Schaub's detractors would see the 
facts in a different light. "How dare Professor Dolfman use the term 
ex-slave?" "Pete Schaub is nothing more than a male chauvinist 
jock." While I do not offer a detailed study of these nuances of asser­
tion and counterassertion, I think they are implicit in the narrative. 
They are there for the reader to see, which is why Professor Phelan 
found them. 
Thus Professor Phelan's analysis unwittingly exonerates me of 
the charge of monologism. My narrative, he acknowledges, gives 
room for more than one interpretation. He seeks out an alternative 
interpretation. He assumes, wrongly, that I am unaware of or tried 
to suppress his interpretation. My argument is that the weight of the 
evidence does not bear it out. ("Response" 268—69) 
My reply was also brief: 
I acknowledge the cleverness of D'Souza's rejoinder to my point 
about the monologism of his narratives about Murray Dolfman and 
Pete Schaub. As he suggests, however, he and I will continue to 
disagree about both how he tells his stories and the larger narrative 
these stories form. On his account, I offend "what Aristotle called 
common sense" by both accusing him of monologism and claiming 
to hear other voices or at least "nuances of assertion and 
counterassertion" in those narratives. "They are there for the reader 
to see, which is why Professor Phelan found them," and, thus, my 
"analysis unwittingly exonerates [him] of the charge of 
monologism." 
I find this reasoning similar to D'Souza's narratives: like them, it 
has a surface appeal, but the more one looks at it the more the appeal 
fades. The initial appeal here derives in part from D'Souza's tapping 
into a general truth about narrative: purely monologic narratives are 
very rare, because the act of narrating almost inevitably involves 
some implicit communication of alternative ways of telling the 
story, shifting the emphasis, locating the privileged positions. So I 
would agree that D'Souza's narratives are not totally monologic; 
nevertheless, I still maintain that they—and D'Souza's defense of 
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them in his reply—reflect an author with a monologic imagination. 
That is, the narratives still show that D'Souza's way of telling the 
stories seeks to exclude or to undermine the alternative voices and 
perspectives that briefly appear within them. 
D'Souza's effort to express those voices in his reply tellingly 
reveals this monologic imagination. He imagines those he calls 
Dolfman's and Schaub's "detractors" saying such things as, "How 
dare Professor Dolfman use the term ex-slave?" "Pete Schaub is 
nothing more than a male chauvinist jock." The first voice speaks de 
haut en bas; the second engages in an ad hominem attack. Neither 
voice says anything that might pass for rational argument (or the 
beginning of one). Consequently, the voices are no sooner heard 
than they are discredited. A storyteller who imagines the opposi­
tion's voices this way seems unable to imagine any genuine merit in 
them. Such a storyteller, in other words, seems unable to hear alter­
native voices without first filtering them through an imagination 
that is already convinced of their error. For these reasons, I find 
myself slowly beginning to accept D'Souza's claim that he has not 
"tried to suppress" my alternative interpretations. He has not tried 
to suppress them, I think, precisely because he has been unable to 
imagine them. 
. . . By telling his stories so that they conform so neatly to his 
ideology, D'Souza encourages us to accept his larger claim that facts 
of campus life speak his interpretations of them. By (unwittingly) 
revealing in his reply that his ideology strongly controls his hearing 
of alternative voices, D'Souza gives us even greater cause to dispute 
that larger claim. ("Monologic Imagination," 270-71) 
Toward a Rhetorical 
Reader-Response Criticism: 
The Difficult, the Stubborn, 
and the Ending of Beloved 
In this essay, more than any other in the book, I make the case for viewing nar­
rative as rhetoric through an appeal to the phenomenology of reading. In seeking 
to link the experience of reading with the activity of interpretation, I experiment 
with the form of the standard critical essay by deliberately employing multiple 
voices and styles, juxtaposing a somewhat lyrical expression of response with 
abstract theorizing and a stream-of-consciousness account of reading and re­
sponding to the character of Beloved. Like the other essays in this book, this one 
is concerned with tapping into the intuitive experience of reading and articulat­
ing its bases in order to express cognitively what we experience intuitively. In 
the fourth section, in particular, I attempt to stay very close to that intuitive ex­
perience even as I inevitably move to more abstract cognition. 
77ie motivation for this experimentation with form arises from the specific 
hypothesis I want to advance: some textual recalcitrance cannot be fully ex­
plained, even though it functions very productively in our reading; the focus on 
Beloved tries to get at an instance of that recalcitrance, while the analysis of the 
narrative's ending seeks to explain the character's productive functioning. In de­
veloping the case, I also reflect on the powers and limits of interpretation's desire 
for mastery. 
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The imagination that produces work which bears and invites 
rereadings, which motions to future readings as well as contemporary 
ones, implies a sharable world and an endlessly flexible language. Read­
ers and writers both struggle to interpret and perform within a common 
language sharable imaginative worlds. 
—-Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark 
Reading Beloved 
I am in Beloved and Beloved is in me. 
Like Stamp Paid, I enter without knocking. For days I live at 124.1 
become Sethe. Paul D. Denver. Amy Denver; Baby Suggs; Stamp 
Paid. The days are intense, difficult, exhausting, rewarding. I reach to 
understand. Stretching, straining, marveling, I perform Morrison's 
world. 
But Beloved also eludes me. Like Stamp Paid on the threshold of 
124, I cannot enter. Parts of Morrison's world won't let me in. Espe­
cially Beloved herself and the narrative's last two pages. Who, what is 
Beloved? Yes, Sethe's murdered daughter. And—or?—a survivor of the 
Middle Passage. Labels, not understanding. And why the cryptic end­
ing? Why move away from the intimate scene between Sethe and 
Paul D to declare "this was not a story to pass on"? 
Another label for Beloved—from the litcrit drawer: oppositional 
character. Spiteful ghost, manipulating lover, selfish sister, all-con­
suming daughter. But also innocent—and representative—victim. 
Where is the integration—or the reason for no integration? A label for 
the ending: confrontational. But why this prose: "In the place where 
the long grass opens, the girl who waited to be loved and cry shame 
erupts into her separate parts, to make it easy for the chewing laughter 
to swallow her all away" (274)? 
These questions, I see, are interconnected—answer one and other 
answers will follow—but something, someone blocks my way. 
Morrison? Me? My race? Gender? Something I have locked away in a tobacco 
tin inside-my heart? Some other ignorance or insensitivity? All of these? 
Oppositional character, confrontational ending indeed. 
There is a loneliness that reads. 
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Reading, Response, and Interpretation 
Other critics of Beloved both relieve and exacerbate the loneliness, es­
pecially in relation to Beloved. In particular, Deborah Horvitz, Judith 
Wilt, Elizabeth House, Barbara Rigney, Ashraf H. A. Rushdy, and 
Jean Wyatt offer excellent insights about Beloved, perceptions about 
her or her monologue that substantially advance my efforts to share 
Morrison's world.1 At the same time, their work paradoxically in­
creases my loneliness because Beloved still seems to elude explanation 
and a gap remains between response and interpretation. Beloved is a 
survivor of the Middle Passage and of a white man found dead in his 
cabin around the time she shows up at 124 (House). She is both 
Sethe's murdered daughter and her murdered African mother 
(Wyatt), a specific character in a specific family and a representative of 
all the Middle Passage women (Rigney), "and also all Black women in 
America trying to trace their ancestry back to the mother on the ship 
attached to them" (Horvitz). She is a figure filled with the psychoki­
netic energy of the others who then use that energy to act out their 
needs and desires (Wilt). She is the incarnation of Sethe's guilt 
(Rushdy). Because the novel supports—indeed, insists on—all these 
not entirely compatible accounts, it prevents us from resting with any 
one and makes the struggle to "perform" her part of Morrison's world 
extraordinarily demanding. Moreover, adding the possibilities to­
gether gives us something less than the sum of the parts: Beloved dis­
solves into multiple fragments. 
This gap between the experience of reading Beloved and the expla­
nations offered by its interpreters is, in one respect, par for practical 
criticism's course. Despite the significant work done in reader-re­
sponse theory in the last twenty-five years, including such useful books 
as those by Iser, Flynn and Schweikart, Rabinowitz, Crosman, and 
Steig, most interpretive practice remains unaffected by this work, rarely 
taking its starting point from the critic's response.2 Perhaps the most 
dramatic example of this general critical habit of separating the experi­
ence of reading from the act of interpretation occurs in Robert 
Scholes's widely read Textual Power. Scholes proposes a progression 
from reading to interpretation to criticism but does not build the act of 
interpretation on the act of reading. For Scholes, to interpret is to 
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thematize, and to thematize is to divide the text into a series of repeti­
tions and oppositions and to link these repetitions and oppositions to 
cultural codes. By locating the fundamental interpretive move in the 
division of the text into binary categories rather than in the identifica­
tion of a sequence of responses, Scholes effects a divorce between 
reading and interpretation.3 
I would like to take a closer look at the activities of reading and in­
terpretation in order to explore further the relations and gaps between 
them and to highlight significant features of our conventional behav­
ior as practical critics. To do standard academic interpretation (hereaf­
ter SAI) is to explain as coherently and comprehensively as possible 
the how and why of a text's signification. Because SAI has as its goal 
cognitive explanation, it involves a kind of translation. The text's lan­
guage is viewed as that which is in need of explanation; the interpreter 
provides some other context and some other language—in effect, a 
code—to achieve that explanation.4 In SAI, the key move in develop­
ing the explanatory code is abstraction from the details of the text. My 
claim about the gap between reading and SAI is that academic inter­
preters typically do not attend to the multileveled act of reading when 
they perform this abstraction. 
I hasten to add that I consider this situation neither a scandal nor a 
surprise. Because the numbers and kinds of possible translations are 
potentially infinite (though at any given juncture in the history of 
criticism only a finite number will be practiced),5 there is no necessary 
connection between reading and the endpoint of any one interpreta­
tion, and the last thing I want to do is to try to legislate one. Indeed, 
much of the current valuable work in cultural studies and the New 
Historicism depends on the interpreter doing such things as finding 
points of contact between literary and other cultural representations— 
activities that often appear unconnected to the interpreter's reading 
experience.6 
Nevertheless, I believe that our conventional habits leave largely 
undeveloped one very rich kind of interpretive practice, one that I 
will call rhetorical reader-response. This practice follows from the posi­
tion I sketched in the introduction and exemplified most fully in the 
essay "Sharing Secrets," which defines rhetorical reading as the recur­
sive relationship between authorial agency, textual phenomena, and 
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reader response. Thus, it assumes that the text is a sharable medium of 
a multileveled communication between author and reader, even as it 
takes the reader's experience of the text as the starting point for inter­
pretation. Its effort is to link response to interpretation by seeking tex­
tual sources for individual responses, while also acknowledging that 
the construal of those textual sources is influenced by the reader's sub­
jectivity. In other words, in its way of linking reading to interpreta­
tion, rhetorical reader-response maintains both that the text constructs 
the reader and that the reader constructs the text, with the result that it 
does not believe that there is always a clear, sharply defined border be­
tween what is sharable and what is personal in reading and interpreta­
tion. Furthermore, even as the approach starts with response, it does 
not regard that response as something fixed beyond question but 
rather as something that may change and develop in the very effort to 
link reading and interpretation.7 All this helps clarify the claims I want 
to make for what follows: when I speak of the experience of reading 
Beloved here, I am referring to my experience. Nevertheless, I will try 
to focus on elements of my experience that I take to be not idiosyn­
cratic but sharable. Moreover, in this essay I am not primarily con­
cerned with trying to specify the boundary between textual and 
personal sources of experience. Instead, I want to explore further the 
typical gap between reading and SAI in order to reconsider SAI's 
treatment of textual recalcitrance, a reconsideration that in turn will 
reveal the desires driving SAI. Finally, both explorations will have sig­
nificant consequences for the claims I want to make about Beloved and 
about rhetorical reader-response criticism. 
The Difficult, the Stubborn, and Interpretive Desire 
One of the challenges and pleasures of interpretation is finding the 
"right translation,' uncovering a code that allows us to claim cogni­
tive understanding of the text, to hear the "click1 of the numerous sig­
nals of the text rearranging themselves into our new system of 
intelligibility. Virtually all texts, to one degree or another, present 
some obstacles to the interpreter, some material that initially seems re­
sistant to whatever translation schema the interpreter is employing. 
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We academic interpreters naturally gravitate toward recalcitrant mate­
rial, but we typically assume that all recalcitrance can yield to under­
standing, even if all that is finally revealed is the inevitability of 
recalcitrance.8 Indeed, this desire for and faith in explanation is the en­
abling assumption of some of our best criticism. But by always assum­
ing that everything can be explained, we overlook the possibility that 
sometimes recalcitrance may not be overcome—that is, may not be 
overcome without some sacrifice of explanatory power. Saying that 
Beloved is this and this and this and that and that and that without at­
tending to the difficulty of integrating all those identities explains Be­
loved in one way, but it does not explain what it is like to read and 
respond to her in the novel. Reading Beloved leads me to propose a 
distinction between two kinds of obstacles to understanding that result 
in two kinds of reading experience: The difficult is recalcitrance that 
yields to our explanatory efforts, while the stubborn is recalcitrance that 
will not yield.9 
The first chapter of Morrison's narrative offers an encounter with 
the difficult. Morrison herself has offered a response-based account of 
her strategy, saying that she wanted her readers to experience "the 
compelling confusion of being there as they [the characters] are; sud­
denly, without comfort or succor from the 'author,' with only imagi­
nation, intelligence, and necessity available for the journey1' 
("Unspeakable Things Unspoken,' 33). Morrison's technique does, 
indeed, induce a "compelling confusion," one that envelops all the 
characters and even the setting. Questions about Sethe, Denver, Baby 
Suggs, the ghost, and Paul D, about their pasts, their presents, and 
their futures, pile up with each new sentence. Yet, with some work, 
including rereading, and some patience, this confusion yields to un­
derstanding, and we can see how Morrison uses this difficulty to influ­
ence our entrance into her "imaginative world." In making us feel 
off-balance, she highlights many of that world's particular ground 
rules, including some that not all of her readers will share: in this 
world, ghosts are not only present but taken for granted; in this world, 
the past coexists with the present. 
As I've already suggested, I believe that Beloved herself is a paradig­
matic case of the stubborn. Despite the best efforts of many careful 
readers, her character escapes any comprehensive, coherent account. 
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No matter how we arrange or rearrange the information about Be­
loved, there is always something that does not fit with the experience 
of everything else. We can solve the problem by following Deborah 
Ayer Sitter's advice to "regard Beloved as a function rather than a per­
son' (29), advice which in effect says "change your assumptions and 
your expectations; stop trying to read about a person here and recog­
nize that you are reading about a synthetic construct that Morrison can 
maneuver as she sees fit.' But finally, following this advice seems to 
require neglecting the way Morrison cues us to read Beloved as both a 
function and a person. When we read, say, about Paul D's encounter 
with her in the cold house, we experience him first struggling against 
and then consenting not just to a function but also to a person—how­
ever enigmatic. 
In the brief discussion of Beloved'%first chapter as an instance of the 
difficult, I followed Morrison's lead and suggested some positive role, 
some functionality for that experience. I want to claim a similar func­
tionality for the stubborn, a claim that highlights its paradoxical na­
ture. On the one hand, I am identifying the stubborn as that which 
resists explanation; on the other, in claiming that it has a positive func­
tionality, I am suggesting that it can yield to one kind of explanation, 
thereby apparently containing and confining it—and so collapsing it 
back into the difficult. I will say more about this paradox after trying to 
clarify the claim about functionality by distinguishing the stubborn 
and the difficult from a third kind of recalcitrance, one that lacks a 
positive functionality, the erroneous. 
Again Beloved furnishes an example. Despite Morrison's careful 
planning, she indicates in the first chapter two conflicting dates for the 
narrative's present time action: 1873 and 1891.10 I see no way of re­
solving this conflict, and apart from specious generalizations about 
Morrison dramatizing the difficulty of reconstructing history, I cannot 
find any account of its functionality." The conflict is an instance of the 
erroneous, a small distraction (if noticed at all) that has no positive 
contribution to make and no functionality within Morrison's narra­
tive. By contrast, the stubborn is an experienced recalcitrance whose 
very resistance to explanation contributes significantly to the experi­
ence of the larger narrative. In other words, although it cannot be fully 
comprehended, we may be able to comprehend its effects. Indeed, 
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when the reader encounters the stubborn, the interpretive task shifts 
from explicating it to explaining the purpose of its recalcitrance. 
Articulating the distinction between the difficult and the stubborn 
invites reflection on SAI's underlying desire for mastery—and articu­
lating the paradox of the stubborn invites similar reflection about the 
desire of a rhetorical reader-response criticism. Whatever we do with 
texts, however much we admire their power, and however much we 
pay lip service to their inexhaustibility, the act of interpretation rests 
upon a desire to make texts yield up their secrets, to take possession of 
them. This desire to possess, as I said above, often leads to brilliant in­
terpretive insights, but it also blinds interpretation to its own hubris. 
Introducing the category of the stubborn into rhetorical reader-
response makes possible a recognition of that hubris. The paradox of 
the stubborn, however, also allows for the repression of that recogni­
tion: if we get caught up in explaining the stubbom's functionality, we 
can erase its elusiveness and turn its stubbornness into the Truth of the 
text, which we once again possess. Letting the stubborn remain stub­
bom means that we accept the possibility that "the struggle to inter­
pret and perform" a sharable world is one we cannot entirely win. In 
this light, the paradox of the stubborn can be seen as its simultaneous 
effect of enriching that struggle and preventing it from being com­
pletely successful.12 
Encountering the Stubborn:

Reading/Interpreting Beloved

A baby ghost. A spiteful, venomous baby ghost. No, a "sad" ghost (8). Or a 
"lonely and rebuked" one (13)? Still, a powerful baby ghost, who can make 
the whole house pitch. A tired breathing. 
These multiple signifiers attach to her and haunt or brood over her 
later bodily incarnation(s). 
An innocent, needy twenty year old. In need of a mother. With no wrinkles. 
Who comes when Sethe's water breaks. Who calls herself Beloved. Who has a 
scar on her neck. Who can't walk but picks up a chair single-handed. Denver's 
guess about her identity is also mine. But what does Beloved want? 
None of the previous associations seems exactly apt—she is not spite­
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ful or venomous or powerful and, after a while, not tired. 
Self-absorbed and Sethe-obsessed. Thirsty—for mother love. "Tell me your

diamonds" (58).

Her appearance is disruptive—Sethe, Denver, and Paul were mov­

ing toward some harmony—and exciting. What mysteries does she

contain?

Puzzling conversation with Denver. Cross-purpose communications? 
"Why you call yourself Beloved?"

"In the dark my name is Beloved.

"What's it like over there, where you were before? Can you

tell me?"

"Dark.... I'm small in that place."

. .  . "Tell me, how did you get here?"

"I wait; then I got on the bridge. I stay there in the dark, in the

daytime, in the dark, in the daytime. It was a long time." (75) 
Return from the underworld? Survival of Middle Passage? There is a differ­

ence, but what is it? As the mystery deepens, my attachment grows.

Return of the spiteful. Why strangle Sethe? Revenge? Seems more like jeal­
ousy: Sethe is thinking that she is glad to have Paul D. A warning delivered? 
So obscurely? But is she the strangler? She denies it when Denver asks her 
why, but she acts guilty. Still, she claims, "The circle of iron choked her." OK, 
Sethe as slave. But Sethe never wore the literal iron. Is Beloved a seer then? A 
haunting, strangely frightening prophet. 
The Ghost of Sex. Moving Paul D. Against his conscious will. Finally 
coming to him in the cold house. "You have to touch me. On the inside part. 
And you have to call me my name" (117). Motivation? Yes, separate Paul 
from Sethe. But there's more. She wants him for herself. Why? To be Sethe's 
rival? Electra? And why does she have power over Paul? Wilt says that Be­
loved acts out the other characters' psychic needs; suggests Denver's 
desire to separate Paul and Sethe, and Paul's need to break the lock on 
his tobacco tin. Suggestive, but not finally satisfying. Beloved loses her iden­
tity in this view. Perhaps the sexual battle is the flip side of their battle when she 
was a ghost. And now she wins? But why can she break apart Paul's tobacco 
tin when his loving Sethe hasn't yet done that? Emotions mingle here: touched 
by her vulnerability, haunted by her power, scared and relieved for Paul. 
More puzzles. Beloved knows one white man. Perhaps she is not the 
182 Chapter 9 
crawling-already? baby returned. Beloved disappears when she accompa­
nies Denver to the cold house. She must be a returned ghost. Beloved 
curls up in the dark and points to a face Denver can't see—"her face," 
which is then "Me. It's me" (124). A Middle Passage ghost? Beloved 
"knows" that she could wake up and find herself in pieces. More con­
flicting feelings: tenderness, fear, and always the mystery. 
Sethe comes to believe that Beloved is her daughter come back 
to her. 
Beloved never tells her story the way Denver tells hers or Sethe and 
Paul D rememory theirs. And Morrison, who employs a remarkably 
protean narrator, never offers an inside view of Beloved—until the 
monologue. House and Horvitz each explicate its cryptic discourse 
admirably. The central story it tells is that of a small girl and her 
mother being forced to travel on a very crowded slave ship. The girl 
keeps looking for her mother s face, but she loses it when the mother 
jumps into the sea. She is eventually put with a man who "hurts where 
I sleep," but she escapes from there and comes out of the blue water to 
see "the face that left me"—Sethe's (212, 213). As House says, the 
monologue supports the view that what we have been reading is a 
complicated case of mistaken identities. Beloved is not Denver's sister 
and Sethe's daughter, but a survivor of the Middle Passage. And as 
Morrison says, the desires of this independent survivor and those of 
Sethe and Denver meet. Perhaps stubbornness is only difficulty. 
Doesn't work. Why privilege the monologue over everything else? Though 
things like the white man get explained (or more accurately, now have 
possible explanations), much is still left unexplained: the strangling, 
the moving of Paul D, the disappearance. Furthermore, so much of 
the experience of the previous twenty-one chapters depends on the 
possibility that Beloved is Sethe's daughter that transforming the stub­
bornness into difficulty denies the experience. 
BETTER TO THINK OF THE MONOLOGUE AS A COUNTER TO THE 
POWERFUL RESPONSES TO BELOVED AS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN 
D E N V E R ' S AND SETHE'S MONOLOGUES. M O N O L O G U E DEEPENS STUB­
BORNNESS RATHER THAN TRANSFORMS IT. NOW MOVED INSIDE 
BELOVED'S FEAR AND CONFUSION AND PAIN—ATTACHMENT AND SYM­
PATHY INCREASE EVEN AS THE MYSTERY DOES. 
The stubbornness persists as Beloved fades into the background and 
Toward a Rhetorical Reader-Response Criticism 183 
Denver moves up front. Who is this character draining Sethe of her life? 
Rushdy says she is the incarnation of Sethe's guilt. Makes good sense of 
some things—Sethe on a hopeless quest of expiation. But Beloved-as-Guilt-
Incarnate denies the experience of her monologue and simplifies the complex dy­
namics between Beloved, Sethe, and Denver. But her childlike selfishness 
complicates feelings further—understandable yet dangerous; I fear for Sethe, 
Beloved is too much with her. And me? 
The strange disappearance. How? Where? Is she pregnant? 
Who is she in the last two pages? 
From Encounter to Formal Interpretation:

The Ending ofBeloved

After concluding the penultimate chapter with an intimate scene of 
hope and reconciliation between Sethe and Paul D, the narrator sud­
denly swerves to a very different spatial, temporal, and emotional 
stance, one that puts considerable distance between that intimate 
scene and the concerns of the final two pages. In them, the narrator 
writes a kind of elegy for Beloved that also subtly calls attention to 
some larger claims that Morrison herself wants to make for her narra­
tive. The effects of attending to Beloved as stubborn are inseparable 
from the development of these claims as we seek to interpret the diffi­
culties of this chapter. After the opening paragraph, which effectively 
breaks the mood of the previous scene by discussing different kinds of 
loneliness (Sethe's loneliness that "can be rocked" and Paul D and 
Beloved's loneliness that "roams" [274]), the narrator turns her full at­
tention to Beloved. 
"Everybody knew what she was called, but nobody anywhere 
knew her name. Disremembered and unaccounted for, she cannot be 
lost because no one is looking for her, and even if they were, how can 
they call her if they don't know her name?" (274). 
These sentences complicate our relation to Beloved and to the 
larger narrative, because they emphasize her stubbornness and begin 
to introduce the paradox of the reading/ writing situation as well as to 
split the awareness of the authorial and narrative audiences.13 The 
characters may forget Beloved, but we do not. Indeed, the narrator's 
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insistence on bringing her back into the narrative and calling her 
"disremembered" paradoxically emphasizes that she is not entirely 
forgotten, not entirely disremembered. We cannot, however, escape 
the assertion of the first sentence. And since we do not know her 
name, we do not know her origin—and do not, cannot fully know 
her. The two sentences together deepen the paradox of reading Be­
loved: unlike the others who knew her name, we do not dismember 
her by "disremembering" her, but we also do not really know this 
woman we are remembering. 
The shift to the present tense in the second sentence further com­
plicates the reading situation. On the very first page of the narrative, 
the narrator has made us aware that she and her audience are contem­
poraries, that we exist together in a present distant from the time of 
the action. "In fact," she says, "Ohio had been calling itself a state only 
seventy years" (3). Only from a temporal vantage point of consider­
ably later than 1873 would the narrator use that only. By employing 
the present tense here and not clearly indicating that it is the historical 
present, the narrator subtly includes her contemporary audience 
among those who are not looking for Beloved. But this very inclusion 
foregrounds the split between the narrative and the authorial audi­
ences. As members of the narrative audience, we may at one level be 
among those who are not seeking Beloved, but at another level, by the 
very act of taking in the narrator's words, we are seeking her and re­
membering her. As members of the authorial audience, we can ini­
tially exempt ourselves from any implication in the "disremembering'' 
or the looking because we know that Beloved is a fictional character 
rather than a historical person. By using the narrator to call attention to 
the split between audiences, Morrison is beginning to move toward 
some larger claims about the kind of story she has been telling. 
"Although she has claim, she is not claimed. In the place where the 
long grass opens, the girl who waited to be loved and cry shame erupts 
into her separate parts, to make it easy for the chewing laughter to 
swallow her all away" (274). 
Again the present tense signals our inclusion. Beloved has claim on 
our attention, our knowledge. But her stubbornness means that she 
cannot be contained by our knowledge. The first sentence also con­
veys an implied challenge to the authorial audience. Will we claim, if 
 185 Toward a Rhetorical Reader-Response Criticism
not her reality, her story—with all its stubbornness? This question be­
comes more urgent as the narrator picks up numerous threads from 
Beloved's monologue—the long grass where Beloved first lost her Af­
rican mother, her fear of breaking into pieces and being chewed and 
swallowed—and interweaves them in a metaphorical description of 
her erasure from history. As the narrator turns elegiac for Beloved 
here, Morrison also begins to draw upon the stubbornness of the char­
acter and the complex emotions the narrative has evoked to prolifer­
ate her signification and make a claim about her significance. The 
erasure of Beloved from history is the erasure of the small African child 
who lost her mother in the long grass, as well as the African American 
who feared she would fall apart when she lost her tooth, as well as all 
the slave women she comes to represent. 
"It was not a story to pass on" (274). 
The bald statement, after white space and with the vague "It," dis­
rupts our reading because it is so apparently self-contradictory. Hasn't 
the narrator just "passed on" the story, and haven't we just spent an 
enormous amount of emotional energy reading it? Of course, one way 
to naturalize the sentence is to stay in the narrative audience and read 
it as the indirect discourse of Beloved's community, to interpret it as 
their response to her appearance and disappearance. But because the 
white space encourages our attributing the vision and voice of the sen­
tence to the narrator, we become aware of additional readings, even in 
the narrative audience. "It was not a story to pass on" and "it was not a 
story to pass on"—in the sense of "to pass by"—but it was something 
else, a reality to be confronted. Sethe and Denver were not able to read 
the story of Beloved's possible other identity. Beloved was never able 
to recognize the difference of Sethe's story from her African mother's. 
Only we have seen the irreconcilable stories and the character who 
cannot be contained by either; only we have felt the full range of emo­
tions generated by her narrative. Will we adopt the attitude expressed 
in the indirect discourse and find the stubbornness of Beloved's char­
acter a reason not to pass on her story? Or will we accept the challenge 
of confronting its multiple, stubbornly shifting realities? 
There is yet another layer here, one that we may see more clearly in 
the light of both the paradox of stubbornness and the underlying de­
sire of interpretation for mastery. In focusing so far on the productive 
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functionality of Beloved's stubbornness, I have in a sense been making 
that stubbornness the key to the ending—and by extension to Mor­
rison's narrative. I have, in other words, been turning the stubborn 
into the difficult—and exhibiting once again the power of inter­
pretation's desire for mastery and possession. But even as "It was not a 
story to pass on' challenges the authorial audience to confront the 
multiple realities of Beloved, it also challenges our ability to share 
those realities. More particularly, I must ask how much I, as a privi­
leged white male reader, see and fail to see, share and fail to share in 
Morrison's vision of the horrors of the Middle Passage, of slavery, of 
the intensity and desperation of Sethe's mother love—and that of 
Margaret Garner, the historical figure upon whom Sethe's story is 
based. To presume mastery here is to move beyond hubris. 
They forgot her like a bad dream. After they made up their tales, 
shaped and decorated them, those that saw her that day on the porch 
quickly and deliberately forgot her. It took longer for those who had 
spoken to her, lived with her, fallen in love with her, to forget, until 
they realized they couldn't remember or repeat a single thing she 
said, and began to believe that, other than what they themselves 
were thinking, she hadn't said anything at all. So, in the end, they 
forgot her too. Remembering seemed unwise.... 
It was not a story to pass on. (274—75) 
Morrison continues to implicate her audience in the narrator's 
statements and to press her challenge about what we will do with our 
reading of Beloved's story. Beloved is a painful memory even for those 
who knew her, because she reminds everyone of the depths of pain 
they endured in slavery. A white reader like myself may try to escape 
the pain—and any responsibility—by confessing, as I just did, the lim­
its of his understanding. But this passage blocks that move. In reading 
this narrative, we—white readers, black readers, all readers—have, in 
a sense, lived with Beloved. Will we forget her because it is unwise to 
remember, unwise because remembering may entail some responsi­
bility to her memory? At this juncture, the repetition of "It was not a 
story to pass on" continues the challenge in the same vein: to pass on 
this story is to be unwise because the story is too disturbing and too 
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unsettling, has depths of pain that may never be plumbed. The impli­
cation about the cowardice of turning one's back is clear. 
So they forgot her. Like an unpleasant dream during a troubling

sleep. Occasionally, however, the rusde of a skirt hushes when they

wake, and the knuckles brushing a cheek in sleep seem to belong

to the sleeper. . . . They can touch it [an old photograph] if they

like, but don't, because they know things will never be the same

if they do.

This is not a story to pass on. (275) 
The ending takes a significant turn at "however." They may for­
get/repress—we may forget/repress—but Beloved is not thereby 
erased from history. She lives on in some way. Furthermore, once we 
acknowledge her presence in history, "things will never be the same." 
By having the narrator shift from "It was" to "This is" not a story to 
pass on, Morrison addresses the authorial audience most directly. Fur­
thermore, the sentence is now loaded with almost as many meanings 
as Beloved, and it has its force precisely because Beloved has been so 
loadc 1 with meanings. This is not just a story to tell for amusement; 
this is not a story to pass by; this is not a story to tell lightly, because 
once you tell it things will never be the same. But this is also not a 
story that you will ever fully comprehend. 
At this point, then, Morrison has gradually built up to some very 
significant claims for Beloved. Morrison has transformed the historical 
event that provided the germ of the narrative, Margaret Garner s kill­
ing her child in 1855 and expressing serenity afterwards, into an emo­
tionally powerful fiction. In this conclusion, however, she is 
challenging us to treat the narrative as a species of history. In insisting 
on Beloved's enduring presence and the power of her story, Morrison 
is drawing upon the representative quality of all the possibilities that 
Beloved has come to stand for and be associated with: all the daughters 
and all the families whose lives were twisted by "the men without 
skin"; all those who lived under slavery, and who lived with its legacy 
even after it was outlawed; indeed, the "sixty million and more" who 
died on the slave ships and to whom Morrison dedicates the book. At 
the same time, by concentrating the power of all these possibilities 
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within the single character, Morrison points to the depths of each: we 
can name the multiplicity, but we cannot claim to know it in the sense 
of mastering it. 
By and by all trace is gone, and what is forgotten is not only the 
footprints but the water too and what is down there. The rest is 
weather. Not the breath of the disremembered and unaccounted 
for, but wind in the eaves, or spring ice thawing too quickly. Just 
weather. Certainly no clamor for a kiss. 
Beloved. (275) 
These last two segments of the narrative complete it in an appropri­
ately powerful way. Remaining in the present tense, the narrator de­
tails the final disappearance of Beloved, and then employs the 
negatives to suggest her ineradicable presence beneath all denials of 
her. More than that, the negatives suggest her need to "be loved." 
Then finally, the narrator utters her name. The functions of this 
signifier are now manifold. In the immediate context, "Beloved" sig­
nals the return of the repressed. Not just ineradicably there under­
neath our history, she—and all those she stands for—are now 
produced for our contemplation and are what this narrative leaves us 
with. Unable to do justice to all the complex realities signified by "Be­
loved," we nevertheless end our reading by attending to them. More­
over, this narrative, which takes its title from this word, stands as 
testimony to the presence and the complexity of those realities. 
At the same time, the word breaks the pattern of repetitions. "It 
was not a story to pass on." "It was not a story to pass on." "This is not 
a story to pass on." "Beloved." The eruption of the word itself exem­
plifies the point: not a story to pass on, but a person whose multiplicity 
transcends any story that can be told about her. And here the impor­
tance of the fiction comes back: her story stands in for the millions and 
millions of other slaves, whose lives and deaths, though not passed on 
in story, are just as deep, just as emotionally wrenching, just as impor­
tant and just as stubborn as hers. 
The pattern also makes "Beloved" available to be read not just as 
the narrator's final word but also as Morrison's final address to her 
readers. Just as the preacher at Beloved's funeral began by addressing 
his audience, "Dearly beloved,' so Morrison ends by addressing us as 
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"Beloved." The intratextual link makes it a gesture of affection and a 
reminder of the challenge: we are beloved, not yet Dearly Beloved. 
This reminder of the character's naming effectively blocks any impulse 
to romanticize the character even as we keep her story alive: the re­
minder calls back what Sethe did to get the name on the tombstone, 
and, indeed, it calls back the knowledge that "Beloved" is the tomb­
stone marker itself. Furthermore, this reminder once again blocks any 
impulse to master the stubbornness of her character by pointing to the 
gaps that keep her from yielding to our understanding and then by ex­
tension to all the history that we have lost, especially to that of the sixty 
million and more whose names we do not know. "Everybody knew 
what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew her name" (274). 
Recursiveness and the Limits of Interpretation 
Beloved still eludes me, but I feel that I see more of her. I still can­
not—and do not want to—transform Beloved's stubbornness into a 
difficulty to solve, but I comprehend some of the reasons for that stub­
bornness. Furthermore, just as the effort to attend to the stubborn has 
helped root interpretation in the experience of reading, so too has in­
terpretation allowed for a clarification, an enrichment of that reading 
experience. Within this rhetorical reader-response approach, reading 
and interpretation, like thinking and writing, can be endlessly recur­
sive, each one opening up the possibility of revision in what the other 
has just done. 
Perhaps more significantly, the stubborn helps reveal the limita­
tions of interpretation's desire for mastery, helps remind us that the ef­
fort to perform an author's world does not always have to result in a 
virtuoso performance for the interpretation to be valuable and en­
lightening. In the spirit of that recognition, I offer the conclusions of 
this essay not as fixed, frozen, and beyond question but as working hy­
potheses about complex matters. To claim any more would be to ex­
hibit a decidedly unproductive personal stubbornness. 

Appendix

Why Wayne Booth Can't Get

with the Program, or, The

Nintentional Fallacy

This essay is a rather different experiment with the form of the critical essay 
from the one undertaken in chapter 9. Its success or failure rides at least as much 
on the handling of voice as on the specific critical principles being explored. In 
any event, since the dominant voice here belongs to one fonathan Allen rather 
than to the "I" of these headnotes and the "I" of all the previous essays, it 
might be a welcome change for all of you who have let that "I" speak into your 
ears for lo, these many pages. 
A couple of weeks ago, while I was in the throes of drafting a paper 
about the significant alterations in Wayne Booth's thinking implied by 
his developing the concept of coduction in The Company We Keep, I 
received a rather amazing letter. As soon as I read it, I realized that it 
contained a far more appropriate assessment of Booths evolving 
thoughts about the relations between authors, texts, and readers than 
anything my lugubrious analysis would yield. This letter, as you'll see, 
is far from unqualified praise of Booth, but I believe it gets at aspects of 
his work that a more reverential approach would just plain miss. 
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Ucando Interpretation Schema 
1212 Madison Ave. 
New York, NY 10101 
Dear Professor Phelan: 
You probably don't know who I am, though I did receive a little 
notoriety among members of the MLA back in 1986 when College En­
glish published the text of a talk I gave to the Executive Council. As 
president of the Madison Avenue Advertising Board, I proposed that 
the MLA support the Board's idea of using well-known fictional char­
acters to endorse commercial products. (Becky Sharp for MasterCard 
and Abel Magwitch for True Value Hardware Stores ["A True Value 
file is a real pip"] were two of my favorites.) Of course those stodgy 
Council members weren't, shall we say, buying, so we never launched 
the campaign. Despite that disappointment, I haven't abandoned my 
quest to put literary studies in the center of our national consciousness 
by linking them to popular culture. And just recently, I've had my 
Breakthrough Insight. Like the Canon automatic camera, my think­
ing is so advanced it's simple. As one of my humanities professors once 
said, it's all a matter of formulating the right question. As soon as I 
asked, what are the hottest things going in literary study and in 
children's popular culture, I knew how Lily Briscoe felt when she saw 
how to finish her painting. Theory and Nintendo: revolution via the 
computer; turn interpretation into a Nintendo game and transform 
the nation's consciousness. Students of America, liberate that signifier, 
but beware the mise-en-abyme; explore different levels of significa­
tion; uncover the cultural code, find the magic theme, and rescue the 
princess Meaning. Move over, Super Mario Brothers; here come 
Nina Baym and Wayne Booth. Move over, Nintendo Entertainment 
Systems; here comes Ucando Interpretation Schema. 
My research and development team—a half-dozen recent Ph.D.s 
who did dissertations in critical theory but couldn't find teaching 
jobs—has already developed several schema in the few short months 
of our operation, including the one that I expect to be our hottest 
seller, "PC or Not PC?" But the reason that I'm writing to you is that 
we've gotten stuck with the one based on Booth's theory, tentatively 
entitled "The Wayne Dance." The research team is getting pretty fed 
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up and one of them has been complaining that Booth isn't worth all 
the trouble he's been giving us—"he's not, you know, what I'd call 
poststructuralistically trendy." To be honest, I'm getting pretty frus­
trated myself—after all, I've got a cultural revolution to get under way 
here—but I'm not quite ready to give up: I seem to have a soft spot in 
my heart for the unreliable narrator. I called Booth for advice, but, 
frankly, he was no help at all. I was shocked to learn that he'd never 
even heard of Nintendo let alone played it: I guess they don't make 
Renaissance men like they used to. He did, however, recommend 
I write to you—"Phelan's weird enough to get into this" was what 
he said. 
Let me describe the basic setup and one of our successes so you can 
get a better idea of what we'd like to do with "The Wayne Dance." 
The first screen in every schema shows a figure (or two, if you are 
playing against someone) at one end of a landscape. The figures, 
whom we call His and Her Meneut, remain the same from schema to 
schema but the landscape always varies. In the deconstructionist game, 
for example, it's a well-planned neighborhood, with carefully tended 
gardens, symmetrical houses, a well-organized downtown. In "PC or 
Not PC?" it's the interior of a church: the Meneut figure stands at the 
back and looks down the aisle at the people filling the pews on the left 
and the right, shouting back and forth at each other. The object of the 
game is to advance across the landscape to some designated desirable 
point. To play, you run the light of a scanning pen over whatever text 
you select and then answer the questions that appear on the screen. 
With every question you answer, the Meneut figure advances a few 
steps into the landscape, and sometimes the landscape itself gets trans­
formed and reconfigured around her. 
Let's say that the text is Poe's "The Cask of Amontillado" and 
you're playing the deconstructionist game, "Always Already Aporia!" 
The object of the game is to break down the orderliness of the initial 
landscape until you reach a point where you can no longer tell which 
way to move because all lines of differentiation between the gardens, 
roads, houses, suburbs, and downtown get lost. You begin by using 
the scanning pen to read the first paragraph into the game's memory: 
"The thousand injuries of Fortunato I had borne as I best could, but 
when he ventured upon insult I vowed revenge. You, who so well 
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know the nature of my soul, will not suppose, however, that I gave ut­
terance to a threat. At length I would be avenged; this was a point defi­
nitely settled—but the very definitiveness with which it was resolved 
precluded the idea of risk. I must not only punish but punish with im­
punity. A wrong is unredressed when retribution overtakes its re­
dresser. It is equally unredressed when the avenger fails to make 
himself felt as such to him who has done the wrong." 
Then the following question appears on the screen: "In this text 
which are the apparently privileged terms, insult or injury; revenge or 
retribution?" If you select insult and revenge, then a new screen appears 
in which His Meneut has advanced a little into a landscape that is los­
ing its order: the gardens are no longer neatly rectangular; the roads 
now wind and vary in length. To get to the final point of aporia, you 
have to answer correctly a whole series of questions that lead you to 
see that the apparently privileged terms are in fact dependent on the 
subordinate ones: Montresor's vengeful insults to Fortunato have their 
power because they are prelude to the ultimate injury—murder. 
Montresor, indeed, has his revenge, but his revenge also has him, and 
it is his having him that produces this text, a text that simultaneously 
boasts of his successful revenge and testifies by its very existence to the 
way retribution has overtaken him. Pretty neat, huh? A few weeks ago 
I thought a privileged term was what you used to refer to the queen of 
England; now I'm ready to challenge J. Hillis Miller to a game of "Al­
ways Already." Imagine what the Nintendo generation will do with 
our schema. 
Frankly, though, our success with deconstruction makes me more 
frustrated and impatient with Booth. We had no trouble selecting a 
landscape—an elegant, albeit somewhat crowded, dance floor. We 
also decided to introduce a third figure into the schema, one we've 
named Implied Arthur—A-r-t-h-a for the female version. Our idea 
was this: at the beginning of "The Wayne Dance" Her Meneut and 
Arthur would be at opposite sides of the floor; as the scanner read the 
text, music would start to play and the other figures on the floor 
would begin to dance. As the player answers questions correctly, Her 
Meneut and Arthur would start to move around the other figures and 
objects on the floor, trying ultimately to reach a meeting point in the 
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exact center, where they would then dance together. Their meeting 
would trigger new music and their dance would go on as long as the 
player desired. Sounds good, right? 
Well, we can't get anything to work. The first trouble we had was 
developing the schema so that it would differentiate between correct 
and incorrect answers to whatever questions we formulated. As usual, 
we used the computer to help develop the schema: we loaded all of 
Booth's books into the computer's memory and gave it a few instruc­
tions about organizing the material. But when we started trying out 
questions, the computer kept either getting hung up or allowing mul­
tiple answers. One of the researchers finally suggested that we erase 
Critical Understanding from the memory—"That pluralist claptrap 
about multiple validity messes up the computer s binary operations." 
Then someone else said we should probably also erase Modem Dogma 
and the Rhetoric of Assent—"I'm afraid that now we have a program 
whose first impulse is to say yes to every answer." Sure, sure, I said, 
just get me a game that works. But they still haven't. 
Take the first paragraph of Poe again. It's easy enough to program 
the game to recognize the first-person pronoun and then generate the 
question, "Is the Narrator reliable?" What we can't do is program the 
game to recognize whether yes or no is a better answer: there just 
doesn't seem to be anything in Poe's language that settles the matter. 
We also are at our wit's end with the problem of how to handle irony: 
there doesn't seem to be any surefire trigger even to produce the ques­
tion, never mind getting the machine to distinguish between answers. 
If you don't mind my saying so, I'm starting to suspect that all Booth's 
work is just rhetorical voodoo. When I came in this morning, I had 
this memo from one of the researchers on my desk. 
"I think I've figured out why we can't do The Wayne Dance. De­
spite his reputation as an old Chicago School formalist, all Booth's 
work finally depends on matters that are not actually available in the 
formal features of texts. Deciding whether a narrator is reliable or unre­
liable, whether an utterance is ironic or nonironic, whether a third-
person narrator is a dramatization of an authorial self or of a different 
persona—none of these decisions can be made only by pointing to 
the text. In every case, Booth is talking about the communication of 
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values and beliefs through language—and through what language 
doesn't say. He's talking about how authors imply their values and how 
readers infer those values, and though he tries like hell in the Irony book 
and elsewhere to make those processes intelligible, it's clear that in his 
view there are no immutable rules for understanding them. Amazingly, 
though, he believes more firmly that this kind of communication oc­
curs than that he or anyone else will be able to explain it adequately. I 
think his faith is romantic tosh—but I know, I know, mine's not to rea­
son why / mine's just to program and sigh. Anyway, maybe if I just fo­
cus on The Company We Keep, I can figure out something." 
Wait, here's the same guy with another memo. . . Worse news. 
"I thought that junk from The Rhetoric of Fiction and A Rhetoric of 
Irony was hard to work with. This stuff in Company is impossible. 
What's more, if we take it seriously we have to redesign the whole 
game. Coduction changes everything. Booth's reader doesn't just 
dance with the author anymore. She dances with other readers, too, so 
we'd have to have all the figures moving in relation to each other. Yet, 
they shouldn't all be doing the same dance, and indeed, they shouldn't 
all be hearing the same music. Booth's thinking seems to go some­
thing like this: if decisions about understanding are difficult, decisions 
about values are even more so. But like the effort and the process in­
volved in understanding, the effort and process involved in evaluating 
are crucial for human life and for the communities in which we live. 
In Company, Booth's own ethical commitment to rhetorical commu­
nity is even stronger than his commitment to understanding the absent 
author. In retrospect, his evolution to this position seems inevitable— 
there are just a few seeds of it in The Rhetoric ofFiction and A Rhetoric of 
Irony—but those seeds are developing into roots in Modem Dogma and 
Critical Understanding. The rationale behind his recommendation to as­
sent to another's argument until having reasons not to and the ratio­
nale behind his choice of a pluralism based on vitality, justice, and 
understanding are essentially the same: the practices that follow from 
these commitments will enhance the lives of those who meet in intel­
lectual exchange of whatever kind. 
Anyway, in Company Booth testifies that his dancing with other 
readers has made him able to make moves on the floor that he'd never 
have been able to do with just himself and the author. His dancing is a 
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lot messier than it used to be, and he often doesn't know when to stop, 
but he seems happier. Less uptight, more willing to be wrong, though 
oddly also more committed to the questions of ethical evaluation that 
got him into trouble in The Rhetoric ofFiction. Well, I'm glad he's hap­
pier, but the whole thing seems crazier and crazier to me: does Booth 
really live in the postmodern, poststructuralist 1990s? I know, I know, 
you just care about getting the schema to work. I'm now convinced 
that there is no way to do that. It's time to stop the music on 'The 
Wayne Dance.'" 
Professor Phelan, is my man right? Is there any way to save "The 
Wayne Dance," any way to keep Booth part of the coming revolu­
tion? Please reply as soon as possible. I'll remember you when the 
revolution comes. 
Urgently, 
Jonathan Allen 
My reply was short. 
Dear Mr. Allen: 
I think you have two choices: (1) make "The Wayne Dance" a 
game for two or more players and have the schema produce the same 
response at every juncture: "Read this carefully and then talk about it 
with your partners for as long as you want." (2) Start the revolution 
without Booth; somehow I don't think he'll mind. 
Sincerely, 
James Phelan 

Notes 
Introduction 
1. It is perhaps especially significant that this second request comes as a 
spontaneous interruption to the maid's story: so caught up is Madame 
Blanchard in the narrative that her impatience to learn what happened next 
paradoxically leads her to slow down the progress of the narration by her ex­
pression of interest in having it move to the next stage. 
2. For more on this definition see Barbara Herrnstein Smith and the reply 
by Seymour Chatman. 
3. Deconstruction by now is a term whose meaning has widened consider­
ably as it has been disseminated through our culture. It is not only Derridean 
philosophers and critics who deconstruct but also television personalities and 
sportswriters—indeed, anyone who questions anything is liable to be called a 
deconstructor. Within the realm of theory, to deconstruct sometimes now 
means to demystify or to show that what we thought was natural and immu­
table is actually constructed and changeable as well as to show how a given 
logic, when read rigorously, undermines itself. I am concerned with this last 
meaning of the term not only because I think it is closer to what was originally 
seen as radical in deconstruction but also because it is the one that bean most 
closely upon deconstruction's attention to rhetoric. 
4. Having offered these generalizations, I hasten to add some important 
qualifications. Barbara Johnson's work, especially in her recent book, The 
Wake of Deconstruction, shows that deconstruction is neither passe nor incom­
patible with a politically engaged criticism. Furthermore, her statement—and 
demonstration—that "the point of a deconstructive analysis is not to treat in­
tentionality as an 'on off' switch but to analyze the functioning of many differ­
ent, sometimes incommensurable, kinds of intentionality'' (18) moves de-
constructive practice closer to the kind of rhetorical analysis I attempt here, 
just as, in ways I will discuss below, my shift away from emphasizing intention 
moves my rhetorical analysis in the direction of Johnson's. In other words, al­
though Johnson remains more interested in incompatibilities among kinds of 
intentionality and I remain more interested in reconstructing coherences, I 
also find a greater overlap between the underlying conceptions of rhetorical 
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reading in her work and mine than I do in the work of the earlier, more widely

influential Anglo-American deconstructors such as Paul de Man and J. Hillis

Miller, whose conceptions I focus on here.

5. See especially A Rhetoric of Irony (1974), where Booth includes "in­
tended" as one of the marks of stable irony and where he employs E. D. Hirsch 
Jr.'s distinction between meaning and significance throughout his argument; 
in addition, see the final—and longest—chapter of Critical Understanding 
(1979), where Booth employs different concepts of author as guides to rhe­
torical reading. In The Company We Keep (1988), Booth complicates his previ­
ous rhetorical model by introducing into it the concept of "coduction,"' the 
way in which readers' interactions with each other help modify their responses 
(especially their ethical responses) to narratives. With his sights set on the 
knotty problem of the "ethics of fiction/' however, Booth does not directly 
address the question of how significant an adjustment he is making in his rhe­
torical model. 
6. One recent strong example of the approach is Peter J. Rabinowitz's Be­
fore Reading, a study of the recursive relationships between interpretive con­
ventions and textual details. Rabinowitz shows how these relations guide 
readers' efforts to fashion the text, which he metaphorically postulates as an 
unassembled swing set, into an intelligible whole. 
Chapter 1 
1. By "implied audience" here I mean what Peter J. Rabinowitz has called 
"the authorial audience," i.e., the hypothetical audience that possesses the req­
uisite knowledge and interpretive skills to respond as the author intended. 
Since most readers typically try to join this hypothetical audience, I shall refer 
to it here as "we.' For more on audiences in narrative see Phelan, Reading 
People, Reading Plots; Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction" and Before Reading; and 
chapter 7 of this book. 
2. Friedman goes on to employ psychoanalytic theory to uncover the 
gendered dimensions of the opposition she posits and to discuss how elements 
of lyric in Barrett Browning's "Aurora Leigh," H.D.'s HER, and Woolf's To 
the Lighthouse disrupt the traditional sequence of narrative plots. For a later, 
highly insightful development of Friedman's thought about plots and plotting, 
see her "Spatialization: A Strategy for Reading Narrative.1' 
3. In what follows I am influenced by the work of Elder Olson and Ralph 
Rader, who both emphasize that the group of works generally given the label 
lyric needs to be understood as a collection of works that operate by distinctly 
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different constructional principles. Olson, focusing on the boundaries between 
what is conveyed in lyric and what conveyed in drama or narrative, describes 
three kinds: lyrics of expression, which convey a single mental activity or 
emotional response; lyrics of address, which convey a verbal act; and lyrics of 
colloquy, which convey an interaction between speakers. Rader, focusing on 
the relations between poet and speaker in different poems, distinguishes be­
tween the dramatic monologue in which the poet creates a character other 
than himself; the mask lyric in which the poet adopts a persona to speak for 
him; the dramatic lyric in which the poet re-presents his experience through a 
dramatic actor; and the expressive lyric in which the poet presents his own 
cognitive experience. By focusing on the role of character and of judgment in 
lyric, I am not so much interested in testing Rader's and Olson's distinctions as 
I am in identifying aspects of the implied audience's relation to lyric that they 
do not address. For a much different approach to the lyric, one which insists on 
the difficulty of definition, see Albright. 
4. For more on this kind of relation between speaker and author, which 
eliminates one plank of New Critical dogma, see Rader. 
5. The present tense, a feature common to dramatic lyrics, also contributes 
to maintaining the lyric mode: we find the speaker describing what he sees, 
not narrating what he did. But this technique itself could be used to great effect 
in narrative, as Faulkner proves in As I Lay Dying. 
6. It is also possible for the speaker to be more individualized than Frost's 
speaker, but it seems to me that once we move to a situation where the pri­
mary work of the poem is the creation of the character of a speaker (the dra­
matic monologue), we leave the territory of the lyric and move into the region 
of drama. 
7. Many critics (see esp. Freedman and Richter) have richly described the 
characters' traits, and so I am doubly aware that any brief sketch will be reduc­
tive. But to illustrate my point about their differentiation, I will risk that 
reductiveness: Bernard is the storyteller, the adopter of many disguises, the 
husband and father; Neville, the homosexual poet, is Bernard's opposite who 
loves order; Louis is the successful businessman who nevertheless remains in­
secure; Susan is the woman who loves and who hates, who turns her back on 
the city and finds some contentment in her farm; Jinny is the woman who lives 
by the energy of her body; Rhoda, an eventual suicide, is Louis's counterpart, 
uncertain, insecure yet highly imaginative. 
Critics such as Richter, Freedman, and Graham who see the characters as 
part of a single consciousness very astutely point out the ways in which the 
characters are joined by interlocking motifs or how, taken together, they form 
an image of a complete, androgynous individual. The trouble with these 
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formulations, however, is that they deny the reading experience of the novel. 
In entering the lyric perspectives of each speaker, we are responding to them 
not as fragments of a larger symbolic whole but as individuals with separate 
perspectives on their experience. 
8. Cf. J. W. Graham, who says that Woolf sought to establish a narrative 
"omnipercipience: a perception (not an understanding) of the characters' inner 
experience fused with a perception (not an understanding) of what they do not 
perceive-—the background of time and the sea against which they are set" 
(204). 
9. For a much different view of the thematic component of the novel, see 
Jane Marcus. 
Chapter 2 
1. I am acutely aware that in an essay of this length I cannot do justice to the 
complexity of the Showman's voice—especially when some of the essay is 
spent on matters other than analyzing the voice itself. I offer what I have devel­
oped here as a place to start on that much larger project, a place that offers 
some foundation in its general discussions of voice and of evaluation but that 
needs a lot more construction arising from extended analyses of the 
Showman's discourse, especially in relation to Amelia. 
2. In part 2 of The Rhetoric of Fiction, "The Author's Voice in Fiction," still 
probably the most widely read discussion of voice in the Anglo-American 
critical tradition, Wayne C. Booth never seeks to identify the distinctive fea­
tures of voice but instead uses the term loosely to refer to the author's presence 
and its overt manifestations through the commentary of a reliable narrator or 
its covert incorporation through the manipulation of an unreliable narrator. 
Booth's imprecision with the term does not impede his argument, which is re­
ally about authors' uses of different kinds of rhetoric for different ends, but the 
imprecision is, I think, symptomatic of the way Anglo-American critics have 
thought about the term. 
Mikhail Bakhtin's work on "double-voiced" discourse provides the richest 
source for anyone who wants to delve into the concept of voice more fully, 
and in what follows I acknowledge an enormous debt to his discussion in the 
chapter entitled "Discourse in the Novel" in The Dialogic Imagination. Never­
theless, to adopt Bakhtin's work entirely means to view the novel only as a site 
of multiple voices. That principle has its uses, but here I want to retain the no­
tion that voice exists alongside character, style, event, setting, and other dis­
tinct elements of narrative. 
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3. Here my interest in voice diverges from that of Peter Elbow, who 
wants to investigate what makes a voice distinctive and personal. His interest 
follows naturally from his purpose of teaching students of writing to develop 
distinctive voices, and I do not think our difference amounts to a serious dis­
agreement. I would just point out that when a writer develops a distinctive 
personal voice or idiolect, he simultaneously develops a relationship to one or 
more sociolects as well. Elbows voice is distinctive—but distinctive within a 
broader sociolect of academic critical discourse. 
4. For a discussion of how style functions relative to other elements of 
narrative, see my Worlds from Words. 
5. Thackeray, Vanity Fair, 666. Hereafter references will be given by page 
numbers in parentheses in the text. The novel was first published serially in 
1847-48 and in book form in 1848. 
6. There are many exceptions, of course. Frequently, episodes cluster to­
gether into larger incidents that make the thematic point. Most noteworthy 
here is the mininarrative surrounding the end of Becky's intrigue with Lord 
Steyne. And given the device of following the same cast of characters, 
Thackeray can, as the narrative progresses, return to material that he has used 
earlier and give it some new uses. He does this recycling most obviously at the 
end of the narrative when Becky shows Amelia the letter George wrote her 
before Waterloo and when Becky reattaches herself to Jos. For a somewhat 
different account of the pattern of organization, see Burch. 
7. This point in a sense builds upon the case that Juliet McMaster has 
made for the importance of the Showman's commentary. 
8. For some worthwhile studies of Thackeray's technique along lines dif­
ferent from the ones I am developing here, see Tillotson, Loofburrow, 
Wheatley, Sinha, Scarry, and Ferris. 
9. In A Rhetoric ofIrony, Wayne C. Booth has persuasively argued that all 
irony involves victims—or at least potential victims: those people who don't 
get it. The difference between Thackeray's ironic one-upmanship and, say, 
Austen's treatment of Mrs. Bennet is that Austen's narrator, unlike the Show­
man, never gives us ironic commentary about Mrs. Bennet that also announces 
her own superiority. Indeed, although Austen's narrator frequently speaks 
ironically, she rarely gives direct ironic commentary in her own voice about 
any character but instead uses the irony to establish norms that can undercut a 
character's speech (quoted or reported) or behavior. She is not showing off at 
the character's expense the way Thackeray sometimes appears to do. 
10. G. Armour Craig argues that in many cases the narrator's coyness about 
Becky's guilt, e.g., in her relationship with Lord Steyne, adds to the complexity 
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of the issue. McMaster makes a similar point. As will become clear, I do not 
think the coyness works that way in this passage. 
Chapter 3 
1. I borrow the term from Wayne C. Booth, who uses distance in The 
Rhetoric ofFiction to denote the relations between unreliable narrators and im­
plied authors. 
2. See Reynolds, Hemingway's First War, 56; and Oldsey, Hemingway's Hid­
den Craft, 64. 
3. Behind this sentence is the assumption, now somewhat familiar to read­
ers of this book, that in reading a fictionalized narrative we are asked to join 
two distinct audiences—the narrative audience that exists on the same fictional 
plane as the narrator and the authorial audience that seeks to understand the 
whole communication from the author, including the functions of the narra­
tive audience. The question about voice here is tied up with a question about 
how the authorial audience is asked to relate to its simultaneous participation 
in the narrative audience. For more on these audiences, see Rabinowitz, 
"Truth in Fiction.' 
4. For a discussion along different lines of Frederic's "retrospective narra­
tion,*' see Nagel. 
5. For more on this point, see Hamburger and Fleishman. 
6. There are, of course, a few occasions when Frederic shifts from past to 
present and speaks with the vision he has at the time of narration: most notably 
when he talks about the priest knowing what he (Frederic) "was always able to 
forget" and when he articulates his knowledge of how the world kills every­
one. But the vision and voice of these passages do not carry over into the rest 
of the narration, and they do not indicate that he has become a self-conscious 
narrator. 
7. For further discussion of the passage, see Reading People, Reading Plots, 
177, 184-85. 
8. For another view on chapters 38 to 40, see Robert Lewis, Hemingway on 
Love. 
9. The binary opposite of paralipsis is paralepsis, a narration defined by 
Prince as one "giving more information . . . than should presumably be given 
in terms of the focalization code governing a narrative." I consider paralepsis in 
my discussion of Nick Carraway's narration in chapter 5 below. 
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Chapter 4 
1. One of the more overt elements of this scene and, indeed, of the whole 
opening is the emphasis on Butler as an aging jockey. But I have chosen to fo­
cus on what I see Hemingway communicating just beneath this overt level, 
things like the discrepancy between the sweating while working out and failing 
to sweat while riding, which seem to me not fully explainable by Butler's age. 
2. Joe's final sentence can also be read as applying to his father: he's lost his 
life, and now they're taking his reputation from him, too. But the main "guy'' 
"they" have started on and left with nothing is Joe. The bettors' negative words 
hurt Joe, not his father. Gardner's words are an effort to comfort Joe. Joe's "But 
I don't know" indicates that he cannot take comfort in these words. Why? Be­
cause "they" have started on him and "they don't leave a guy nothing.'' 
3. See especially Seymour Chatman's essays in Coming to Terms entitled 
"The 'Rhetoric' of'Fiction'" and "A New Point of View on 'Point of View.'" 
For an argument focused on the limits of the structuralists' interest in sharp di­
visions between story and discourse, see Harry Shaw's "Loose Narrators.1' 
4. The final sentences are in present tense rather than in the past. But the 
lack of any bridge in the narration from past to present indicates that the 
present tense functions to convey Joe's continuing loss of faith in his father 
rather than an insight that his telling the story has suddenly led him to. That is, 
if we ask, when does Joe lose his firm belief in his father, the answer is after he 
has heard the bettors' words. And if we ask, why does Hemingway shift to the 
present tense, the answer is that he wants to show Joe still feeling the effects of 
the experience, something he couldn't do as effectively if he had Joe stay in the 
past: "But I didn't know. Seemed like once they got started they don't leave a 
guy nothing." 
5. For more on mimesis as conventional, see chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 
1. The trajectory of the commentary on Nick's reliability is itself worthy of 
analysis. In The Rhetoric ofFiction, Wayne Booth cited Nick as an example of a 
"thoroughly reliable" first-person narrator. But since then, Nick has been seen 
as more and more unreliable. See, for example, Donaldson, Cartwright, and 
especially Lockridge. Of these essays, I find Donaldson's to be the most illumi­
nating, though his approach is very different from mine. 
2. Although he does not comment on this segment of the narrative, Ron 
Neuhaus notes Fitzgerald's effort to have Nick speak as an "omniscient I" in 
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the latter part of the book, and he finds that the split between the ironic Nick 
and the omniscient Nick creates an incoherent effect. 
3. Lockridge, to his credit, is scrupulous enough to acknowledge that 
Nick's unreliability is such that we cannot know for sure that this buried plot is 
the real one, and so he thematizes the puzzle in his statement that "The Great 
Gatsby embodies a modern predicament: the belief that it is impossible to see 
or know anything absolutely" (179). 
4. In effect, I am at this point building on Dorrit Cohn's work on conso­
nant and dissonant narration (that is, narration in which the homodiegetic nar­
rator identifies with the character and that in which the homodiegetic narrator 
judges the character). My point is that the reasons for mixing consonant and 
dissonant narration may have less to do with the character's ability to view his 
or her past than with the implied author's need to move between presenting 
the narrator as self-aware and presenting the character as acting in such and 
such a way. My discussion of Nick below should clarify this point further. 
5. For an excellent recent example of such ideological critique, one that in­
cludes a fine discussion of Fitzgerald's representation of Daisy, see Tyson. 
6. Again, it is important to point out that the logic of the narrative sets up 
the female character, this time Jordan, to be the site of evil and temptation. 
Chapter 6 
1. Mary Ann Dazey points out that the title is doubly ambiguous: the refer­
ent of sharer might be Leggatt or the captain, and secret can be either an adjec­
tive modifying sharer or a part of a noun-noun compound analogous to such 
phrases as Conrad aficionado or pizza lover. 
2. For a good discussion of the importance of titles in influencing readers' 
expectations, see Rabinowitz's Before Reading, 47-65. 
3. For an extended treatment of the ethical dimensions of writing and read­
ing narrative, see Booth, The Company We Keep. 
4. It is this feature of the technique, I believe, that leads even such a percep­
tive critic as Steven Ressler to remark, "There is no retrospective sense, no 
time gap between the original events and their recounting" (97). In other 
words, though Ressler's claim runs counter to the narrator's remark about the 
"distance of years," it does capture the narrator's practice of presenting the 
events without commentary from his older, seemingly more mature self. 
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5. Keith Carabine finds documentary evidence to support the view that 
Conrad wrote the story between December 3 and December 15, 1909. 
6. In this connection, it is worth noting that, despite considerable debate 
about the captain's decision to protect Leggatt, most critics assume that, on the 
axis of values at least, the captain is a reliable narrator. Noteworthy exceptions 
are Troy and Murphy. 
7. Identifying a subtext always has the attraction of making us feel that we 
are especially astute readers, the ones who "get it,1' as opposed to, say, the be­
nighted narrator and those flesh-and-blood readers who remain tied to the 
view of the narrative audience, unable to join us in the authorial. Before de­
claring that a possible subtext is part of the authorial design, it is helpful to re­
member that this attraction is quite strong and that the search for subtexts, if 
conducted with sufficient ingenuity, can almost always turn up a delicious 
finding. In other words, we may sometimes decide that some of what we catch 
as we go fishing under the overt text should be thrown back. 
8. Other possible hidden meanings are suggested by Johnson and Garber's 
wonderful, playful essay exemplifying the strategies of psychoanalytic inter­
pretation. 
9. For more on this moment, see Johnson and Garber. 
10. The captain himself uses the word queer (in scare quotes)—"I don't 
know whether the steward had told them that I was 'queer' only, or downright 
drunk" (121)—but, as far as I have been able to determine, this word did not 
have the associations with homosexuality in 1909 that it does in contemporary 
usage. 
11. In "Betraying the Sender," Peter J. Rabinowitz has argued that some 
texts that contain secrets—his main example is Nella Larsen's Passing—are 
"fragile" because their appeal depends on their creation of two authorial audi­
ences, one that does not get the secret and one that does. Once the secret be­
comes generally known, the power and appeal of the texts is, if not entirely 
lost, then altered. His essay offers a fascinating exploration of the ethics of 
teaching fragile texts. I do not think that "The Secret Sharer" is a fragile text in 
Rabinowitz's sense because I think that its power and appeal remain even after 
the secret is revealed. Furthermore, as will become clearer in the next section 
of this essay, I also think that this particular secret is only a part of the text's 
power and appeal. 
12. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Elizabeth Preston, Su­
san Swinford, Mark Conroy, Peter J. Rabinowitz, and Rick Livingston on an 
earlier version of this essay. 
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Chapter 7 
1. A full analysis of the audience positions would also include some account 
of how the implied reader's position is part of the text's play with audience, 
but for purposes of clarity, I have not presented that part of the analysis (and, 
indeed, the text hardly deserves such attention). 
2. For important earlier work on the technique, see Morrissette and 
Hopkins and Perkins. See also the recent special issue of Style (28, no. 3 
[1994]), guest-edited by Monika Fludernik, devoted to second-person narra­
tive, in which the present essay initially appeared. 
In a sense, the theoretical section of this essay is also a revision of my discus­
sion of the relation between narrative and characterized audiences in chapter 5 
of Reading People, Reading Plots. 
3. Although the sex of the "you" at this point in the narrative is not defini­
tively marked, it soon will be: at a wedding, his mother "will introduce you 
as his girl" (56). For more detailed commentary on this beginning, see 
Richardson. 
4. In "The Narratee Revisited," Prince admits that in the earlier essay, he 
"too often conflated" narratee, addressee, and receiver (302). To avoid a simi­
lar conflation here, I have included the alternative terms for these concepts. As 
Prince explains, "The narratee constitutes a special case of the enunciatee (to 
adapt GreiirQssian terminology): it is the enunciatee—the encoded or in­
scribed 'you'—in a narrative text and it may or may not coincide with the os­
tensible addressee of that text and/or with the receiver of it: thus, I might 
explicitly address a narrative to X but (consciously or unconsciously) inscribe 
Y as a "you' in it and (accidentally or not) Z may turn out to be its actual re­
ceiver" (302). In Lolita, for example, Humbert Humbert explicitly addresses 
(at least initially) a judge and jury; but by the end, Lolita herself is inscribed as 
his main audience, and John Ray Jr. turns out to be the actual receiver. Al­
though this delineation of the different readerly roles increases the precision of 
our analysis, it also runs the risk of creating a terminological tangle around ad­
dressee when we discuss second-person narration. To avoid the tangle, I shall 
hereafter follow Prince's model and use enunciatee to designate the narratee and 
reserve addressee for the implied reader. 
5. Whether this view of the authorial audience's beliefs can be demon­
strated or not, the larger point is that our decision about where to locate the be­
lief does have consequences for our understanding of the effects Bronte is after. 
In Wuthering Heights, by contrast, I would contend that Emily Bronte asks her 
authorial audience to view the supernatural events—the life after death of first 
Catherine and then Heathcliff—as genuinely possible. This demand on the ac­
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tual reader is one reason so many people find the book both powerful and 
strange. Just how Wuthering Heights communicates this demand is a complex 
matter that would take a separate essay to demonstrate; for now, let me just say 
that the unreliable Lockwood's commonsense faith in the impossibility of the 
life after death is one important (though not, of course, sufficient) indicator. 
6. Note the similarity between structuralism's implied reader and rhetorical 
theory's authorial audience. These two concepts are largely interchangeable. 
7. This is the insight upon which Robyn Warhol builds her useful study of 
"distancing" and "engaging" narrative address in nineteenth-century British 
fiction. 
8. Although my primary concern here is with second-person narration, I 
intend the point about the complementarity of narratee, narrative audience, 
and ideal narrative audience to be useful when talking about homodiegetic and 
heterodiegetic narration as well. To take just two examples: in Lardner's 
"Haircut," Whitey's narratee is the customer in the barber chair; in the narra­
tive audience, we observe the haircut and the storytelling, and we recognize 
that Whitey assumes the customer is the ideal audience simply because the 
customer is a man from out of town. This recognition, in turn, helps character­
ize Whitey and helps distance our position in the narrative audience from the 
position Whitey attributes to his ideal audience. In LordJim, the shifting of 
narratees and the difficulty of determining Marlow's ideal narrative audience 
are both crucial parts of the narrative audience's experience, because they sig­
nify how much the narrative is about Marlow's effort to tell Jim's story in a way 
that will then enable him to come to terms with it. 
In chapter 5 oiReading People, Reading Plots, devoted primarily to Calvino's 
If on a winter's night a traveler, I discuss the narratees in "Haircut," LordJim, If on 
a winter's night, and a few other texts as examples of what I call a "characterized 
audience" and distinguished them from the narrative audience. Although I 
still find that those designations are helpful, I believe that employing the con­
cepts of narratee, narrative audience, and ideal narrative audience as comple­
mentary allows for a fuller and more precise account of the narrative discourse 
of these texts. 
9. This formulation has much in common with Wayne Booth's concept of 
coduction. See The Company We Keep, 70-75 and passim. One of the Press 
readers for this book suggests that I am "overly impressed" with Moore and is 
not entirely sure that the genuine emotion I find in the story is there to be 
found. These comments strike me as the basis for a productive coduction; to 
the case that I make in the body of this essay, I will only add here that my gen­
eral effort as a flesh-and-blood reader is to adopt an attitude of generosity to­
ward implied authors. Whether I am overly generous to Moore is a judgment 
210 Notes to Chapter 8 
that I will continue to question—and something I hope to get some advice 
about from other readers. 
10. The story is working against the standard "happily ever after" hetero­
sexual romance narrative. Whether gay and lesbian readers will be able to 
move easily into the enunciatee position is, I think, highly debatable. The les­
bian reader, however, may find it easy to join Moore's authorial audience to 
the extent that they will be inclined to read against the imperatives of the self-
help genre ("Begin by meeting him in a class"). 
11. For helpful commentary on this essay, I am grateful to Jane Greer and 
especially Peter J. Rabinowitz. 
Chapter 8 
1. One feature of the debates about political correctness that seems to 
have remained is the practice of referring to these debates as the "culture 
wars." I have refrained from that practice here because I think that the war 
metaphor itself helps generate more heat than light; it encourages people to 
think of themselves as fixed in one camp or another, and it encourages them to 
demonize those who disagree with them (their so-called enemies). Although I 
have deep disagreements with D'Souza, I have no interest in making him a de­
mon, and I respect his own efforts to refrain from ad hominem arguments. 
2. D'Souza writes 762 footnotes, citing university reports, campus news­
papers, university press books, metropolitan dailies, weekly and monthly 
magazines, and scholarlyjournals. 
3. Atwater's ad also has the important function of combatting George 
Bush's negative image as a "wimp" by projecting it onto Dukakis—but that 
dimension of the ad is part of another narrative. 
4. Stanley Fish has long promoted the view that in literary criticism there 
are no facts independent of interpretation, and he has often seemed interested 
in extending this claim to the world at large. Yet, in one of the essays he wrote 
for his series of debates with D'Souza, he goes to great pains to argue that there 
are facts that all interpreters should recognize and that some of these facts refute 
some of D'Souza's claims. See "Speaking in Code, or, How to Turn Bigotry 
and Ignorance into Moral Principles," esp. 94-98, in There's No Such Thing as 
Free Speech. 
See also Gerald Graffs argument for the way that arguments such as 
D'Souza's have highlighted problems in theorists' commitments to and under­
standings of certain elements of poststructuralist theory. 
Many antifoundationalist philosophers have been arguing that there are 
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no facts outside of some discursive framework for constituting them. I find that 
this description does not quite capture the complex relation between facts and 
interpretations. While I agree that any fact is a fact relative to some discursive 
framework, it seems to me that the significant larger conclusion is not that 
there are no facts independent of interpretations (Fish's position) but that there 
are a plurality of facts, each of which has its intelligibility within its own sys­
tem. Thus, although it would be possible to redescribe, say, the cases of 
Dolfman and Schaub within a system of intelligibility that interpreted their be­
havior as a system of neurons firing, that description would not be in competi­
tion with the descriptions that D'Souza offers. The coexistence of different 
facts demonstrates the plurality of our ways of conceiving of those facts, not 
their lack of existence. 
5. Of course, the ways in which any particular narrative rises above the 
contestation and achieves a widespread acceptance are many and complicated, 
involving such things as the relation between one's power to speak, the skill­
fulness with which one tells the narrative, and the audience's assumptions 
about the speaker's position. In short, to say that we must make our stands on 
the truth as we see it is not to suggest that those truths will necessarily prevail. I 
know that in the marketplace of ideas there is no such thing as the free, disin­
terested play of the best and truest that has been thought and said. 
Chapter 9 
1. Morrison's novel, in the short time since its publication, has already at­
tracted a significant number of very fine interpretive essays. In addition to the 
essays by Horvitz, Wilt, House, Rigney, Rushdy, and Wyatt that I draw upon 
here because they most directly address the question of Beloved's identity, see 
also Finney, Holloway, Henderson, Schapiro, and the five essays published 
together in the autumn 1992 issue of African American Review by Bell, 
Demetrakopoulos, Page, Sale, and Sitter. 
2. None of the numerous essays on Beloved I have read shows any signifi­
cant debt to reader-response theory. One of the very attractive features of 
Steig's fine book is how tightly he connects the experience of reading and the 
act of interpretation. Rabinowitz, as his title suggests, is primarily interested in 
the conventions that influence the experience of reading. Crosman is con­
cerned with the different frames that we can bring to the act of interpretation. 
The contributors to Flynn and Schweikart's collection offer a variety of per­
spectives on the difference gender makes in reading. 
3. That Scholes's book won the NCTE's David Russell Award I would 
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like to read as a sign of both its excellence and a wide acceptance of its views. 
In his more recent Protocols of Reading, Scholes redescribes interpretation as 
having both centripetal (in toward the text and its intentionality) and centrifu­
gal movements (out toward the reader and her subjectivity); in making the 
space for the centrifugal, he allows more play for the reader's response, yet 
stops far short of locating interpretation in experience. His 1993 essay, "Re­
sponsible Extravagance: Reading after Post-Structuralism,' calls for an even 
greater license to the reader's ingenuity. For a fuller discussion of the model 
Scholes sets forth in Textual Power, including some reservations about its heavy 
reliance on repetitions and oppositions, see my Reading People, Reading Plots. 
4. The typical code consists of (1) categories that organize the numerous 
signals in the language of the text into fewer, more general units and (2) rules 
for combining the categories. Sometimes the categories are provided by the 
text (e.g., "rememory' or "claiming one's freedom" or "'circling" in Beloved); 
sometimes they are provided by an interpretive system the critic brings to all 
texts (e.g., object relations; gender and power; dialogism); and sometimes they 
are provided by some combination of text and interpretive system (call and re­
sponse; maternity and slavery). The critic then employs the rules for combin­
ing the categories and seeks to develop a coherent and comprehensive account 
of how the text's language (or at least some significant subset of that language) 
can be understood as signifying a particular set of meanings. 
Standard accounts of interpretive adequacy such as those in Booth and 
Hirsch usually include a criterion of "precision" or "correspondence" in addi­
tion to comprehensiveness and coherence. I do not include it here because, 
unlike them, I am not trying to establish the philosophical grounds of interpre­
tive adequacy but to describe what practical critics generally do under the um­
brella of interpretation. For the same reason, I will not try to sort out—and 
create a hierarchy among—different notions of comprehensiveness, coher­
ence, or precision. 
For similar and fuller descriptions of interpretation along the lines I've 
sketched here, see Steven Mailloux's essay on the term in McLaughlin and 
Lentricchia, and Rabinowitz's discussion in the chapter in Before Reading called 
"Starting Points.' 
5. Stanley Fish, among others, has argued that at any one time the institu­
tion of criticism will sanction only a limited number of translation schemes (or 
in Fish's language, interpretive communities). Fish's point here, whatever res­
ervations one might have about his larger account of the profession (see 
Battersby), is descriptively accurate. My point is that interpretation is poten­
tially, not actually, infinite. 
6. I recognize that this statement is open to the objection that such critics, 
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having been trained in a certain way, are in fact basing their interpretations on 
their reading responses, that, for example, they read with a knowledge of the 
cultural networks they trace in their interpretations and so respond accord­
ingly. Objection sustained—and indeed, I have tried to account for this possi­
bility in my description of reading. But my point here is that the ground of the 
appeal in, say, Stephen Greenblatt's interpretation of King Lear in Shakespearean 
Negotiations, is not at all to the act of reading or viewing the play, but rather on 
his work of contextualizing and analogizing. His claim is not at all about how it 
feels to be in the audience at the Globe, but very much about what the play can 
be said to mean in its cultural moment. I admire his work, but want to ask a dif­
ferent question: what happens when we ground our interpretations in the act of 
reading? 
7. The approach I am advocating here has links with the reader-response 
criticism of Iser and Rosenblatt and with the rhetorical poetics associated with 
Chicago School criticism. But I am more interested in the affective dimen­
sions of reading than Iser or Rosenblatt, and I depart from the Chicago 
School's treatment of the reader as, ultimately, a property of the text. 
8. For a lively argument that recalcitrance itself is the basis of literary form 
and quality, see Wright. I find much of Wright's argument to be appealing, 
but I stop short of accepting his strongest claims, which seem to make recalci­
trance not just a means but also the purpose of literary form. 
9. The category of the stubborn clearly has some affinities with the 
deconstructive notion of unreadability, especially as it has been developed by 
Paul de Man's rigorous analyses. But I take the concept of the stubborn in a di­
rection different from the one in which he takes the notion of unreadability. 
Where his rhetorical concerns focus on the figures of the text, mine move to 
questions of author-reader relations. Where his unreadability leads to the 
mise-en-abyme, my stubbornness leads to a paradoxical functionality within a 
larger system of what can be read (as I try to demonstrate below). 
10. The fourth sentence reads, "For years each put up with the spite in his 
own way, but by 1873 Sethe and her daughter Denver were its only victims" 
(3), suggesting 1873 as the present. Then, in dating the departures of Howard 
and Buglar from 124, the narrator says, "Ohio had been calling itself a state 
only seventy years when first one brother and then the next stuffed quilt pack­
ing into his hat, snatched up his shoes, and crept away from the lively spite the 
house felt for them" (3). Since Ohio became a state in 1803, this sentence puts 
their departure in 1873, which could still fit with that fourth sentence. On the 
next page, the narrator says first that "Baby Suggs died shortly after the broth­
ers left" and then that Denver "was ten and still mad at Baby Suggs for dying" 
(4). So Denver appears to have been born in 1863. Later in the chapter, in 
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present time, Sethe says to Paul D that Baby Suggs has been dead "Eight years 
now. Almost nine,' which suddenly jumps the present action to 1891. That 
would fit with our learning that Denver is eighteen, but of course later we 
learn that Denver was born in 1855 during Sethe's escape from Sweet Home, 
so the present action must be occurring in 1873. And indeed, after the first 
chapter all the signals point to 1873—74 as the time of the narrative's present 
action. 
11. Later on Morrison gives inconsistent evidence about how long Sethe 
was at 124 before schoolteacher arrives: sometimes she says three weeks, other 
times four. Since these dates often come through a character's stream of con­
sciousness, 1 believe that this inconsistency can be read as functional in its dem­
onstration of the interaction of history and memory. 
12. Introducing this distinction between the difficult and the stubborn or, 
more precisely, introducing a category called "the stubborn" (the difficult has 
long been our stock in trade) is not without its own potential problems. One 
critic's example of stubbornness will be another's instance of mild difficulty. 
The category of the stubborn could easily become a wastebasket into which 
tired critics—or those facing deadlines—toss their recalcitrant data. But the 
abuse of a thing is no argument against it. Like all interpretive hypotheses, 
claims about the stubborn will be subject to the scrutiny of other interpreters; 
those that wither under such scrutiny will turn out to be, well, not so stubborn 
after all. Furthermore, given the pride of place currently accorded to the ability 
to produce innovative close readings, I doubt that critics will rush to proclaim 
any given textual phenomenon as an instance of the stubborn. The risks of be­
ing wrong are too great. If another critic shows that what I take to be the stub­
born is actually the difficult, then I am in the embarrassing position of having 
to admit that I have not read closely enough. I am less worried about the pos­
sible abuses of the concept than I am hopeful about its potential to advance the 
cause of tightening the connections between the experience of reading and the 
activity of interpretation. 
13. The key difference between narrative and authorial audiences at this 
juncture of Beloved is that the narrative audience believes in the reality of the 
character and events while the authorial audience knows that it is reading fic­
tion. See Rabinowitz's "Truth in Fiction. 
Glossary

This glossary seeks to define, with clarity and concision, the set of terms and 
concepts fundamental to my understanding of narrative as rhetoric. In most 
cases, there are fuller discussions of these concepts, including information 
about their sources, in the preceding essays. It is my hope that opting for lean­
ness here will, in combination with the fuller discussions in the essays, best 
serve the goal of clarity. My definitions of narratological terms such as paralipsis 
and paralepsis are inflected by my commitment to the rhetorical approach; for 
more formal narratological definitions, see Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of 
Narratology. 
addressee the audience to whom an utterance is directed. When the 
speaker is the narrator, the addressee is the narratee; when the speaker is the 
implied author, the addressee is the implied reader or authorial audience; 
when the speaker is the flesh-and-blood author, the addressee is the flesh-and­
blood audience. 
antifoundationalism the philosophical position that maintains there are no 
universal or fundamental truths, no bedrock assumptions upon which to base a 
metaphysics. The version of antifoundationalism I consider in the introduc­
tion holds that all truths are constructed by our discourse. 
authorial audience the hypothetical, ideal audience for whom the author 
constructs the text and who understands it perfectly. The authorial audience of 
fiction, unlike the narrative audience (defined below), operates with the tacit 
knowledge that the characters and events are synthetic constructs rather than 
real people and historical happenings. The term is synonymous with implied 
reader. 
authorial intention the meaning and purpose of an utterance as designed 
by its author. It is much easier to define the term than to identify all the differ­
ent stances critics and theorists have taken regarding the concept. 
autodiegetic narration the telling of a story by its protagonist. See also 
homodiegetic narration and heterodiegetic narration. 
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character an element of narrative that has three simultaneous compo­
nents—the mimetic (character is like a person), the thematic (any character is 
representative of one or more groups and functions in one way or another to 
advance the narrative's thematic concerns), and the synthetic (character plays a 
specific role in the construction of narrative as made object). 
coduction the production of interpretation or evaluation through conver­
sation with other readers. 
dialogism the presence of multiple voices within a narrative and their rela­
tionships. See also double-voicing. 
(the) difficult textual phenomena that initially provide some recalcitrance 
to interpretation but are designed to be interpreted. See also the stubborn and 
the erroneous. 
dimensions and functions the attributes of a character that create the po­
tential for signification within the progression are dimensions. The realization 
of that potential creates functions. On the mimetic level, an attribute is a trait; 
when one trait combines with others to form a portrait of a possible person, 
that mimetic dimension is participating in a mimetic function. On the the­
matic level, an attribute is a trait considered as representative (e.g., a character's 
race) or as an idea (e.g., a character's belief in the supernatural); when the pro­
gression turns in some way on the presence of this trait, then it is being 
thematized or, more formally, the thematic dimension becomes a thematic 
function. On the synthetic level, dimensions are always functions because di­
mensions are always already parts of the construction of the narrative. The syn­
thetic functions can, however, be more or less foregrounded; in realistic 
narrative, they tend to remain in the background; in metafictional narrative, 
they tend to move to the foreground. 
discourse the set of devices for telling a story, including vision (who sees), 
voice (who speaks), duration (how long it takes something to be told), fre­
quency (whether something is told in singulative or iterative manner), and 
speed (how much story time is covered by a stretch of discourse). In structural­
ist narratology, discourse is regarded as the "how'' of narrative, distinct from 
the "what"—character, event, and setting. 
distance the relation between the norms of an implied author and those of a 
narrator. Distance will always be greater in unreliable narration than in reliable 
narration. 
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double-voicing the presence of (at least) two voices in one utterance. In 
unreliable narration, for example, we hear both the narrator's voice and the 
implied author's voice undermining the narrator's. 
enunciatee the audience directly addressed in second-person narration. See 
also addressee. 
(the) erroneous textual phenomena that fall outside the larger pattern of a 
text's design (e.g., Morrison's giving two dates for the present time action in 
the first chapter ofBeloved). 
fabula the "what" of narrative before it is rendered in discourse; the se­
quence of events in chronological order. 
formalism an approach to literature that assumes that its meaning is to be 
found in the specific features of the text itself rather than in the author's con­
sciousness, the reader, history, or other so-called extrinsic factors. 
foundationalism a philosophic position that seeks to ground truth and 
meaning in some fixed, transcendent concept; Descartes's "cogjto, ergo sum' 
is a classic instance of foundational thinking. 
heterodiegetic narration in which the narrator exists at a different level of 
(fictional) existence from the characters. Omniscient third-person narration, 
for example, is heterodiegetic. 
homodiegetic narration in which the narrator exists at the same level of ex­
istence as the characters. The Great Gatsby is an example of homodiegetic nar­
ration. When the character-narrator is also the protagonist, as in A Farewell to 
Arms, the homodiegetic narration can be further specified as autodiegetic. 
ideal narrative audience the hypothetical, ideal audience for whom the 
narrator is writing. See also narratee and narrative audience. 
implied author the consciousness responsible for the choices that create 
the narrative text as "these words in this order'' and that imbues the text with 
his or her values. One important activity of rhetorical reading is constructing a 
sense of the implied author. 
implied reader the audience for whom the implied author writes; synony­
mous with the authorial audience. 
instabilities and tensions unstable situations upon which narrative pro­
gressions are built. Narrative moves by the generation, complication, and 
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(sometimes) resolution of instabilities and tensions. An instability is an unstable 
situation within the story: it may be between characters; between a character 
and his or her world; or within a single character. A tension is an unstable situ­
ation within the discourse, consisting typically of a discrepancy in knowledge, 
judgments, values, or beliefs between narrator and authorial audience or be­
tween implied author and authorial audience. 
lyric a genre in which situations, feelings, ideas, or actions are presented as 
significant in themselves and worthy of the audience's contemplation rather 
than for the audience's judgment. 
mimetic/mimesis mimetic refers to that component of character directed 
to its imitation of a possible person. It also refers to that component of fictional 
narrative concerned with imitating the world beyond the fiction, what we 
typically call reality. Mimesis refers to the process by which the mimetic effect 
is produced, the set of conventions, which change over time, by which imita­
tions are judged to be more or less adequate. 
monologism single-voiced and thus single-minded and single-valued dis­
course; discourse not open to alternative views. 
narratee the audience directly addressed by the narrator; the narratee may or 
may not coincide with the ideal narrative audience. 
narrative in rhetorical terms, the act of somebody telling somebody else on 
a particular occasion for some purpose that something happened. 
narrative audience the observer role within the world of the fiction, taken 
on by the flesh-and-blood reader in that part of his or her consciousness which 
treats the fictional action as real. The narrative audience position, like the 
narratee position, is subsumed within the authorial audience position. 
narratology the theoretical movement, rooted in structuralism, whose goal 
is to define the essence of narrative as a mode of discourse, to describe its fun­
damental structure and to delineate the nature of its particular elements—au­
thor, narrator, narratee, character, event, setting, and so on. 
narrator the teller of the story. 
paralepsis a device in which a narrator's discourse reflects a greater knowl­
edge than he or she could presumably have; in other words, a device in which 
the narrator tells more than he or she knows. 
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paralipsis a device in which a narrator's discourse does not reflect his or her 
full relevant knowledge; in other words, a device in which the narrator tells 
less than he or she knows. 
poststructuralism a theoretical movement, marked by a general commit­
ment to antifoundationalism, focusing on the instability of language, the cul­
tural constructedness of all categories, including those previously thought to 
be natural, and the plurality and fragmentation of the subject. 
pragmatism/neopragmatism a philosophic position arising out of 
antifoundationalism, which views truth and meaning as the product of our be­
liefs and our discourse about the world and its entities. 
progression the movement of a narrative from beginning to end and the 
principles governing that movement. Progression exists along two simulta­
neous axes: the internal logic of the narrative text and the set of responses that 
logic generates in the authorial audience as it reads from beginning to end. 
Though this description focuses on the movement of narrative through time 
from beginning to end, a concern with progression is more than a concern 
with narrative as a linear process, precisely because it recognizes the dynamic, 
recursive relationships among the authorial audience's understanding of be­
ginning, middle, and end. 
recalcitrance a resistance by textual phenomena to interpretation. See also 
difficult, erroneous, and stubborn. 
reliable and unreliable narration reliable narration is that in which the 
narrator's report of facts and rendering of judgments are in accord with the 
perspective and norms of the implied author. Unreliable narration is that in 
which the narrator's report of facts differs from the implied author's or in 
which the narrator's judgments about the events or characters differ from the 
implied author's. This second kind of unreliability is more frequent. 
sjuzhet the fabula rendered in a specific narrative discourse; the synthesis of 
story and discourse. 
story the what of narrative: character, events, and setting are parts of story; 
the events in chronological order constitute the story abstracted from the 
discourse. 
structuralism the theoretical movement devoted to uncovering the basic 
structures underlying cultural discourses from literature to fashion. Structural­
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ism took Saussure's analysis of language in A Course in General Linguistics as its 
model and tried to find correspondences between the structures of these other 
discourses and the structure of language as described by Saussure. 
(the) stubborn textual recalcitrance designed not to yield to interpretation 
yet nevertheless contributing to the text's overall design. 
synthetic that component of character directed to its role as artificial con­
struct in the larger construction of the text; more generally, the con­
structedness of a text as an object. 
thematic that component of character directed to its representative or ide­
ational function; more generally, that component of a narrative text concerned 
with making statements, taking ideological positions, teaching readers truths. 
voice the synthesis of a speaker's style, tone, and values. 
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